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

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
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Bosnia and the West

A Study in Failure

Noel Malcolm

THE WESTERN WORLD'S reaction to the destruction of Bosnia has been a triumph of diplomacy. A triumph, that is, of diplomacy over foreign policy. The sky has been dark with airplanes shuttling statesmen and their entourages between London, Paris, Washington and Geneva. Meetings have been held, deferred and reconvened; pieces of paper have been signed, and declarations made to the television cameras. And yet, in spite of all this—or rather, to a large extent, because of all this—the killing and destruction in Bosnia have continued unabated.

A crude but adequate account of the difference between diplomacy and foreign policy might go as follows. The sign of successful diplomacy is that all parties can come out of a meeting feeling that their interests have been respected. The sign of successful foreign policy is that one party can come out of the meeting knowing that its own interests have been advanced. Diplomacy seeks to assuage, to conciliate, to reassure: the end-state at which it aims is a psychological one. Foreign policy, on the other hand, has concrete aims: to make things happen which are in a country's own interest, or stop things happening which are frustrating it.

On Bosnia, Western governments were from the outset unsure about what their own policy interests were. Insofar as they had some general guiding principles (the need for "stability" in south-eastern Europe, the wish to avoid setting precedents for other parts of the former communist world, the desire to maintain good relations with Russia), they failed to apply them correctly. Indeed, they managed (as will be discussed below) to achieve almost systematically the opposite of those aims. But their primary activity was always diplomacy, negotiation and conciliation. To give just one crucial example: in the summer of 1992, after the first reports and pictures had emerged of Serb-run concentration camps in northern Bosnia, a wave of public concern gave many of the Western governments the feeling that "something must be done." At this point, the obvious thing to do was to convene a special meeting of American, EC, and NATO governments (with perhaps one or two pro-Western Muslim powers as well), hammer out a joint policy, and agree on ways of implementing it. Instead of this, a conference was held in London during August 1992 to which a huge range of countries was invited, including all the Balkan states and all the parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They were politely asked to settle their differences, which of course they failed to do. All that the West had achieved was to advertise its own lack of clear policy objectives—and, by the

Noel Malcolm is a political columnist for the London *Daily Telegraph*. His book, *Bosnia: A Short History*, was published by New York University Press last year, and reviewed by Warren Zimmermann in the Fall 1994 issue of *The National Interest*.

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same token, to show that it had no preferences of its own when it came to judging between the competing claims of the attackers and defenders in Bosnia's war.

A Failure to Understand

AT THIS POINT, the two basic failures of the West on the Bosnian issue become so closely entwined as to be almost inseparable. One is a failure (largely, an absence) of policy. The other is a failure of understanding. At no point during the entire Bosnian war have the pronouncements of Western statesmen shown any clear understanding of who made this war happen and why. Although commentators and analysts had been accurately charting the political strategy of the Serbian communist leader, Slobodan Milosevic, since 1988—the takeover of the political machinery in Montenegro and the Vojvodina, the illegal suppression of local government in Kosovo in 1989, the mobilization of nationalist feeling in Serbian public opinion, the slow-moving constitutional coup against the federal presidency, the Serbian economic blockade against Croatia and Slovenia in late 1990, the theft by Serbia that year of billions of dinars from the federal budget, thereby destroying the federal economic reform program, and the incitement and arming of Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia during 1990 and 1991—it was as if the Western governments could see no pattern in these events whatsoever. When Croatia and Slovenia, losing patience with Milosevic's attempts to manipulate the federal Yugoslav system, voted for independence, the West reacted with incomprehension. Until the last moment, in June 1991, politicians from both the EC and the United States were trying hard to persuade the Yugoslav republics to stay together. Then, not long after the Yugoslav Federation had broken apart, they began to comfort themselves instead with the thought that the break-up had been inevitable—something caused not by the particular policies of a man sitting at his desk in Belgrade, but by long-term, impersonal forces of history.

Two theories of historical inevitability were touted, one external, and one internal. The external theory said that the break-up of Yugoslavia had been caused by the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. Quite how or why events in Moscow should have such dramatic effects on Yugoslavia, which since 1948 had been more free of Russian control than any other country in Eastern Europe, was not explained. Nor did the proponents of this theory ever say why it was that Yugoslavia had been plunged into war, while Czechoslovakia, a country so much more directly influenced by the fate of communism in Russia, managed to split itself with all the bloodlessness of a self-dividing amoeba. The main reason for holding this implausible theory about Yugoslavia was not that it rested on historical analysis, but that it carried the comforting (and diplomatically useful) implication that nobody in particular inside the former Yugoslavia was ultimately responsible for the war. And insofar as anyone there was responsible, everyone was equally responsible: they were all merely fulfilling the roles allotted to them by history.

A similar conclusion was drawn from the theory of internal inevitability. This was the theory which said that the driving forces of Yugoslav history were "ancient ethnic hatreds." Lazy politicians who dipped into their history books were able to pick out a few examples of wars and massacres, which they flourished at their audiences with the words: "It was ever thus." In fact, the examples they offered were from the twentieth century, or at most the late nineteenth; they arose mainly from the most untypical episodes in Balkan history, conflicts introduced or exacerbated by forces (such as the Axis invasion) from outside Yugoslavia itself. For most of the rest of the history of those lands, there are no records of Croats killing Serbs because they were Serbs, or vice versa. And even though it was of course true that the killing had been severe during the

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Second World War, it was not obvious why, nearly fifty years later, a population the majority of which had no personal memories of that war should spontaneously rise up to re-enact its horrors.

But the myth of all-consuming "ancient ethnic hatreds" was too convenient for the politicians to ignore. Within days of the Croatian and Slovene declarations of independence in 1991, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd declared, "Yugoslavia was invented in 1919 to solve a problem of different peoples living in the same part of the Balkans with a long history of peoples fighting each other." One British diplomat, Sir Crispin Tickell, breezily announced that there was a history of hatred between the Yugoslav peoples running back "thousands of years"—a remarkable statement, in view of the fact that the Slav peoples are known to have arrived in the Balkans only in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. Prime Minister John Major, meanwhile, managed to combine both the external and the internal theory, when he assured the House of Commons, more than one year after the outbreak of the Bosnian war:

> The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the discipline that that exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia. Once that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds reappeared, and we began to see their consequences when the fighting occurred.

American politicians were not immune to the temptations offered by such catch-all theories. According to the account of the Clinton White House recently published by Elizabeth Drew, at the very time when Warren Christopher was touring Europe (in May 1993) trying to get support for a more active policy on Bosnia, President Clinton became convinced that nothing could be done about the war because it was just an upsurge of "ancient ethnic hatreds." What had convinced him (and Hillary Rodham Clinton, and General Colin Powell) was the book by Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, which, while it says almost nothing about the history of Bosnia, fancifully portrays all the inhabitants of the Balkans as zombie-like creatures out of Bram Stoker, naturally programmed to hate and kill one another. We can only speculate as to what the course of history might have been if, instead of reading Kaplan's book, President Clinton had read the long and critical review of it published in the Summer 1993 issue of *The National Interest*.

The Doctrine of Equivalence

THIS PARTICULAR FAILURE of understanding, shared by statesmen in both Europe and America, was crucial to Western policy (or rather, to the lack of it). It was the perfect counterpart to the West's reliance on mere diplomacy: each reinforced the other. The original sin of diplomacy is its doctrine of equivalence—its assumption that all parties to a conflict must be treated equally, with *prima facie* equal rights and claims. The theory of "ancient ethnic hatreds," conveniently, rendered all parties to the conflict equivalent: the Serbs were expressing ancient Serb hatred, the Muslims ancient Muslim hatred, et cetera, and one bundle of hatred can be no better and no worse than another. At a stroke, attacker and defender were reduced to the same status. The fact that the defender in this war was not just an ethnic group but a democratically-elected government, containing Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, was an unfortunate detail which most Western policymakers tended to elide. (To this day, situation maps issued by the UN Protection Force [Unprofor] in Sarajevo mark Bosnian army positions not as the Bosnian army but as "the Muslims." One wonders whether these maps are ever glimpsed by that battalion of the Bosnian army's Second Corps in Tuzla, which is composed entirely of Serbs.) Indeed, the

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reduction of the Bosnian war to an upwelling of "ancient ethnic hatreds" did not only lower the status of the elected government of that country. It also raised the status of the rebel Serb leadership, who now tended to be regarded not as a gang of ambitious local politicians egged on from Belgrade, but as representative figures, through whom the deep, historic forces of ancient Serb hatred found their natural outlet.

The immediate consequence of this doctrine of equivalence was that Western diplomats and military men conducted their activities in Bosnia on the principle that everyone was more or less equally guilty. "Everybody is to blame for what is happening in Bosnia and Hercegovina," declared Lord Carrington, the EC negotiator, three weeks after the initial Serb attack there, "and as soon as we get the cease-fire, there will be no need to blame anybody." (Time has brought no further illumination to Lord Carrington's thinking on this matter. In an interview at the end of December 1994, he declared, "I don't think any of them are particularly in the wrong. They are all in the wrong. And all have some right on their side.") The military commanders who were sent into Bosnia quickly adopted the same attitude. It was easy for them to do so, because, apparently on principle, they had never been briefed about the origins and underlying political purpose of the war. All they could observe was people fighting, and people breaking cease-fires; and since this happened on both sides of the front line, they declared (like schoolmasters awarding points for good or bad behavior) that both sides were guilty. As the first Unprofor commander in Sarajevo, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, put it in a phrase which was to be widely repeated in official circles, "There is more than enough blame to go around for all sides, with some left over."

Two other damaging consequences of this doctrine of equivalence need to be emphasized. The first is the distorted view it created of the nature of the Bosnian war, and of how to stop it. In the eyes of Western policymakers, this war was not a project engaged in by a set of people with political aims; it was an outbreak of an undifferentiated thing called "violence," which had just sprung up, as a symptom of Bosnia's general malaise, here, there and everywhere. Clausewitz was out; Freud and Jung, as theorists of the death wish and the collective unconscious, were perhaps thought more appropriate. Lacking a political understanding of the origins and nature of the war, the West responded to it not with politics but with therapy. The main aim of our policy, it was frequently said, should be to "reduce the quantity of fighting." The way to do this, it was claimed, was to reduce the quantity of weapons entering the war zone. Nowhere was the failure of understanding more graphically expressed than when politicians such as Britain's Douglas Hurd said that to allow arms into Bosnia would be like putting petrol on the flames. A fire is a single, undifferentiated thing; a war is a conflict between two parties with opposed sets of intentions, in which disparity in arms between them may be just as much (or more) of a stimulus to greater killing than parity.

Only by removing almost all trace of political understanding from their view of the Bosnian war could Western politicians continue to argue about it in this way. And yet that excision was performed, and performed thoroughly. It is hard, for example, to think of a single speech by any British, American, or European politician which has discussed Serbian war aims at any length, or even used the term "war aims" at all. In the absence of such analysis, it is not clear what Western politicians can really mean when they claim that their policies have at least "contained" the conflict within the former Yugoslavia. This is another one of those phrases which relates to images of brush fires or epidemics; but unless the people who use it believe that Milosevic's war aims included the conquest of, say, Hungarian or Austrian territory, they cannot claim that it is their

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own policies which have "contained" the war within the former Yugoslav border.

The Single Most Damaging Instrument

THE ARMS EMBARGO, which flowed as a natural consequence from these misunderstandings and misrepresentations, was the single most damaging instrument of the Western world's policy on Bosnia. Politicians who like to describe their policy as "non-intervention" have, by the means of this embargo, intervened decisively, entrenching the massive military superiority of the force which launched the original attack on Bosnia in April 1992. The application of this embargo to Bosnia was itself a classic illustration of the shortcomings of any doctrine of equivalence. UN diplomats liked using the phrase "even-handed" to describe this embargo, which was indeed applied to Serbia as well. But since Serbia, and its proxy forces in Bosnia, had the stockpiles of the fourth largest army in Europe, while the Bosnian government, on the first day of the war, had no army at all, the effects of this even-handedness were far from equivalent.

By September 1992 it was estimated that the Bosnian government forces had two tanks and two armored personnel carriers (APCs), while the Serb forces had three hundred of the former and two hundred of the latter. The most recent detailed breakdown of forces, compiled by the Croatian General Karl Gorinsek in October 1994, gives the Bosnian army forty-five tanks and thirty APCs, and the Serb forces four hundred tanks and two hundred and fifty APCs. (Serb forces in the UN-controlled areas of Croatia, who now cooperate openly in joint campaigns with the Bosnian Serbs, also have two hundred tanks and one hundred and fifty APCs.) The fact that, even with this imbalance in heavy armor, the Bosnian government forces have managed to hold the front lines almost static for more than two years, is in itself suggestive. What it suggests is that the Bosnian government forces possess certain other advantages—of motivation and morale—over their Serb opponents. This in turn may suggest that if only the Bosnian government troops had had more arms of their own (including anti-tank weapons, and artillery-locating radar), they would have been able not only to hold the front lines, but to inflict defeats on their attackers. In the long term, the Bosnian arms embargo has not so much "reduced the quantity" of fighting as extended its duration.

British and French politicians tend to talk about the embargo as if it were out of their hands—a legal matter, locked up in a UN Security Council resolution which cannot be unpicked. The truth is that the application of this embargo to Bosnia is a matter of policy, not law. The resolution introducing an arms embargo (no. 713) was applied to the whole of Yugoslavia, at Belgrade's request, in September 1991. At that time Bosnia was still part of the Yugoslav state. In April 1992 Bosnia was recognized as a new state, independent and separate from Yugoslavia, and on May 22 it was admitted as a member-state to the United Nations. Yet still the embargo was applied, despite the glaring *prima facie* conflict between this application and Bosnia's right of self-defense under international law. On what basis was the decision made to continue the embargo in this way? The answer is that in late December 1991, when the UN secretary-general was considering the implications of recognizing Croatia, he wrote to the UN-appointed negotiator, Cyrus Vance, asking whether it would be advisable to keep up the arms embargo against any ex-Yugoslav republic. Vance replied that this would be helpful for the peace process, and Boutros-Ghali embodied this advice in a report which he submitted to the Security Council on January 4, 1992. Cyrus Vance was not even a legal officer of the UN; he had merely given his advice on a point of policy, relating to a country (Croatia) where the war was in the process of ending. And yet this opinion was treated as a matter of legal prin-

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ciple, and used three months later to tie the hands of the Bosnian government when a war was launched against it.

"Facts on the Ground"

THE OTHER consequence of the doctrine of "ancient ethnic hatreds," wrapped up in an attitude of policyless diplomacy, was an acceptance by Western diplomats of the principle of ethnic division. The reasoning here was very simple. If violence is the natural product of hatred, and hatred the natural mode of interaction between people who are ethnically different, then the obvious way to stop the violence is to separate the ethnic groups. At no point in the entire Bosnian story was the close fit between the failure of Western understanding and the success of Serb war aims made more apparent. One key player in the story, the Unprofor commander General Philippe Morillon, has made the point explicitly himself. In his own recently published book about the war, a monument to political and historical incomprehension grandiosely entitled *Croire et oser* ("To Believe and To Dare"), he repeats the usual mantras about ancient ethnic hatreds and then adds:

> This past lends itself very well to the theory of ethnic cleansing. Since the brothers who live on this territory never stop fighting one another, you have to separate them. The idea is simple; it may not be in good taste, but it catches on....

The suggestion here is quite plain: only the over-scrupulous "good taste" of Western readers, who have no experience of these brutal Balkan types, will prevent them from recognizing that the Serbs had the best solution to the problem all along. (Somewhere in this chain of reasoning the General has lost sight of the fact that, until the Serbs started applying this solution by driving tens of thousands of peaceful Muslim citizens out of their homes in April 1992, the problem of war in Bosnia did not exist.)

Gradually, the Western diplomats began to apply the principle of ethnic separation. The process began with their use of the phrase "the facts on the ground" to describe the conditions which the outside world was powerless to alter (even though the immovability of those "facts" was itself largely a consequence of the arms embargo enforced by the outside world). Sometimes the impression was given that those "facts on the ground" were purely military; but within a few months of the outbreak of the war, most observers had understood that the mass expulsion of non-Serb populations from Serb-conquered areas was not just a by-product of the fighting, but belonged to its central purpose. Although the first version of the Vance-Owen plan, unveiled in October 1992, did contain some clauses about the safe return of refugees to their homes, the concessions it made to local power in the system of "cantons" it envisaged (even the police force would be locally, not centrally, controlled) made it impossible to imagine that ethnic cleansing would be reversed. The second version of the plan, released in January 1993, took a further, fateful step: it assigned "ethnic" labels (Serb, Muslim, Croat) to the various cantons themselves. This was an open endorsement of ethnic separation, and a major factor in the outbreak of serious fighting one month later in central Bosnia between Muslims and Croats, who wanted to secure "their" respective territories.

The Vance-Owen plan was rejected by the Serbs in May 1993: their experience of Western diplomacy was that they were pushing against an open door, and they saw no reason why it should not be opened even wider. Accordingly, the next set of proposals, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan of August 1993, outlined a cruder division of Bosnia into three ethnic mini-republics, the borders of which were explicitly a reflection (albeit a modified one) of the "front lines" of Serb military conquest. Since Radovan Karadzic

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had issued instructions that no more than 5 percent of the population in the territory he controlled was permitted to be non-Serb, any proposal which consolidated his conquests as a Serb mini-republic was bound to be, in effect, an endorsement of ethnic cleansing.

Since then, the paper proposals have changed again. Thanks to the initiative of the "Council of Bosnian-Hercegovinan Croats" in February 1994, assisted by a more positive American policy initiative in Sarajevo and Zagreb, the war between Muslims and Croats has ended, and a Croat-Muslim Federation has been declared. In theory, this Federation will be completed eventually when the Serbs join it too: there will then be a Croat-Muslim-Serb federal Bosnian state. However, for the purposes of negotiations to end the war, the Federation is one entity and the Serbs are very much another. The "Contact Group" of diplomatically involved countries (Britain, France, Germany, the United States and Russia) has come up with a proposal for a territorial settlement which gives 51 percent of Bosnia to the Federation and 49 percent to the Serbs. This proposal, put forward originally as a final, take-it-or-leave-it offer, does contain theoretical commitments to the continuing existence of the whole Bosnian territory as a Bosnian state; it also has pledges to respect human rights, permit the return of refugees to their homes, and so on. In recent months, however, it has become clear that this "final" offer will be modified yet further to satisfy the Serb leaders. The one thing they require, without which they will never sign the plan, is the granting of a constitutional status to the Serb-controlled 49 percent, of such a kind as to allow it ultimately to secede from Bosnia. If they are granted this, the final achievement of Western diplomacy will be the division of Bosnia, the ratification of Serb military action and the perpetuation of ethnic cleansing.

Western diplomats may be inclined to ask, "Never mind about ancient ethnic hatreds. Whatever their reasons, is it not a fact that the political will of the Serb people of Bosnia today is set against being included in a Bosnian state? Do not the Serbs too, like the Bosnian state itself, have a right to self-determination?" To this there are two answers. The first is that nobody knows what the democratic will of the whole Bosnian Serb population really is. It is often said that "the Serbs" boycotted the referendum on Bosnian independence in February-March 1992; in fact, people in many predominantly Serb areas of Bosnia were prevented from voting by Karadzic's paramilitary gangs, which erected road-blocks and stopped the ballot-boxes from entering. Serbs in almost all the major cities did vote, and voted in favor of independence for Bosnia. Today, there are still 200,000 Serbs living in Bosnian government-controlled territory. The territory controlled by Karadzic now contains approximately 600,000 Serbs. Before the war, there were 1,369,000 Serbs in the whole of Bosnia: this means that Karadzic, despite having conquered 70 percent of Bosnia, including all the areas with majority Serb populations (and many without), now has less than half the original population under him. Of the rest, some have been killed in the fighting, but the vast majority have fled—either to Serbia itself, or further afield. Karadzic's claims to be the democratic representative of all the Serbs are thus numerically doubtful; they are also historically baseless, since, on the one occasion when his party did win a democratic election (gaining the votes of most Bosnian Serbs in the election of 1990), their platform said nothing whatsoever about dividing Bosnia by force.

As for the Serbs' claims to "self-determination," it is the simple facts of ethnic geography which render them invalid. Had the Serbs all lived in a compact bloc of territory, with its own traditions and political identity, it might eventually have been right for a democratic Bosnian state to let that territory go, if that was what the Serbs desired—just as the British government would eventually grant Scotland independence, if the great

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majority of Scots so wished. But the ethnic map of Bosnia was a crazy patchwork, not a neat conjunction of three blocs, and the exercise of the so-called "right" of self-determination by the Serbs has involved the wrongful expulsion of hundreds of thousands of non-Serbs from their homes. This is not democratic self-determination, but the invention, by force, of a new political-territorial entity based on ethnic or racial purity—something not seen on European soil since the 1930s. And the invoking of the phrase "self-determination" is of course doubly false here, given that the political plan which this move was meant to serve, and the massive military resources which helped to effect it, came not from the Bosnian Serbs themselves but from the Serbian government in Belgrade.

Three Principles of Policy

SUCH, THEN, IS the main achievement of Western diplomacy: an acceptance, through ignorance, of the "inevitability" of the Bosnian war, which led step by step towards an acceptance of the fundamental claims of the people who made that war happen. In this sense, the Western governments, by not having any definite policy, have had a pro-Serb policy by default.

But it would be unfair to imply that the foreign ministries of the leading European and NATO countries had never been able to think of any principles of foreign policy that might have some relevance to the Bosnian war. Three general principles have been evident in their thinking. One was the need for "stability;" another was the desire not to set precedents for other parts of the ex-communist world; and the third was the wish to maintain close, cooperative relations with Russia. On each of these principles, the European governments (led by Britain and France) have sought to maintain what they believed to be their long-term interests; but on each of the three, their attempts to do so have been essentially counter-productive.

"Stability" is one of the key words in the British Foreign Office lexicon, where it tends to be associated with the doctrine that every region needs one strong local power to keep it in order. Although no British spokesman has ever said on the record that Serbia ought to be the dominant power in the Balkans, this pattern of thought was nevertheless evident in the eagerness of British ministers to accept the Serb conquests in Bosnia as a *fait accompli*—as if a new level of entropy had been created, a more stable system, which it would be in no one's long-term interest to reverse. The truth, however, is that any division of Bosnia (and particularly one which enables the Serb-held territories there to join up with Serb-held parts of Croatia) will create long-term instability in the region. It will lead not only to obsessive irredentism, in both Bosnia and Croatia, but also to a political power struggle within the new Greater Serbia, between the Belgrade regime and politicians in the outlying territories.

The desire not to set precedents for other parts of the ex-communist world was the main force behind the determination of Europe and America to keep the Yugoslav federal state together in June 1991. They feared the sudden break-up of the Soviet Union—which, two months after they had failed to keep Yugoslavia together, suddenly broke up anyway. Since that moment, the argument about precedent setting has ceased to be a justification for Western policy and has become a condemnation of it. The message sent by Western governments to radical nationalists in the Baltic states, Central Europe, the Caucasus, and the Russian Federation itself is that war, mass expulsions and/or the de facto alteration of borders by force will, in the end, be accepted by the outside world. One might go further and say that the message to a Baltic state such as Estonia is that if a Zhirinovsky government were one day to arrange for puppet forces to take over half the Estonian territory, the most decisive reaction of the Western world would be to slap an arms embargo on the

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Estonian government. The point here is not that such events in the future would not indeed present serious problems and dilemmas to policymakers in the West; it is simply that the precedent set in Bosnia makes such a scenario a more attractive choice for a future radical regime in Moscow.

Relations with the present regime in Russia have been a dominant factor in the handling of the Bosnian crisis by the Western powers. As Lord Owen put it in his Churchill Lecture of November 1993, "An essential interest, once the war started, was that the newly established U.S.-Russian partnership over Iraq in the Security Council could be maintained over Yugoslavia." The idea that a new era of East-West cooperation had begun in 1990-91 was especially strong in Britain and France. The British foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, struck up a personal friendship with Andrei Kozyrev, and co-authored articles with him in the British press, declaring that Russian and Western security interests were "indivisible." The strongest argument used by both Britain and France against lifting the arms embargo was the claim that a proxy war would develop, with the West backing the Bosnian government and Russia supporting the Serbs. This geopolitical imperative to maintain good relations with Russia took precedence, in British thinking, over the requirement to permit a sovereign state to defend itself from attack. And so in this way the nature of the argument about Russian cooperation shifted: whereas in the case of Kuwait, that cooperation was valued by Western leaders because it helped them to impose a solution on a problem, in the case of Bosnia the failure to solve the problem (or even to allow the Bosnian government to solve it itself) was thought a price worth paying for the sake of Russian "cooperation."

Since the Russians tended to support the Serbs, the inevitable effect of subordinating our Bosnian policy to the desire not to offend Russia was to make that policy more pro-Serb. The idea that Russia is naturally committed to the defense of Serb interests is, however, one of the most unexamined assumptions of Western policy. Vague claims are made to the effect that the Serbs are (as Lord Owen put it in his lecture) "Russia's traditional ally." The historical case for this is shaky: the real bridgehead of traditional Russian policy in the Balkans, as the war of 1877 and the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878 showed, was not Serbia but Bulgaria. After the Second World War it was the Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, who volunteered to make his country part of the Soviet Union; relations have been cool and distant between Moscow and Belgrade, on the other hand, for nearly fifty years.

It is true that Zhirinovskyite nationalists in Russia have found it convenient to interpret the Bosnian war, using their own domestic paradigms, as a fight between heroic Slavs and evil Muslim hordes. It is also true that Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev have found it increasingly convenient to use the existence of such rhetoric in Moscow to advance their own interests—either as a bogey with which to threaten the West ("fund us, or these people may replace us") or as an alleged force of public opinion. A process of bargaining has been set up, in which the Russian government knows that if it makes pro-Serb noises opposing any new policy move on Bosnia, the West will offer it concessions on other matters in order to overcome those objections. In this way, the West has actually given Russia an incentive to be awkward over Bosnia. The most dramatic example of this came in November and December 1994, when Moscow's policy on Bosnia hardened suddenly: it vetoed a Security Council resolution on the transport of fuel to the Croatian Serbs, and refused to allow the CSCE meeting in Budapest to make any reference to Bosnia in its final communique. The reaction of Western diplomats was, naturally, to think, "We have been underestimating Russian sensitivities; we must treat them more gently in order to get them 'back on board.'" Within a couple of

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weeks, the real reason for this Russian ploy had emerged: it was a softening-up operation, designed to make the West less willing to criticize Moscow when the Russian army began its assault on Chechnya. In that context, the advantage to Russia of disagreeing with the West over Bosnia becomes clear. What should also be clear is that the West's own policy—based, in theory, on the need to maintain cooperation with Russia in the Security Council at all costs—has actually given Russia that incentive to be uncooperative.

The West Divided

WHILE THE BRITISH and French determination to pursue this policy has produced very little long-term harmony with Russia, it has led to some episodes of intense disharmony within the Western alliance. A new alignment has operated, with Britain, France, and Russia on the one hand and the United States and Germany on the other. On February 5, 1994—the very day, as it happened, of the marketplace massacre in Sarajevo—the French defense minister, François Léotard, was in Moscow, asking his Russian opposite number to assist in the development of a Bosnian policy that would counteract America's "pro-Bosnian" tendencies. (This account of their conversation comes from an article in *Le Monde*, evidently derived from a briefing to that paper's Moscow correspondent by Léotard himself.) During the previous year, a confidential memorandum had circulated in the British Foreign Office arguing in favor of the same idea: "The most useful Russian contribution of all," it said, "has been its firm resistance to U.S. pressure for lifting the arms embargo against the Muslims...It has been reassuring to know that when the crunch came, the Russian veto would be forthcoming." This is a strange position for two of the major military powers of Western Europe to find themselves in, just when the entire future of the U.S. role in NATO is becoming a sensitive question.

Some of the reasons why Britain and France have drifted into this position have been outlined already. The reasons why the United States and Germany adopted a different position require less explanation. Both of these countries have acquired the habit (the United States long ago,Germany more recently) of judging foreign policy issues by "moralistic" criteria such as self-determination and human rights. Germany had the Baltic states at the forefront of its mind when it considered the claims of Slovenia and Croatia to independence, and Bill Clinton was sufficiently moved by pictures of Serb-run concentration camps, during his election campaigning in August 1992, to declare, "We cannot afford to ignore what appears to be a deliberate and systematic extermination of human beings based on their ethnic origin." Once elected, President Clinton would from time to time make half-hearted efforts to persuade his allies to change their Bosnian policy, and in these efforts he was usually seconded by the German government. But each time, the American initiative met an apparently immovable object in the form of British and French resistance. The United States had not sent troops to Yugoslavia initially, partly because of the European Community's possessive insistence that this was a European affair. During these later arguments, the trump card played by the British and French was always that no country had the moral right to dictate policy on Bosnia if it did not have troops on the ground. And since, for well-known reasons, the German army would not set foot in Yugoslavia either, this argument quelled German objections too.

The alignment of Britain and France against Germany, and their bringing of Russia into play, may be seen as part of a wider foreign policy of "containing" German influence in Eastern Europe. In private, British policymakers still mutter that the war in Yugoslavia was all the Germans' fault, because of their policy of "premature recog-

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nition." This interpretation of Germany's actions links up naturally with a more sinister theory about Germany's motives—namely, that Germany planned the destruction of Yugoslavia in order to build up a kind of economic Fourth Reich in south-eastern Europe. The second theory is highly implausible (although, like all conspiracy theories, hard to disprove); the first is demonstrably false. Germany did not cause the war in Yugoslavia, and only forced through the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia after cities such as Dubrovnik and Vukovar had been pounded for many weeks by heavy artillery. Independence was inevitable: the idea, still cherished by Lord Carrington among others, that Croatia could have been persuaded at that stage to climb back into a Yugoslav federation was quite unreal.

What sounds more plausible is the claim that the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in January 1992 "caused" the war in Bosnia. But this is less than a half-truth. It is true that it then became necessary for Bosnia to seek recognition too, and it is also true that the granting of that recognition was used as a convenient pretext by the Serbs to launch their military action; but their action had been planned long before that, and their carve-up of Bosnia was already under way. Over the previous twelve months large tracts of Bosnia had been declared "Serb Autonomous Regions;" arms deliveries had been made to Karadzic's men; the rudiments of a Bosnian Serb state (parliament and government) had been declared in October 1991; units of the federal army had taken control of key communications centers; and artillery had been dug into position round Sarajevo during the winter months. Recognition was not the cause of the Serb military operation, but merely the trigger for it.

A fairer criticism of the German-led European policy would be that, having encouraged Bosnia to seek recognition in these circumstances, it gave the Bosnian government no security guarantees, and even encouraged the Serb-led "federal" army to move men and material out of Croatia onto Bosnian soil. But this was a failure for which the whole of Europe, and the UN, must take responsibility. Possibly the degree of military commitment required to make any security guarantee credible was overestimated then, as it was consistently thereafter. The Serb attack, far from being a replica of Tito's guerrilla army, was essentially an armored and mechanized operation, dependent on main roads and fixed artillery positions. A decisive use of air power might well have stopped it in its tracks during the first few days. But that opportunity was missed, and by the time military options were looked at seriously by NATO planners in the summer of 1992, the scale of the task seemed too daunting: the planners, who had apparently excluded any cooperation with the Bosnian Army from their calculations, had decided that a large commitment of NATO ground forces would be needed, and this was something which no Western politician could envisage. "I cannot imagine circumstances in which we would send troops into Bosnia," said Douglas Hurd in July 1992.

Three months later, he sent them. Their purpose, however, was not to stop the killing, but merely to assist in the feeding of those Bosnians who had not yet been killed. Seldom have troops been sent into the middle of a war with a more inadequate mandate—or rather, succession of mandates, since their powers and responsibilities were added to in haphazard fashion by a number of subsequent UN Security Council resolutions.

The disadvantages of this non-military military operation form an entire subject in itself. Just two main aspects of it need to be emphasized here. The first is the way in which, having placed thousands of their own soldiers in positions that were vulnerable to Serb attacks, the British and French governments became even more eager to avoid antagonizing the Serbs. This hostage syndrome became evident as early as December

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1992, when the British, having helped to set up a theoretical no-fly zone over Bosnia, began arguing at the UN against measures to enforce it, for fear of what might happen to British soldiers inside Bosnia if a Serbian plane was ever shot down. In their incremental military involvement in Bosnia, Britain and France resemble Brer Rabbit in his dealings with the Tar Baby; and yet, when America dares to suggest a different approach, they tell it that only those who are embedded in tar up to their elbows have any right to decide what the correct policy should be.

The other aspect of the UN deployment which deserves special attention is the systematic misrepresentation, by UN commanders and their spokesmen, of the actual nature of the mandate. They describe themselves as "peacekeepers:" this is highly misleading. Normal peacekeeping operations involve patrolling an agreed settlement between two belligerents; they require completely equal treatment of both sides, and they are also dependent on the consent of both sides, a consent which must extend even to such matters as the national composition of the UN contingents. Some of the most vital ingredients of the UN mandate in Bosnia do not fit this model. They are Chapter VII enforcement mandates, which do not require the consent of those against whom force must be used. The initial mandate (Resolution 770) was to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid by all means necessary; this was explicitly enacted under Chapter VII. The mandate to enforce the no-fly zone (Resolution 816) was also a Chapter VII mandate; so too were the key provisions on "safe areas" (Resolutions 824 and 836), which require Unprofor to "deter attacks against the safe areas" and "take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments." And yet, in the eyes of one Unprofor commander after another, these have been nothing more than parts of a "peacekeeping" mandate, under which they have come to believe that their main role is to function as amateur diplomats, doing nothing to any one side that might be interpreted as unequal treatment. The wheel has turned full circle: even the military involvement of the Western world in Bosnia (or rather, especially the military involvement) has become an illustration of the doctrine of equivalence, the ultimate expression of the diplomatic worldview.

AT THE END of such a catalogue of errors, some suggestions may be required as to what the right answers might be. Inevitably, the reply of the Irish peasant in the story comes to mind, who, asked for directions, answers, "I wouldn't start from here." With a minimal Western military action in October 1991, at the time of the bombardment of Dubrovnik, it might have been possible to check the Serbs' ambitions and make them seriously reconsider their plans for Bosnia. Again, with a proper guarantee to protect the Bosnian state in April 1992, backed up with an immediate response from the air, it might have been possible to stop the war in Bosnia within its first week. Thereafter, the fundamental error was to suppose that military resistance to the Serb advance was impossible, because it would require massive NATO forces on the ground. The Bosnian government never in fact asked for Western soldiers to go and die on Bosnian soil; it developed its own army, which now heavily outnumbers the Bosnian Serb forces. Properly armed, and given limited assistance from the air, it could have regained the territory itself. The unfortunate truth, which none of the world's diplomats likes to admit, is that this war will only end by military means. Both sides have accepted a four-month ceasefire only because they both felt the need for a quiet period in which to build up their forces. It is in the long-term political interests of the West to see that the Greater Serbian experiment fails. The practical problem—which should be entrusted to military planners, not diplomats—is to devise ways of assisting the defeat of that experiment, while at the same time extricating from Bosnian territory those Western soldiers who should never have been sent there in the first place. □

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A Tired Anarchy

Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.

RUSSIA, FOR OUR officials and foreign policy leaders, is an increasingly scary and strange place. We don't seem to know where we are or what we are doing.

The Chechen war climaxed a crescendo of bizarre and troubling events. The Moscow journalist Dmitri Kholodov, who was investigating scandalous thefts by army generals, the training of mafia hit men by the army, and FSK (ex-KGB) destabilization operations against Chechnya, received a briefcase from the FSK. When he opened it, it exploded and he was killed.

Attention was called to the private armies that exist not only in the Caucasus region but in Moscow when a millionaire's "security guard" was attacked in the street by masked gunmen who turned out to be members of Yeltsin's personal bodyguard. The Moscow KGB came to the aid of the "security guard" and struggled with Yeltsin's guards; the upshot was the dismissal of the Moscow KGB chief and the subordination of the Moscow KGB to Boris Yeltsin's bodyguard.

This bodyguard, under the former KGB major Alexander Korzhakov, and the larger Main Guards Department under KGB General Barsukov have become a center of uncontrolled power with forty thousand troops including tanks and paratroops, and are metastasizing into the provinces. Korzhakov is now passing on the acceptability of new ministers and issuing directives to the prime minister to halt economic reform. His new "analytical center" is framing plans for a "National Guard," a kind of parallel army, like the Red Guards, the SA, or the Waffen-SS, which will extend through all the provinces and answer directly to Boris Yeltsin. Such events, amid the swirling rumors of canceled elections, emergency presidential rule, and Yeltsin's blind-drunk binges or terminal illness, display both megalomania and panic. None of this inspires confidence.

But we're stuck on Boris Yeltsin. And the more strangely or arbitrarily or insanely he acts, the less he is in control, the more we cling to him, in our need for something recognizable and reassuring. As an administration official, evidently Strobe Talbott, told a reporter, "Just who else are we going to deal with? Yeltsin is president of Russia, period."

In 1987, when the forces of disintegration first began to show themselves, there was good excuse for not identifying this reality or preparing a policy to deal with it. But at this point, after having waited so long for the strong reformed state of Gorbachev to appear, and then waiting for the strong reformed state of Yeltsin to appear, it begins to be strange. Over two administrations our officials have stubbornly clung to a policy of dealing only with governments, above all the Russian government, and put all our hopes

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on the leader of the moment. Everyone says at this point that this makes policy too personal, yet we keep doing it. Something is at work here beyond the normal range of human misjudgment, bureaucratic interest and vanity, although all these factors are present. This pattern needs to be understood as something like an obsessive-compulsive disorder.

The Pre-Chechnya Consensus

THE CHECHEN WAR is the culmination of tendencies that were building through last year. During this time a new direction in Russian foreign policy became evident, one that is increasingly assertive and, in its language, increasingly anti-American. By the fall of 1994 there seemed to be a consensus of the foreign policy elite that Russia needed to assert itself more, especially in the independent republics of the "near abroad" and on behalf of ethnic Russians living there. This consensus seemed to respond to a broad popular mood, but it was also shared by most of the democratic intellectuals who have been our friends.

The new rhetorical consensus has been supported by some real actions in the republics of the near abroad. People there share an almost universal consensus that Russia is extremely powerful, that it is now working to restore the former Soviet Union, and that almost everything that happens there, whether it seems to have any connection with Russia or not, is the result of Russian scheming.

I once thought that these suspicions were the result of a paranoid imagination, which is a common experience for Westerners in the post-communist world. But careful study of the evidence does show that in at least three important cases Russia has worked to destabilize the independent governments of other Soviet successor states. When Abulfaz Elchibey, the nationalist and pro-Western prime minister of Azerbaijan, was about to sign an oil investment agreement with Western firms, he was overthrown by Surat Huseynov with Russian arms. When Elchibey's successor, Heydar Aliev, signed a similar agreement last fall, Russia protested and a similar attempt to overthrow Aliev was made. And in Georgia, the Russian "power ministries"—the defense ministry under Grachev, the internal affairs ministry (MVD) and the successor agencies to the KGB—supplied the Abkhaz rebels who were fighting to secede from Georgia with arms and Russian and Chechen mercenaries, putting pressure on the Georgian side to sign a truce. When the truce was signed and the Georgian heavy equipment withdrawn, the Abkhaz side, receiving back their equipment from the Russians, broke the truce and won a complete victory. Then Yeltsin used the disaster to force Georgia to accept a continuing Russian military presence and membership in the CIS. The chairman of the defense committee of the State Duma, Sergei Yushenkov, has characterized the principles of Russian policy thus:

> They are very simple. Take the Caucasus, for example. We are trying to establish our power in the region using other people, stirring up civil war, and supporting warring forces and groupings with arms and ammunition and even personnel.

The Chechnya Crisis

THE RUSSO-CHECHEN conflict provides a better window on real Russian policy, and the domestic reaction to it, than any of these events.

As a side effect of the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechnya declared its independence under the leadership of General Dudayev. This is one of the events in the world whose drama we have scarcely absorbed. It is as though Quebec or Brittany or Scotland had actually declared its independence, was armed to the teeth and serving as a base for criminals who plundered

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trains going from one part of the country to another. General Dudayev made no effort to give Chechnya the orderly structure of a normal state. He behaved like a bandit, at best a medieval Robin Hood figure who, thanks to Russian forbearance, had a state to play with. Chechnya was not only a real problem, but a standing humiliation for Russia and an incitement to other non-Russian areas to declare their independence. So Russia had very serious reasons to reject the independence of Chechnya. Here, if anywhere, you would think, the new national foreign policy consensus would apply.

There was, in fact, an intervention following the Chechen declaration of independence. It failed and was disavowed by the Russian Supreme Soviet. Luckily, it was not necessary to use force, because Chechnya was completely isolated by Russian territory on three sides, and by the highest chain of the Caucasus mountains on the remaining side. There are no roads across the Caucasus mountains here; all the roads, all the railroads, all the oil pipelines between Chechnya and the outside world pass through Russia, but there never has been any effective blockade of Chechnya. The explanation may be that, as many Russian journalists have charged, powerful officials were using Chechnya as a sort of free port for illegal exports of oil, gold, diamonds, and arms. Perhaps there were also political reasons: some of the illegal arms seem to have gone to Serbia, and Chechen mercenaries were used in the Russian operation to tear Abkhazia away from Georgia. The most amazing thing is that Chechnya, having declared its independence, defied Russia, established an army, intended to establish foreign relations was until very recently receiving a subsidy from the Russian government, like any other backward province.

So Chechnya maintained its independence for three years. It is one of ten post-communist mini-states, extending from Croatia to the old Soviet-Chinese border in the Pamirs, that has factual independence but no international recognition and no international responsibilities. During the three years of Chechen independence, a slow exit of Russians took place. Grozny, the capital, is an old Russian town founded in 1818 as a fortress against the Chechens. When the USSR collapsed about three quarters of Grozny's population was Russian. About half of those people were driven out, not apparently by any decision of the Chechen government, but just by the fact that life there was so difficult and so dangerous. The concern of Russia for Russians abroad has to be seen in the light of this kind of fact. Russians in the near abroad do suffer from discrimination; in some places they feel or are made to feel unwelcome. But, on the whole, Russia has not done anything about it, contrary to a very popular myth both within Russia and in the West.

Around the end of the summer of 1994, the Russian government broke with its three-year pattern of de facto toleration of Chechen independence. Clans which had always opposed Dudayev were armed and organized to overthrow him. Such a decision was certainly understandable on the part of Russia. But it seems to have been part of a pattern of restoring Russian influence and military presence over the entire Caucasus, as part of the more assertive foreign policy described above. It was actually preceded by the maneuvers to destabilize independent Georgia and Azerbaijan, on which it was modeled. Yeltsin's decision has to be seen in the context of his increasing dependence on the "power ministries" which had organized those earlier adventures. His struggles with the communist and nationalist opposition in the Supreme Soviet, now the Duma, which culminated in the street fighting of October 1993, had antagonized the right. Meanwhile, in the absence of a communist enemy, the democratic forces were breaking into small quarreling groups, which were antagonized by Yeltsin's use of force against the Supreme Soviet. There remain few cohesive entities that could prop up Yeltsin, except for the army and the security police.

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The leaders of these power ministries have had three tries at subduing Chechnya but have botched the campaign month after month, turning it into a national crisis and threatening Yeltsin's own position. Because they have not been removed as a result of the failures, the impression that Yeltsin depends on them personally is growing.

Phase one of the campaign began during the fall of 1994. Relying on the "Abkhaz Model"—using local proxies to achieve Moscow's ends—the power ministries organized and equipped Chechen opposition clans to attack Dudayev. Those attacks failed; the Abkhaz model did not work.

Phase two began on November 25. Reinforcements of Russian troops from elite units like the Kantimirov division, which protects Yeltsin's position in Moscow, were added to the Chechen opposition forces. Reporters were briefed that they would seize Grozny and occupy the presidential palace the next day.

Ignoring the ridges that dominate Grozny, the attack made straight for the center of the congested city and the presidential palace with tanks. Not surprisingly, the attack fell apart and the Chechen opposition and their Russian allies retreated to their bases, ignominiously.

The KGB and MVD having completely mismanaged these first "covert" operations to destabilize Chechnya, Yeltsin dumped the mess in the lap of an utterly unprepared army. Most of the senior Russian army commanders opposed it, but Minister of Defense Grachev accepted with alacrity. Yeltsin issued a 48-hour ultimatum for Dudayev's forces to lay down their arms; it was extended several times, showing the muddle in Moscow, but finally the invasion, phase three, began on December 11. Once again the attack disintegrated. When Chechens who found themselves in the path of the invasion took hostages, Russian commanders refused to advance or to fight for the release of the hostages. Moscow tried again with a grand assault on New Year's Eve. Once again the troops went straight into the center of Grozny, were cut off there and either burned to death in their tanks or surrendered in panic.

The tactical orders seem to have been given, not by any military man, but by Nikolai Yegorov, a former collective farm chairman appointed by Yeltsin to coordinate the destruction of Chechen independence. Yegorov, according to one army general's conjecture, had read as a young communist some party textbook that explained how, in 1917, the Bolshevik sailors had been ordered to seize the palace, the railroad station, and so forth. So Yegorov gave the same orders on the last day of 1994. The timing of the attack, according to some Russian sources, was determined by Grachev's birthday, January 1.

Yeltsin responded to the disaster by adding intensive, wildly inaccurate bombing and shelling to the ground assault on Grozny. These tactics were more effective, although at the cost of enormous numbers of civilian casualties and refugees, including many Russians. By mid-January, the Chechen militias had abandoned the presidential palace. By early February, Grozny was virtually destroyed, and Dudayev's forces were apparently pulling back from what had been his main base of support.

Thus Yeltsin succeeded in greatly weakening Dudayev—but at the cost of his own last link to the democratic movement, most of his remaining popular support, the remaining support for a Russian connection in Chechnya, and tens of thousands of civilian and military lives. The weakening of Dudayev has not meant the strengthening of Yeltsin's administration; resistance has not ceased in a single town where it was going on previously. As of January 24, the Russian headquarters in Grozny still worked underground for fear of Chechen snipers in the surrounding buildings. What Yeltsin has actually accomplished is to add to the already wide areas of the Russian Federation that are not controlled by any government.

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Four Conclusions

SO WHAT WERE the reactions in "chauvinist, assertive Russia" to the invasion? Contrary to that characterization, virtually all the democratic forces and public opinion as a whole have been passionately opposed to the Chechen war. The Communist Party opposes the fighting in Chechnya vehemently. The biggest surprise is what the Russian nationalists did. Zhirinovsky, the most extreme nationalist, has become one of only three prominent politicians supporting the war, but his party's first reaction was condemnatory: "The anti-national government in the Moscow Kremlin conceives the war in Chechnya as an endless war, till the death of the last..."—Russian, one might think, but no—"...Chechen." This oddly cosmopolitan sentiment passes, in the Russian context, as ultra-nationalist.

As for the army, the bulwark of nationalism, General Gromov, deputy minister of defense, and General Lebed, both officers on active service and heroes of the nationalist-communist opposition, denounce the policy of the president and defense minister. On December 16, General Ivan Babichev, the commander of the western third of the Russian attack forces and of the elite Pskov airborne division, announced publicly that, regardless of orders, he would advance no further: "...we are not going to use tanks against the people." Rather than being removed from his command for mutiny, Babichev was apparently sent to command a quiet part of the front, where he made a personal non-aggression pact with the opposing Chechen fighters. (Later he was somehow persuaded to return to the battle.) As the destructive war against civilians ground on, many other officers and units of the army and security forces refused to be involved, resigned or returned home without orders.

This is all very strange. From it, I think one may draw four conclusions. First, Russia does not have a government in the normal sense of the term: an organization where the decisions of higher officials are binding on lower officials. The Soviet state has been disintegrating since 1985, and we can see now that Yeltsin's attempts to knit it back together after the October 1993 street fighting have failed.

This is not just the conclusion of a Western academic. Andrei Kortunov, perhaps the most brilliant foreign policy specialist of the Moscow establishment, has concluded from the Chechen war that "Alas, today there is no state as such—as the West understands it—in Russia." From a quite different part of the political spectrum General Alexander Lebed simply asserts, "The state no longer exists." The adventure in Chechnya has made the situation even worse. The head of Yeltsin's own presidential administration has recently stated that "manipulating the situation in Chechnya, reactionary forces in individual regions are trying to tear pieces of power away from the federal authorities....These problems must be solved as soon as possible."

"Yeltsin is president of Russia, period," said President Clinton's "senior official," using the title to block inquiry into the reality it is supposed to express. When we speak of a president, we mean someone who is the head of a state that he can generally deliver on important issues. If there is no state, in the sense of a hierarchy of officials habituated to obey each other, there can be no president in the sense that interests us diplomatically. It is worth quoting Kortunov once again:

> Boris Yeltsin no longer has control over the actions of his enforcement structures and in general has a very vague idea of what is happening outside the Kremlin. And since this is the case, what is the point of the current summits, talks at the highest level, international conferences and consultations, and so on? Talks with the president become a meaningless exercise in rhetoric.

The second conclusion to be drawn is

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that the culture of foreign policy debate in Russia today is a Western democratic culture. That is, it has the same messiness as equivalent debates in the West, with everybody making charges about everything. There is no national unity. Without a public consensus on the existence of a real threat and public confidence in the government, the government is not able to rally people. If the present Russian government had the patriotism, legitimacy and competence to carry out difficult efforts on behalf of Russian national interests, this sort of public climate would be a real obstacle to serving the public interest. But with the political system that Russia has at the moment, half-formed and half-collapsed, it has to be considered as an aspect of democratic checks and balances. That is why it is vital that some vague sense of democracy in Russia be maintained. The disorder of Russian public debate restrains, for the moment, adventures that would be injurious both to Russia and to us.

By refusing the Yeltsin government's attempt to mobilize them for war in Chechnya, Russians have shown that, in a profoundly important respect, they are like us. This is perhaps the biggest surprise of the Chechen crisis. Our opinion-makers tend to present Russian officials as Western-oriented, but to imply that there are vast forces of aggression and intolerance within the Russian people. This conventional wisdom now seems to be almost the opposite of the truth. On one side there is a small circle of ex-communist officials who are trying to recreate the USSR with a Russian label, using the brutal and cynical tactics that the communist regime fostered. On the other side of this issue there is the vast bulk of the Russian people. Like their Western counterparts (but unlike the Chechens and Serbs) the Russians of today do not like fighting, killing and dying. There is a deep horror of using the state's armed forces for any serious purpose. In fact, Russians seem less willing to use force than Americans and possibly equal today's Germans in their distaste for it. Perhaps, as in Germany, the brutalities of the totalitarian regimes, against the background of latent coercion that these regimes exemplified, have discredited in a lasting way the use of force.

My third conclusion is that military and public strategy have been bungled from start to finish, and it is an open question whether the government that did all this can manage equally complicated and controversial processes of economic reform and democratization. Dudayev's military forces have done rather well, given that they are civilian militias or bandits. Where did they get their arms and training from? The Russian army signed an agreement to turn over half its weapons, including aircraft, tanks, and rockets, when they evacuated Chechnya. The Chechens got more weapons, as well as invaluable training and combat experience, in Abkhazia, where they fought on the Russian side against the government of Georgia. So the Russians trained and equipped a force that is now working against them. Fighters are being recruited in Abkhazia to fight for Dudayev, and Russian government spokesmen have been threatening Ardzinba, Abkhazia's president, for sending them. But it was Russia that put Ardzinba there and made Abkhazia an independent mini-state. This is a very incoherent form of Russian expansion.

Fourth and last, one can conclude that Russian national reassertion is not a mass taste or instinct, but a posture or gesture. To clarify what I mean, I would suggest that it is something rather like racism is in the United States. You hear racist jokes, but if you were to ask the people who make those jokes, "Well, shall we bring back segregation? When? How?" they would be very disoriented and perhaps frightened. Postures and prejudices are not policy. I think that there is no public instinct for Russian national reassertion that supports the assertive policy that seemed, even a few weeks ago, the consensus of the Russian establishment. To make it clear: *the Russian public is not imperialist.*

The concern for Russians abroad is also a posture in this sense. Russia has done more

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for the Serbs, the Abkhaz and the anti-Dudayev clans in Chechnya than for Russians abroad to date. We will see. Maybe they will do more.

Russian nationalism does manifest itself in anger at outsiders. But it does not result, so far, in solidarity, discipline or sacrifice among Russians. Thus it does not have the consequences that, say, Serb or Palestinian nationalism has.

New Reality, New Policy

THE END OF the sixty-year struggle against totalitarianism has produced a new reality: the disintegration of states. Our experience of this phenomenon, as with Chad in the 1980s or China in the 1930s and 1940s, usually was incidental to solving more urgent problems. Even in China, from the 1911 revolution to the Red Chinese triumph in 1949 the struggle was between strong state-building forces: the Guomindang, the Japanese, the communists. Today, in the former Soviet Union, there are no such forces, nor an ideology with remotely the appeal of communism in intra-war China.

But if Russia and her neighbors seem fated for a period of anarchy, it will be a tired anarchy; Russian nationalism is combative, not imperial. The anarchy is unlikely to end in a traditional civil war waged for ultimate stakes; after Afghanistan and in the wake of Chechnya, Russians have little taste for fighting.

The United States should recognize that Russian combativeness is easily discouraged. It reflects not a persistent desire to achieve specific objectives but a need for recognition of Russia as a society. When this yearning does create real dangers (for us or for Russia itself), it should encounter obstacles, but these need not be major to be effective. Nor is there any reason to say whether we are responsible for them.

Thus, symbolism becomes the core of the U.S.-Russia diplomatic relationship. On this basis, we should take great care not to ignore or exclude Russia. We should look for opportunities to involve Russia where we do not disagree; Somalia or Rwanda are examples. We should avoid arguing in public or challenging Russia. In cases where we disagree, it may be fine to agree to disagree, as Clinton and Yeltsin did at the summit on Bosnia. Above all, we should avoid tests of will.

NATO expansion to the east is destined to be particularly divisive. Pushing the alliance to the border of the old Soviet Union would be a powerful symbol of Russian otherness, of its rejection by the West. It is not that the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is a bad idea; in itself it is very useful. The problem is the lack of a parallel "security structure" that links the West to Russia. We have not had the imagination to devise something entirely new for an entirely new epoch of history.

Not that we should rush to sign treaties with a disintegrating Russian government, because it cannot commit the country and the future. Only such agreements as can be fulfilled immediately and verified by our own resources should be considered. An agreement to destroy all of a certain category of nuclear weapons, for example, might be such an agreement; if all are destroyed, none can reappear easily. But treaties and agreements that require a disintegrating Russian government to carry out a complex policy course involving many bureaucracies over a long period of time are an invitation to trouble. The major SALT and START treaties of the past, and the already-violated CFE treaty, are examples of what to avoid in the future. If Russian generals do not obey a direct wartime order, why should we expect them to obey the complex details of an international treaty for years at a time?

More importantly, we should recognize that diplomacy is only a part of the total relationship between the United States and Russia. The Moscow government is so weak that major advances cannot be made by

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diplomacy. The Russian position should be thought of as not only the position of the Moscow government, but as that of the parliament, the various ministries, the provinces and the larger Russian society. In Chechnya, for example, it is the policy of the Moscow government that is brutal and stupid; the position of Russian society is prudent and humane. We are allowing politics to stand for the whole of our relationship with Russia, in the totalitarian manner.

Since it eased the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany, which were valuable accomplishments, diplomacy has achieved little in the post-communist world. We tried to save Gorbachev and keep the Soviet Union together. We tried to save "reform" by keeping Yeltsin in power. We have tried to resolve crises in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh by negotiations. So far we have failed in every case. The disintegration of the post-communist state machinery is a great impediment to diplomacy. While diplomacy skims along the surface, the true shape of Russian reality is being forged in the society and the economy.

Engagement and Its Limits

DESPITE THE LIMITED opportunities for diplomacy, the relationship between the United States and Russia is still of vital importance. It is hard to remain detached from great upheavals and the attendant human suffering, as our long misery in Bosnia shows. But an understanding of the situation and a consistent policy can shape and limit our commitments. A proper response requires both a recognition of the need for continued engagement and a sense for its limits.

The case for engagement is compelling. The former Soviet Union is an enormous reservoir of power; American interests will be hurt if this power is exercised by the wrong hands. At the moment, the crux of the problem is the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and the facilities and human skills that attend them. We cannot predict from one year to the next who will control these weapons and, in the current situation, the precedents and prospects are not happy ones. The Soviet Union has a long tradition of employing nuclear threats, and in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis this almost led to war. Brandishing nuclear weapons may prove a tempting and easy response to the mood of resentment and discontent now rising in Russia.

Beyond nuclear anxieties, there is a long-term danger that Russia will again become an aggressive state dominated by an extremist world view. A combination of sustained disorder, suffering, and humiliation tends to produce this outcome. There is little movement in that direction now, but the seeds are visible; common sense suggests a need to maintain what influence we have over the anarchy in which they may grow or wither. By doing so we are buying an insurance policy; we develop the understanding, connections and capabilities to act more energetically should a major threat develop. (Not allowing our armed forces to atrophy is another part of this insurance policy and an essential part of a strategy for dealing with post-Soviet disorder.)

However, engagement with the Russians should not be merely a matter of containing current or future threats. The debate over post-Cold War foreign policy has been strangely fixed on threats while ignoring opportunities. And there are enormous opportunities in any vast area that is opening up and undergoing fundamental change. Young Americans are moving to Prague, Budapest, and Moscow in droves because they, unlike the old foreign policy elite, sense that is the last frontier.

The need for engagement should be disciplined by calculating possibilities for American influence; it is easy to both exaggerate and underestimate. If administration officials argue that the International Monetary Fund must give a six billion dollar loan to Russia to keep Yeltsin in power, to

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keep Chubais in the government, or to keep "reform" going, they are trying to make us believe in magic. The major decisions in Russian politics will be made for Russian reasons, and the Russian anarchy is too complex, too rapidly changing, and too poorly understood for us to influence it in a short term, tactical way.

But we do have power, enormous power. We have what the people in the former Soviet Union want: hard currency, efficiency, high technology, a normal life (as they consider ours to be) in global civilization. The trick is to figure out how to convert this raw power into usable influence. We are lucky that the power we have is used more easily on the post-communist societies and economies than on the central state, for these are the most important part of the U.S.-Russia relationship.

Policy toward Russian society should aim at deepening ties with the West and strengthening first of all those people and groups that are democrats and capitalists. But we should by no means abandon Russian nationalists or define them from the beginning as our opponents. The Chechen war has exposed the emptiness of combative rhetoric; the shared opposition of democrats, communists and nationalists reveals how misleading these labels can be. Our strategy should be to lead Russian nationalism in a constructive direction, not to fight it. Economic policy should be guided by the principle that privatization is in American interests, even if it is by theft or goes to the old communist *nomenklatura*, because it will slowly create interest groups that will defend those interests, undermine the possibility of any return to effective despotism, and lay a basis for oligarchic or even democratic politics.

American and Russian Means

THERE ARE A variety of tools for achieving these policy ends. The tools may seem weaker or less directly effective than those familiar from the Cold War, but their number, both in the West and in Russia, is substantial, and includes both governmental and private implements.

The most important mechanisms for strengthening Russian civil society are the National Endowment for Democracy and the political, labor and business institutions associated with the endowment. In the conditions of the disintegration of the Russian state, these become, in principle, our main policy instruments toward Russia. The endowment's success is hard to measure. But my judgment would be that, by promoting democratic groups such as Sergei Kovalyev's Moscow Helsinki Group, it has certainly helped create the Western, democratic tone of public debate that is so visible during the Chechen War. Given these facts, there is an astonishing disproportion between the level of our support to the endowment—it has averaged thirty million dollars or so per year—and our support for the programs and organizations, such as international financial institutions and the State Department, that address the needs of Russian society less directly and successfully.

The formal mechanisms for improving Russian economic life are not perfectly suited to the task. Our government, like others, tends to prefer to distribute aid through international financial institutions, because they make foreign aid less controversial. But these institutions exist primarily to extend aid to well-established governments, in return for changes in government policy. Most of the post-Soviet governments are not strong enough to implement these kinds of conditions; the World Bank or IMF must either bend their standards—as is becoming their habit with these countries—or confirm the prevalent anti-Western belief in the existence of sinister outside forces trying to control Russia. But the fundamental problem is that of giving aid to a disintegrating state; we should be giving most of our aid to individuals and groups who support democracy and free markets.

In this regard, bilateral aid is superior.

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While our aid programs need trimming and reorganization if they are to be responsive, we must be careful not to destroy foreign aid. Given a cast of disintegrating states, money is the most powerful lever we have to shape the evolution of the former Soviet Union. Few realize how much can be achieved at how small a cost: the United States taxpayer employs hundreds of thousands, in fact millions of people to negotiate with, make policy toward and potentially defend against these countries; for every such person we employ in Washington, we could employ about fifty people in Russia, or five hundred in Georgia, for the same cost.

But of course the big economic impact will come from Western businesses. Even with the bleak prospect Russia faces after the Chechen debacle, there are enormous amounts of money to be made in the former Soviet Union. Still, cooperation between business and government could be greatly improved. Businessmen tend not to be very political, which means they often misread the political context which determines whether they can work in a country or not. On the government side, diplomats do not like to work for American business.

Disintegration and chaos paradoxically open up avenues for progress. Not only are the provincial governments of greater relative importance, but the various bureaucracies in Moscow now offer windows through which the winds of American influence may blow.

Already important, the power of the provinces is waxing. It is based not on formal government regulation but upon the realities of post-Soviet society: kinship, friendship, local respect, mutual advantage and the power to intimidate others or pay them. Power on the playground or the drill-ground is more real than power in any bureaucracy. Consequently, we need to be in touch with all the regions of the Russian Federation, and to have policy toward each, even if it consists of deciding that what happens there doesn't matter to us. At the same time, we need to do this without further discrediting the Moscow government. The principal purpose of our contact with the Russian provinces is not to conduct diplomacy, but to channel foreign aid, support democracy-building trends and target Western investment to areas where we could make a significant difference. These might be areas where democratic sentiment is strong or areas that have better than average chances of prospering in conditions of a disintegrating Russia, or preferably both.

The ultimate aim is to create nuclei of relative order, prosperity and pluralism that can play a growing influence on the evolution of Russia as a whole. In the likely conditions where pan-Russian economic planning has collapsed and where state subsidies no longer protect the poorer areas, some regions simply are going to be much more successful than others. The energy-rich areas and those on the periphery, where local economies will be lifted by contact with the dynamism of the European and Chinese economies, are likely to be more successful.

The most important determinant of success will be whether markets and the forces of the international economy are allowed to function or are arrested by xenophobia, nostalgia for central planning, autarchic dreams, over-regulations, high taxation, or the attempt of political elites to control all wealth. Democracy, too, will determine success: regions able to give residents some sense of sharing in the community and to control the enormous popular resentment that now exists in Russia will be more stable. Moscow, itself a region, will retain importance meanwhile as the seat of central authority and a center of democratic strength.

With time, the gap between successful and failing regions will widen, and the successful ones will become more powerful and objects of imitation. They will be able to induce the failing regions and the weak cen-

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tral government to cooperate with them on their terms. If Moscow reasserts its authority someday, the more successful regions will retain a disproportionate role in the composition and character of the government that then emerges.

American policy toward Russia's provinces must be guided by a ruthless sense of priorities. Inevitably, some provinces will sink, because their rulers are hopelessly mired in communist ways of thinking or because they have no resources, no fertile soil and no place anyone would choose to live. Our own resources are limited, and they will only count if we concentrate them in a few areas that are particularly promising. Fortunately, our modest means will be relatively powerful by the provincial standards; those in danger of sinking will be eager for any help they can get.

This principle should also guide our dealings with the various Moscow bureaucracies. We can choose our partners, within limits. For example, Kozyrev supports the Chechen war, while Prime Minister Chernomyrdin clearly has worked against it. Now that Vice President Gore has opened a channel to Chernomyrdin, why should we reward Kozyrev by giving him things that Yeltsin wants? Give them to Chernomyrdin and let the channel between Kozyrev and Secretary of State Warren Christopher languish. This "bureaucratic targeting" would allow us to make the most of our financial support: aid to the central government should be reduced drastically, but not eliminated, and we should disburse no aid where we do not approve the specific bureaucratic units that will control it, pay it out, and benefit from it. All of this would offend an ordinary government in ordinary times, but these times are strange.

WHAT RUSSIANS and Americans both need most is a better definition of what is going on in the post-communist world. Because Russian combativeness is more a matter of symbolism than of concrete gains for the disintegrating Russian state, how events are labeled, which policymakers sometimes dismiss as mere "rhetoric," becomes a vital part of policy both for Russia and for us. Russian combativeness and Western intolerance both are rooted in the myth of a painless, "velvet" revolution. When Gorbachev undertook perestroika, and the West welcomed it, we all wanted change, but without disruption. This was an impossible hope. The great longing of the people in the Soviet bloc was for a normal life, and diplomats likewise have tried to return to a normal foreign policy. In Russia's situation, this meant a nineteenth-century foreign policy; as one of Yeltsin's advisers told me gleefully this fall, "This used to be called the Great Game, and we're back in it!" But the nineteenth century is over, and the diplomatic attempt to return it has only created more instability around Russia's periphery, and in Moscow, as the Chechnya muddle shows again.

In the West, the reaction to disorder, whether in Russia or in Bosnia, tends to be to isolate and abandon the area. Yeltsin's Chechen war already has produced new declarations that Russia is hopeless; this reaction is destructive to our own interests.

The collapse of communism is a vast historic transformation, equal to the collapse of the *ancien régime* in France or even the end of the Roman Empire in the West. Moreover, this transformation occurs not in a static world but one simultaneously undergoing other transformations, such as those connected with the new global economy. The whole world, not just the ex-communist world, is entering a new age; indeed, the former Soviet Union, where all the old patterns are being broken at once, may enter the new age first. The disorder of the post-communist transformations will not subside easily or quickly. While these transformations are occurring, they are the largest events in our world, at once too promising and too threatening to leave us detached. □

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

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A Different Dance

—*from Tango to Minuet*

Leon Aron

IN THE GLORIOUS autumn of 1991 the Soviet kingdom of ideological imperatives fell, and the foreign and security policies of Russia began to be shaped by what might be called the "normal" factors: domestic politics and the economy, history and geography. Suddenly, Russia's course became open to variations—and meaningful speculations.

Those in this country who speculated out loud almost instantly split into two camps. Each ranged across party affiliations and spanned the conservative-liberal divide, and each quickly acquired allies in the mass media and among policymakers. One school of thought (let us call it the "Historical") contended, in oversimplified essence, that a nation's history is its destiny. Historic genes would see to it that, sooner or later and *mutatis mutandis*, Russia would revert to its age-long authoritarian and imperialist ways. The best known exponents of this view have been Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The opposing camp (call it the "Romantic") had its main advocates in Jeane Kirkpatrick and, until last spring, Richard Nixon. The Romantics argued that nations do change, and that democracy—even one as tentative, fledgling, incompetent, and chaotic as Russia's—cures historic ills, as in our time it has done already in the cases of Germany and Japan.

It is clear today that both the Historicals and the Romantics were partially right—and also that both have erred, although the Romantics, so far, have been closer to the mark. The internal condition of Russia has changed immensely for the better, and is continuing to change, though progress has not occurred as fast or as decisively as the Romantics had hoped. As far as foreign policy and security are concerned, the process of change has turned out to resemble not a highway, but a muddy and pitted country road that zigzags, undulates and detours a great deal.

The justifiable concern caused in the West by the twists and turns of the Russian course has been endowed with additional weight and darker hues by a powerful mindset which requires a serious effort to resist. That mindset arises and gains credibility from an undeniable fact: for the last four centuries and until a few years ago Russia has been at the heart of two relentlessly expansionist empires: first that of the tsars and then that of the communists. Seen in this light, the dips and loops in the road—from the alleged Russian involvement in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict (whether authorized by the Kremlin or not), to the continuing presence of the Fourteenth Army in Moldova, to the defense of the brutal

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communist dictatorship in Tajikistan—easily acquire significance and portent well beyond their actual scope.

Russia Great versus Russia Free

YET ALONGSIDE THESE disturbing developments there has unfolded a dazzling spectacle of what might be called the Yeltsin revolution in Russian foreign policy. From Ivan the Terrible through Peter the Great and Catherine to Stalin, Russian state-building invariably included three elements: first, a potent messianic streak (from Russia as a "Third Rome," to Russia as the leader of the Slavs, to the "heart of world socialism"); second, the relentless expansion and strengthening of the empire; and third, dependence on massive military strength. Yeltsin has radically revised (indeed, in many instances, reversed) all three components.

The ideological dream has been interrupted—one hopes, terminated—and Russia is learning to speak prose both to its own people and to the world. The empire has been broken up. And the military is being starved for funds and men, with a brutal determination unprecedented in Russian history. The annual diminution of the defense budget for three years in a row; the steadfast adherence of the Yeltsin administration to the target reduction of the armed forces to under 1.5 million (from 4.5 million just three years ago); and the withdrawal from the Baltic countries controlled by Russia for two centuries—these are only the most dramatic manifestations of the military revolution.

But the most momentous development has been a break with another national theme, one which, like a thread of steel, bound rulers and ruled for centuries. This theme was the unquestioned and unquestionable priority of national security and foreign policy objectives over domestic concerns. The readiness with which the latter were sacrificed to advance the former was the central characteristic of the Russian state for at least four centuries. As the great Russian historian Nikolai Karamzin succinctly put it in a memorandum to Alexander I in 1818, "The first duty of the sovereign is to preserve the internal and external unity of the state. Solicitude for the welfare of social classes and individuals must come second." Throughout Russian history, an overwhelming preoccupation with the integrity of the empire was a critical brake on domestic liberalization. As Adam Ulam has said:

> At decisive moments it was not only the government but also Russian society which found itself unable to opt clearly for freedom if its price seemed to involve the threat to the country's unity and greatness. [In 1990, it was precisely such a threat that moved Gorbachev, belatedly and unsuccessfully, to attempt to slow down the reforms.]

When Russian foreign policy was reborn, Yeltsin, too, faced the same cursed dilemma of Russian history: Russia great (that is, Russia imperial) versus Russia free. He became the first Russian leader ever to choose Russia free. Consider the magnitude of what Yeltsin did. In December 1991, when he hammered the last nail in the coffin of the Soviet Union in Belovezhskaya Pusha, he not only gave up all of the imperial conquests of Peter, Catherine, and both Alexanders but reversed the four hundred year old tradition in which the very national idea of Russia was derived from that of the imperial state. He "uncoupled" Russian identity and Russian statehood from the Russian empire. Until then, the two had never been separate: the emergence of the modern Russian state under Ivan the Terrible coincided—after the conquest of the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates—with the birth of the Russian empire. The result of this revolution may be summarized quite simply: not since the middle of the sixteenth century when the Russian expansion began, has there been a Russia less aggressive, less belligerent, less threatening to neighbors

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and the world than the Russia we see today.

Liberal Disenchantment with America

IT IS QUITE clear today, however, that despite the justified euphoria that attended the early stages of this revolution, it has not, in the end, produced a Russian foreign policy that is uniformly and unremittingly solicitous of the United States, or even automatically accommodating of its interests.

Nor, in retrospect, could it have. Just as in Russian domestic politics anti-communism is no longer viewed in Russia as synonymous with democracy, but only as a necessary and in itself insufficient condition for progress, so, while the radical break with foreign policy objectives of the past creates a vital precondition for Russia's re-integration in what Moscow used to call "the civilized world," it does not in itself ensure a cloudless relationship with the United States and its allies.

Between the August Revolution of 1991 and today, there has occurred a major change in the ways in which the Russian political class views Russia's proper role in its neighborhood and the world. In particular, there has been a change in perceptions of Russia's relations with the United States, whose motives and objectives have been intensely—and less than objectively—re-examined in Moscow. The most remarkable feature of this metamorphosis is the political provenance of those affected by it. Until it occurred, there had been a very stable correlation between domestic ideological positions and perceptions of the outside world: the rejection of the West almost perfectly coincided with reactionary—that is, in the Russian context, leftist, statist and nationalist—domestic positions. But starting in the second half of 1992, suspicion of the United States and calls for a tougher foreign policy line in pursuit of Russian national interests began to emanate from different and most unusual ideological quarters.

Several months ago in Moscow, for example, a top official on the National Security Council, having just enthusiastically described to me a criminal justice reform that would provide additional and weighty guarantees for the individual against the state, proceeded to portray the U.S. policy toward Russia as based on raw force, narrow egotistical interests, and condescension—all, in his opinion, designed to deny Russia its great power status. One of the earliest converts to this line among prominent, cardholding democrats was Vladimir Lukin, ex-ambassador to the United States and now the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Duma. Today, he is in very large and distinguished company.

Consider, as another striking example, a statement made last spring by a leading Russian anti-communist and engineer of the Soviet Union's demise, Gennady Burbulis. As Yeltsin's top aide and state secretary, Burbulis was the second most powerful man in Russia during the critical first year of the revolution, between September 1991 and October 1992. Speaking in the House of the Cinema, the home of the most radical democratic opposition to Gorbachev during perestroika, in April, 1994 he responded to a question about the former Yugoslavia and Russia's dispute with Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet in these terms:

> The lyrical phase of Russia's partnership with the world community and, first and foremost, the United States, is over. We are moving toward tough pragmatism, which they have pursued all along....The world has been divided. Someone needs a Russia weak, dispossessed, humiliated and endlessly dependent on everybody; others are not ready to accept us as full partners in the world community, complete with a distinct foreign policy and convincing arguments in its defense.

Whence such a sharp departure from what used to be, only two years earlier, an utter and near-universal enchantment with the United States by Russian democrats? One reason is almost certainly the initial

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existence of inflated and unfulfillable expectations. When Russian foreign policy was reborn in early 1992, the so-called "liberal-internationalists"—at the time unchallenged as the charters of Russia's new course—brimmed with as much enthusiasm for the "new world order" as did the Bush White House. Fresh from the burial of Soviet totalitarianism, they were infused with a vision of the world in which the old and tired notions of traditional power diplomacy—all those "spheres of influence" and "zones of vital interests"—were about to be made irrelevant by a kind of multinational police force, led by the United States. In that dream, the "civilized world" would swiftly and decisively intercede for peace, democracy, and human rights and would check violence everywhere, including, of course, in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Then came a conflagration of bloody ethnic and political fighting in Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova, and the escalation of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, all of which coincided with the siege of Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs. The sight of the international community's impotence, its inability to enforce the "new world order," or to contain, let alone settle, a savage ethnic conflict very much like ones that were sweeping the Russian southern periphery at the time, led the Russian "internationalists" to re-examine the hopes they had for the ability of the United States and its allies to restore a just peace anywhere. Assessing the Soviet-sponsored Cuban military intervention in Ethiopia in 1977-78, Zbigniew Brzezinski declared that "SALT lay buried in the sands of Ogaden." As far as the Russian "internationalists" were concerned, the "new world order" was buried in the hills around Sarajevo.

But perhaps the weightiest reason behind the hardening of the Russian foreign and national security postures was provided by that "iron law" of post-revolutionary consolidation: when the dust settles down, there is at least partial return to traditional national agendas and traditional ways of articulating and implementing them. In Russia this process resulted in a broad national consensus on key foreign policy objectives, a consensus which emerged and solidified in 1992 and was codified in 1993.

The New Consensus

THIS CONSENSUS revolves around three strategic goals: Russia as regional superpower; Russia as world nuclear superpower; and Russia as a great—though not "super"—world power. The support for and maintenance of each of these objectives will inform Russian behavior for decades to come. Each goal will ramify through Russia's relations with the United States. Ironically, it is the nuclear superpower dimension, the thorniest of the bilateral issues in Soviet times, that so far has proved to be the easiest to deal with. This despite Russia's far greater reliance on the nuclear deterrent today when her conventional capability is greatly reduced, and despite the near-obsessive zeal with which Moscow went after the Ukrainian and Kazakh weapons. It is in this area that the most unambiguous and important achievement of the U.S. engagement in Russia's post-Soviet strategic space has occurred: the de-nuclearization of Ukraine, which opened the way to the implementation of START I and ratification of START II. Some of this success undoubtedly is due to the well-developed and still well-oiled machinery of arms control negotiations, but most of the credit should go to a far more relaxed posture on Russia's part, once it bowed out of the competition for global superpower primacy.

Things get considerably more complicated as we approach the geostrategic space in which Russia seeks to pursue the other two goals of its core foreign policy agenda. Frictions with the United States that spring from this pursuit are likely to be of a systemic and recurrent nature, never to be completely "solved" and disposed of, only more

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or less successfully managed.

In response to U.S. actions outside Europe, we should expect Moscow to assume, at least initially, positions distinct from ours, sometimes stridently so. Yet, ultimately, the posture is not going to be antagonistic or even hostile. Reflecting a slow and very painful adjustment to the fall from superpowership, this stance is not unlike the foreign policy of de Gaulle's France: another great power, that, having seen its relative importance vis-à-vis the United States diminish precipitously, compensated by using every opportunity to make up in rhetoric what had been lost in substance.

Russia's engagement of the United States and its allies in Eastern and Central Europe—a "gray zone" between the abandoned global stance and the intense, nonnegotiable regional superpowership—is certain to be more stubborn and sustained than elsewhere in the world. It will include a resistance by all diplomatic means available, and a heated, at times blistering, rhetoric. In extreme cases, the West will face a choice between diluting and slowing down—or even abandoning—its policies, and a serious deterioration, indeed a possible breakdown, in relations with Moscow.

East-Central Europe will remain a source of strain because of the built-in tension between two geopolitical tendencies, clearly evident today. On the one hand, and reflecting an organizational credo that appears to equate expansion with vitality, NATO will keep trying to "anchor," police, protect, and eventually incorporate, the post-communist nations of Europe. On the other, Moscow will continue to resist Western expansion into the Slavic areas adjacent to Russian borders, reflecting an historic anxiety which is at least as old as West European fear of Russian imperialism, and which conjures up the nightmarish images of a *cordon sanitaire* around Russia.

The resulting contention will be further sharpened by the understandably relentless pressure of the Central European nations themselves for membership in NATO. To them it is both the ultimate symbolic imprimatur of their European lineage, interrupted by nearly five decades of war and Soviet domination, and a Trojan horse with which to penetrate the barriers of "fortress Europe"—a case of traveling to Luxembourg and Strasbourg via Brussels. Both of these prizes are far more real and urgent than any fear of the menace from the East. In this regard, the contre-temps caused by NATO's decision eventually to accept the Visegrad nations as members, while excluding Russia, appears characteristic. Having failed spectacularly to deal with a real threat to the European "new order" in Bosnia, NATO has proceeded to make up for the defeat by advancing toward a commitment against a threat that does not exist.

The Budapest Decision

FOR THE UNITED States, the endorsement of NATO's expansion, after almost two years of resistance, could be a watershed. During the previous three and a half years, under two administrations, Russia's rapidly evolving domestic and foreign policies lent themselves to three basic interpretations: the glass half-full, half-empty, and not-clear-but-let's-wait-and-see. Until the December 5, 1994 CSCE summit in Budapest, the U.S. appeared to be guided by the first and the third estimates. The "Partnership for Peace," ingeniously devised to postpone the crucial decision and buy time until truly informed judgment becomes possible, epitomized this highly prudent and responsible attitude. In Budapest, for the first time, the glass was found half-empty.

The full impact of this fateful verdict on U.S.-Russian relations may not be immediately apparent but is likely be very real and extensive. In international politics, symbols are just as real a currency as treaties and troop deployments. NATO's decision undermines the tentative but hopeful paradigm of U.S.-Russian relations that emerged at the

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Washington summit in September 1994. There, for the first time, instances of divergent national interests were discussed frankly. Some were resolved, others registered as disagreements to be worked out later. Yet all were clearly demarcated and localized, thus preventing them from poisoning the overall relation. That this foundation for a mature relationship became possible was due to the cumulative effect of those intangible but indispensable catalysts of all genuine and lasting diplomatic rapprochements: good will and trust. It is precisely these vital antidotes to strategic breakdowns that have been seriously sapped by the U.S. endorsement of the NATO expansion.

To the Russians, the implied exclusion from the "civilized world" represents a judgment on the country's ability to complete its march toward democracy. It is this pronouncement on the fate of the Russian experiment, issued by the country still by far the most admired by Russians, that accounts for the resentment across the political spectrum and for the brusqueness of President Yeltsin's remarks in Budapest. Yeltsin stated, "Europe, not having freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War, is in danger of plunging into a cold peace. Why sow the seeds of mistrust?"

Two weeks before Budapest, Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Duma and a leading contender for the post of the minister of foreign affairs in the post-Yeltsin government, commented in *Moscow News* on the Republican victory on November 8th and its significance for Russia:

> The struggle [in the United States] between the two views on the "Russian problem" is intensifying sharply. The first view holds Russia a great nation which, on the whole, is proceeding in the right direction and the progress of which will determine success or failure of the "democratic wave" of the 1980s - 1990s. In the other view, Russia is a semi-prostrate communist giant, immanently imperial and aggressive, ruined by incompetent leadership and soon to be ready to tread the same road [as in the past] that would lead, eventually, to confrontation with the West. Until now, the first view has largely prevailed. Yet the changes in the political climate in Washington could push Clinton toward the other position.

An old and experienced American hand, Lukin was correct both in his description of the Washington *Weltanschauung* and in the impact of U.S. politics on the White House's change of policy.

The damage done by the NATO decision has been further deepened by the context in which it was made and by its timing. Having, in effect, declared Russia less fit than, say, Slovakia[1] to participate in the dominant security structure of Europe, the U.S. and their NATO allies made little attempt to tie Moscow to the new world order by other means: either by special arrangements between Brussels and Moscow which would parallel those between NATO and the Visegrad nations, or by greater Russian

[1]Expressing what appears to be a view popular with the supporters of NATO's action, Charles Krauthammer, in a recent column, pronounced Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia deserving to be "brought into NATO within three years time." At the same time he declared Russia unfit for the membership because, among other bad things, "half of the Russian people voted for fascist or communist parties" in the December 1993 elections (*Washington Post*, December 16, 1994). He omitted to mention that, while 20 percent of Russians voted for the communists or their allies and 23 percent voted for Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 36 percent of Poles voted for the communists in the most recent elections, as did 33 percent of Hungarians. The anti-Russian bias among some American conservatives must indeed be quite strong if one of their best and brightest insists on the rapid admission into NATO of countries ruled by communists or left nationalist populists—so long as Russia opposes it.

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cooperation with, and perhaps a promise of eventual participation in, the G-7.

The timing of the NATO decision compounded the harm, as it coincided with the twilight of the Yeltsin phase of the Russian revolution. The decision to draw a line separating Russia from the rest of Europe presents the Russian political elite with a new geostrategic reality which will undoubtedly shape their choices in the next two years—precisely at the time when they will lay a blueprint for a post-Yeltsin foreign policy.

The Near Abroad: Influence or Imperialism?

IN NO OTHER area will this blueprint be more complicated and pointed than in Russia's pursuit of regional superpowership. We would do well to understand the place of the near abroad in Russian national security.

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev voiced an assessment widely shared in Russia when he stated that the most probable danger to his country was

> not a direct armed invasion but her gradual entanglement in conflicts in neighboring nations and regions. Given the complex interrelation and interdependence of the various [newly independent] states and peoples, any armed conflict may evolve into a large-scale war.

But Russian concerns in the near abroad go far beyond purely military affairs. Much like the United States, which with the end of the Cold War has revised and expanded its definition of national security to include, for instance, free trade, the new Russia has redefined its own national security posture by placing a very strong, perhaps paramount, emphasis on progress toward economic prosperity and democracy. The centrality of the near abroad to Russia stems precisely from the view in Moscow that neither objective will be achieved without first securing a measure of stability in the newly independent states and then effecting economic re-integration with them.

Tied to Russia—in some cases for centuries, and in all cases for many decades—by a myriad of economic, political, social, military, and human cords, the new states are seen by the Russians—and it is here that the national consensus is the widest and the strongest—as the keystone to Russian national security in a most immediate sense. The key guiding document in the area of foreign policy, a kind of National Security Directive Number One, signed by Yeltsin in April 1993, states this quite unambiguously:

> The vitally important interests of the Russian Federation are connected, first of all, with the development of her relations with the states of the near abroad. Russia cannot develop normally other than on the basis of new economic and transportation ties, cooperation in the area of defense, and in the settlement of conflicts.

In addition, Russian tentative political stability is perennially threatened by the prospect of an explosive exodus of ethnic Russians from the countries of the near abroad, especially the 9.7 million from Central Asia. In private conversations, both Russian officials and politicians of very different political hues insist that they had no choice but to defend the Afghan-Tajik border and support the puppet communist regime in Tajikistan, about which they have no illusions. They claimed that a victory of Muslim fundamentalists there would result in the destabilization of the whole of Central Asia and in the falling "dominos" of a massive Russian exodus from Uzbekistan (1.6 million), and Kazakhstan (6.2 million)—an exodus with which Russia would not be able to cope economically, socially and politically. Already an estimated two million have emigrated to Russia since 1989, and at least six million more are considered likely to move in the near future.

If the French experience in the 1960s is a guide, the Russian *pieds noirs*—impoverished,

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homeless, unemployed, and bitter—are also likely to be profoundly reactionary. It took France (a far richer and stable society in the 1960s than Russia is today, or will be any time soon) two decades to digest and partially defuse a far smaller number of French exiles from Algeria. Whether or not Russian refugees from near abroad would organize themselves into an equivalent of the *Organisation Armée Secrète* (an organization that, if formed, thousands would join, and hundreds of thousands vote for), it seems more than likely that the extreme leftist parties would respond very quickly by advocating the restoration of the Soviet Union by force.

To note the deep domestic political, economic, and social roots of the Russian policy in the near abroad is not, of course, to imply that Russian behavior there should not be watched extremely carefully for the clues that will help answer the all-important question: Is Russia engaged in a purposeful, sustained and coherent rebuilding of the empire—or is it merely fashioning a security belt, a "sphere of influence" of the kind that for centuries has existed around most great land powers?

The question, and the distinction, are critical because the answer goes to the heart of our paramount concern: Russia's progress toward a democratic state at peace with its own people, its neighbors, and the world. For, unlike, say, French and British counterparts, the Russian empire historically has never been compatible with Russian liberalization. Because of the geography of the near abroad, a determined effort at recapturing and consolidating the empire is almost certain to be accompanied by a slide toward authoritarianism and militant nationalism at home.[2] On the other hand, the establishment of an old-fashioned "sphere of influence" along Russia's southern border, attended though it is certain to be by the usual quota of nasty tricks, is likely to be non-lethal to the Russian progress.

We need to establish, and inform Moscow of, a series of markers on the perimeter where the "zone of influence" ends and open-ended imperialism begins. Together such markers would constitute a kind of conceptual tripwire around Russia and set off alarms and Western opposition if crossed. These markers are not difficult to agree on, and three are quite obvious. The largest of them involves Russian behavior in relation to Ukraine, i.e., any and all Russian attempts to pressure, Finlandize, or threaten Ukraine's territorial integrity, be that in the Russian-majority enclaves of Crimea or in the Northeast. The second segment of the tripwire should be placed on the Russian border with the Baltic states and activated, for instance, by Moscow's insistence on basing rights for the Russian fleet, submarines and early warning systems; military build-up in Kaliningrad and special "rights of access" to this Russian enclave within Lithuania; or long-term "Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation." The third manifestation of the imperial designs would be an attempt to forcibly detach from Kazakhstan its six northern provinces by inciting and abetting Russian irredentism there.

This distinction should form the basis for our reaction to Moscow's actions in the near abroad. The rebuilding of the empire would be an act of political will and should be resisted, expeditiously and vigorously. The construction and management of a "sphere of influence" is an inevitable geostrategic reality. While its harsher manifestations may properly be criticized and an effort made to persuade Russia to exert its influence by more civilized methods, the reality should be acknowledged and the larger strategic stakes in our relationship always be kept well in mind.

The Russian invasion of Chechnya is a case in point. At once repugnantly brutal and inept, it should raise questions about the nature of the present Russian regime and President Yeltsin's dramatic physical and political decline. Yet the issue here is not imperialism but separatism. Chechnya is not

[2]See my "Yeltsin's Vietnam," *The Washington Post*, August 22, 1993.

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the Sudetenland of 1938, the eastern Poland of 1939, or the Afghanistan of 1979. Rather, it is like the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka, Turkish Kurdistan, or Indian Kashmir of today: an area where a determined ethnic or religious minority seeks independence from a larger nation of which it has been a part for many decades. (And if Moscow does not make major concessions to the Chechens, the situation there will unfold along the same lines: an endless "dirty" war, fought with increasing brutality by both sides, complete with terrorism inside Russia itself.)

To criticize Russian behavior in this war is not to criticize Russian imperialism but, rather, the inability of the quasi-democratic polity to resist the age-long tradition in which a "small victorious war"—to quote Viacheslav Plehve, minister of the interior under the last Russian tsar, Nicholas II—is seen as the shortest and most reliable way of proving the effectiveness and ensuring popularity of an unstable regime.

As far as Russian imperialism is concerned, the only point conclusively proven by the wretched Chechnya affair is that even an imperfect democracy erodes, if not cures, the imperial urge. Although tardy in bestowing on Russia many of its other boons, Russian democracy has matured enough to make lengthy military expeditions very dangerous for the regime. The longer Russia persists on the non-authoritarian path, the harder its leaders will find to undertake even relatively minor "inside jobs," much less to enact grander imperial designs.

The Honest Broker

YET THERE IS TODAY a glaring disjunction between the attention being given to the near abroad by the West in the form of close monitoring of Russian actions and the West's inability and disinclination to intervene effectively in the region itself. Given the obvious lack of interest, funds, political will and, most importantly, public support for expending money, much less lives, in these exotic faraway lands, remote indeed is the likelihood of any direct Western intervention. To be sure, so obvious is the Western desire to stay away from the near abroad that, in response to Western protestations of concern for it, Yeltsin could well borrow from General de Gaulle and call the West's bluff. Asked at a press conference at the Elysée in April, 1961 if he was concerned that France's withdrawal from Algeria would produce an opening there for the Soviet Union or the United States, he responded, "*À toutes deux je souhaite d'avance bien du plaisir.*"[3] (Loosely translated: "Both are most welcome to have a lot of fun there.")

As things stand today, the most we could hope for by way of constructive U.S. involvement is a mediation effort patterned on what might be called the Ukraine-Estonia model: the brokering of agreements with Russia which led to the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from Estonia. In both cases the United States provided Russia and her neighbors with a forum and a framework that allowed both sides to make concessions they themselves had come to recognize as inevitable, but for which they needed a domestic political cover in the form of the alleged, and publicly decried, U.S. "pressure."

Meanwhile, as in the case of Russian domestic politics, the fluidity of conditions relating to the near abroad presents U.S. policymakers with the familiar problem of having to make judgment calls on the basis of inadequate information. Still, here too, the glass appears to be half-full rather than half-empty.

So far Russia has proved, at best, a reluctant integrationist. It took, for instance, months of debate in the parliament to approve the treaty with Georgia that led to the deployment of several hundred Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia. As late as last June, the upper chamber of the Russian par-

[3]Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle* (New York: Norton & Co., 1992), vol.II, p. 278.

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liament rejected Yeltsin's request for that deployment—which, when it finally occurred, received formal UN approval.

Even stranger for those who allege a consistent and centrally directed rebuilding of the Russian empire must be the case of Crimea. A part of Russia for two centuries until arbitrarily assigned to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954, the region is instilled with unique beauty and history that occupy a special place in the national conscience of Russians. Seventy percent of Crimea's population are ethnic Russians who dream of unification with the Motherland. Yet Russia has consistently refused to get involved, even now after the coming to power of the newly-elected president, Yuri Meshkov, who campaigned and was elected last February with 73 percent of the vote, on the radical program of the peninsula's secession from Ukraine. Another truly paradigmatic case is the recent rejection by Moscow of a monetary union with the new pro-Moscow regime in Belarus. This development epitomized one critical difference between the new Russia and the old Soviet Union. For Russia today, the price that it is willing to pay, both in treasure and in blood, for control and extension of authority in the near abroad is strictly limited. For the Soviet Union, when imperial domination was at issue, cost was no object.

Choreography for Change

PERHAPS METAPHOR can help. During the forty-five years of the Cold War, relations between the two superpowers could be likened to the tango. The dancers were intertwined, locked in a seemingly inescapable embrace, pressed against each other like two wrestlers. The movements were sharp and sudden, and every move instantly produced a counter move. Every inch of the dance floor was contested and yielded only after a struggle. The partners' eyes were fixed on each other, to an almost total exclusion of other dancers on the floor. Their preoccupation, even obsession, with each other was nearly complete. The rhythm was taut and wakeful, and the air brimmed with tension, danger, excitement and the anticipation of some proximate resolution, dramatic and final.

When communism fell, we continued to dance the tango with the Soviet Union's successor, Russia. We invested ourselves deeply and engaged very closely—mostly out of the desire to help bring permanent change quickly, to remake Russia into a prosperous democracy, but also because this was the rhythm and the choreography we were used to. Under pressure from the inevitable divergence in national interests this dance of near-obsessive closeness and quick and final results had to be abandoned. It now has been. But what is to replace it still has to be decided.

Will we replace the artificially imposed closeness, which masked real differences, with frosty hostility or a turning away? Will the U.S. and Russia, having abandoned the outdated tango, limit themselves to exchanging angry glances across the dance floor and stepping on each other's toes while dancing with other partners?

That outcome is not inevitable. There is available an alternative, a balancing act between the inherently unsustainable closeness of the past few years and the "cold peace" of the past few months. This new strategy would involve an unflinching airing of differences but also a painstaking building on the common ground that exists and a conscious effort to give each other some benefit of the doubt—all to buy time for the Russian democratic experiment and to increase its chances of success by removing the traditional impediments to Russian liberalization: the perception of external hostility and of national humiliation. It is time for America and Russia to learn a new dance, one that would allow, at once, for both safe distancing and periodic contact at critical points. How about the minuet for a model: elaborate, graceful, slow, aloof, and cerebral? The part-

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ners spend a great deal of time away from each other, yet get together at regular intervals, give right hands to each other, and, upon turning a full circle, part again until the next occasion.

This combination of distance and regular engagement is crucial for a correct American posture, because of the duality of Russian policy. In the coming years, Russian foreign policy will involve, both in form and in substance, an unprecedented blend: on the one hand, the dramatic and benign change brought about by Yeltsin's departure from the traditional Russian foreign policy paradigm; on the other hand, the continuity dictated by both the powerful historic tradition and geostrategic imperatives of a huge post-colonial continental power.

It is from this duality that the greatest challenge to the U.S. policymakers is likely to result. For at different times and in different places, one or the other element—novelty or continuity—is likely to be stronger. To be effective, United States policy must recognize and accept the reality of both formative influences and learn to distinguish between the two. The nuanced response that such an approach could produce would be likely to keep U.S.-Russian relations on an even and constructive course.

While not precluding forceful and honest discussion of disagreements, the U.S.-Russian minuet would keep the partners regularly engaged in a cooler, calculated, yet still friendly and regularly revisited arrangement. This would seem the best means available to prevent disillusion, recriminations, and distrust from rising to threaten what is still the firmest guarantee of world peace: Russia's and America's good will and openness toward each other. □

Alternative Medicine

Before the UN is trashed, it behooves its critics to come up with something better.

—Richard Cohen
The Washington Post
November 29, 1994

There is a well-known story about a man who, during the Lisbon earthquake of 1775, went about hawking anti-earthquake pills; but one incident is forgotten—when someone pointed out that the pills could not possibly be of use, the hawker replied: 'But what would you put in their place?'

—L.B. Namier
In the Margin of History

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NATO's Expansion

Why the Critics Are Wrong

William E. Odom

UNTIL THE twentieth century, modern international systems were constructed in Europe and largely confined to Europe. In this century, they have been started in Europe but made global, involving North America and East Asia centrally and other regions peripherally. Likewise, the destruction of these systems has begun in Europe. The open question today, therefore, is whether Europe is in the construction or destruction phase. Given the trends there, the smart money is on destruction.

Why so? The short answer is leadership, especially U.S. leadership. Stable systems have always been created by the leaders of the major powers. The configuration of power today is such that only the United States can launch the construction of a new system, although it would need the cooperation of several other key states. Having adequate power, however, is not enough. Leadership with a strong sense of direction and the plodding consistency to remain on course is no less critical. Yet power and leadership will not be enough if the window of opportunity closes under the forces of disorder.

The window appears to be closing more rapidly as a result of the failure in both U.S. and European elites to agree on a strategy and build a political consensus to support it. This hiatus in concerted thought and policy action began in the last two years of the Bush administration after perhaps the greatest achievement of diplomacy in European history: the reunification of Germany within NATO, a peaceful realignment in Europe with no modern parallel. Yet that feat may prove a hollow victory because President Bush failed to rally NATO in 1991 to act in Yugoslavia and to plan for security arrangements in the eastern half of Europe. The window has been closing ever since.

The absence of effective policy action has not been matched by an absence of thinking about a strategy or the tendering of unsolicited advice. Advice abounds but consensus has been scarce. American former statesmen, scholars, and pundits are vocal but deeply divided on the major issues of the Bosnia crisis and the expansion of NATO. Europeans, including Russians, are no less divided. All the differing policy prescriptions are too numerous to examine separately; thus I shall suggest a few general approaches which subsume most of the variants. In reviewing them critically, I make no pretense at concealing my own policy preferences.

Russia First

THE FIRST SET of prescriptions gives Russia first priority in U.S. foreign policy. President Richard Nixon

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advanced the "Russia first" approach most vigorously during the Bush administration. Within the Clinton administration, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott is reportedly its strongest proponent, although he is hardly alone among incumbent U.S. officials. Although President Clinton shares Talbott's view, he apparently began to move away from it in the fall of 1994 as he gave NATO expansion more serious consideration. Former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé also belongs to the "Russia first" camp, calling for a Russian-American defense community.[1] And former NSC staffer Stephen Sestanovich, also a close student of the Soviet Union, warns against any U.S. policy that might enable Russian nationalists and extremists to destroy Russia's inchoate democracy—more precisely, he warns that expanding NATO and accusing Moscow of imperialism within the Commonwealth of Independent States are not conducive to the promotion of democracy in Russia.[2] The unlikely political mix of Nixon, Iklé, Sestanovich, Talbott, and Clinton suggests that this camp straddles the left-right political divide in U.S. politics, but a closer look exposes its internal left-right differences.

Talbott's rationale, it seems, is betting on Russia's successful transition to liberal democracy. Sestanovich shares this outlook, dismissing the reassertion of Russian hegemony over much of the former Soviet Union as a significant threat to Russian democracy. The virtue of the goal cannot be disputed. With cooperation between the United States and a democratic Russia, a security system for the whole of Europe can be worked out, and the Western Europeans would be highly supportive of such cooperation. Iklé's rationale, on the other hand, depends less on Russian democracy and more on military cooperation, thus having the logic of a security condominium.

The problem with the democracy rationale is twofold. First, Russia has to succeed as a democracy and that outcome is far from certain. Second, it has to succeed fairly soon; otherwise, disorder in the Balkans and setbacks in the transition programs in the states of the former Warsaw Pact cannot be dealt with in an effective fashion, because the necessary cooperation from Moscow will not be available. Indeed, fears of upsetting Russia will prevent Western unilateral action to deal with such problems.

To a significant degree, these adverse consequences have already beset the Clinton administration, and they may explain its decision to propose the expansion of NATO in December 1994. In short, this variant of the "Russia first" strategy has had its chance, and has come up wanting. Giving up on it, however, does not mean writing off Russia or ceasing to help its successful transition. Rather it means recognizing that European security has to be addressed *now*, without conceding a Russian veto on the solution, with Russian cooperation if possible, but without it if necessary. In other words, the virtue of the "Russia first" strategy need not be cast off despite what its proponents fallaciously insist, as they surrender their moral dignity by watching silently as the Chechens are smashed into submission.

The problems with the cooperative security rationale are no less serious. First, the Russian military is too diminished from failed perestroika reforms and from general decay to be capable of the kind of relationship Iklé and others seek. Second, the Russian military is so entangled in domestic

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[1]Fred Iklé, "Comrades in Arms," *The National Interest* (Winter 1991), pp. 22-32; more recently, "How to Ruin NATO," *The New York Times*, January 11, 1995, p. A21. Unlike other "Russia first" enthusiasts, Iklé is more enamored with the Russian military than Russian democracy.

[2]Stephen Sestanovich, "Giving Russia Its Due," *The National Interest* (Summer 1994), pp. 3-13. See also his "Russia Turns the Corner," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1994), pp. 83-98, for a bullish view on the prospects for Russian democracy.

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politics that it finds as many reasons to treat the United States as an adversary as it does to treat it as a partner. Any reliable partnership would require repeated U.S. approval, implicit if not explicit, of anti-democratic Russian behavior, of which the case of Chechnya is only one example. Russian policy in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus would create the same moral and political burdens for a United States that entered into a security arrangement.

Let Europe Take Care of Itself

ANOTHER SET OF views boils down to leaving Europe to its own security devices. Its variants are several, but at root they all come to a common prescription: the United States should no longer guarantee European security. Some of its proponents still support NATO but oppose its expansion. Others really do not care if NATO survives. Many of its proponents do not advance it as a coherent strategy but merely invoke it to justify shifts in budget priorities toward U.S. domestic programs.

Its most vociferous proponents are libertarians. The CATO Institute's incessant spokesman on foreign affairs, Ted Galen Carpenter, calls NATO an expensive anachronism, but one that is downright dangerous because it has the capacity to drag the United States into European wars. It is time, he insists, for Europe to organize its own defense and pay the price of peace in Europe.[3] Owen Harries offers a less prescriptive view that comes close to the same conclusion, asserting that the "West" as we knew it in the Cold War no longer exists. Instead of calling for the end of the Atlantic Alliance, he argues that the objective conditions for its maintenance are gone and that efforts to expand it, perhaps even merely to salvage it, will fail. In the absence of a Soviet threat or its equivalent, foreign policy interests within Europe and across the Atlantic are too incompatible to be reconciled by U.S. leadership.[4]

Three realities make this approach more likely to create dangers greater than the ones it seeks to remove. First, were the United States to leave the security of Europe entirely to Europeans, no common Western European defense community would replace it. The only state powerful enough to lead such a community is Germany, a leader France and Britain will not accept. Yet neither France nor Britain can take the lead itself. Franco-German cooperation in the European Union aims to overcome this mutual distrust, but the prospects of its reaching a common European defense and foreign policy look dimmer today than it did two or three years ago.

The Bosnian affair has demonstrated the core problems of achieving a so-called "European pillar" based on a political union that could prosecute effective military operations under a single command. In the face of U.S. passivity, France, Britain, and Germany quickly revealed that they are far from a common foreign policy, even in Europe. Germany's early recognition of Croatia prompted France and Britain to condemn Bonn and tilt initially to the Serbian side. This old pattern of competitive diplomacy is unlikely to remain confined to the former Yugoslavia; it can easily spread to Central and Eastern Europe.

The second reality is Russian foreign policy. Russia has lost an empire but not yet its imperial aspiration. Without an American presence in Europe, Russia may succeed at the diplomatic game it is already playing—encouraging dissension among the Europeans and disengagement on the part of the United States. A senior German CDU (Christian Democratic Union) leader, Kurt Bidenkopf, was told by the former Politburo

[3]See his *Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 1994), pp. 1-9.

[4]Owen Harries, "The Collapse of the West," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October, 1993), pp. 41-53.

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member Alexander Yakovlev, in 1989, that after the Cold War the Europeans will soon be "dancing around the golden calf of Moscow's favor."[5] Likewise, Karsten Voigt, a senior SPD (Party of Democratic Socialism) member of the Bundestag, said to a Washington audience in December, 1993 that leaving Germany as the easternmost liberal democracy in Central Europe would inevitably force it to make deals with Russia over the rest of Central Europe. The danger to Europe is not a new Russian military threat but rather Russian internal disorder, coupled with a foreign policy aimed at dividing Europe as the United States looks on passively.

The third reality is a military-technical one. It would be difficult for Europe to build a modern defense capability even if it were willing to spend the money. The nature of military weaponry, the military-industrial base, manpower requirements, and the role of space have so dramatically altered over the past four decades that Europe is not capable of achieving anything like the military power it enjoys within NATO. The changes relate not just to technology but also to the geographical space required to test, deploy, and train soldiers to use modern weapons. Europe does not have the space. Russia does. Nor does Europe enjoy a common language required for the manpower pool of a modern military in the same class as the U.S. military. Russia does. The U.S. military compensates for these European inadequacies.[6]

Although they have suffered severe quantitative reductions, NATO's military components still enjoy a rather large qualitative advantage over any potential adversary today. This qualitative edge has been driven mainly by the United States military. Without the American stimulus, the military establishments in Europe would have difficulty staying abreast of the continuing technological dynamic in military affairs; and, conversely, without the NATO obligation a similar stagnation would be more likely in the U.S. military. Those who urge the U.S. to let Europe take care of itself probably do not understand what sustains this military advantage—otherwise they would address the implications of letting it seriously erode.

It is precisely the American involvement in Europe, through NATO, that has provided Western Europe with what it has never had in modern times and is unlikely to attain any time soon on its own: a substitute for a supra-national political and military authority. To remove it is to ensure the slowdown and eventual reversal of European economic integration and political cooperation, not to mention a breakdown in military cooperation. Thus the libertarian prescription would produce an economically stagnant and militarily insecure Europe. How libertarians see this kind of Europe fitting with their prescriptions for the U.S. economy is difficult to fathom.

It must be admitted, however, that the United States cannot continue to play this role in Europe if the Europeans do not desire it. No U.S. policy should discourage or try to block European aspirations for "taking care of themselves." On the contrary, they should be encouraged to proceed on that path. But pushing them onto it before they are ready and determined to end the Atlantic Alliance is hardly the way to ensure their success.

Return to a Balance of Power

STILL ANOTHER SET of views recommends a return to a traditional balance of power in Europe. Henry Kissinger, and to some degree Zbigniew Brzezinski, although they both favor the expansion of NATO, subscribe to the balance

[5]Bidenkopf to the author, in Washington, December 1993, citing it as evidence of where the politics of Europe would go without strong U.S. leadership in NATO.

[6]See William. E. Odom, *America's Military Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1993), chapters 4 and 6, for elaboration of this point.

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of power approach.[7] Its more avid proponents, however, do not insist on, or even favor, NATO's continued existence. By forming a new concert of European and North American powers engaged in a collective security system, they would make it essentially irrelevant.[8] Russia, Germany, Britain, France, and the United States would organize security in Europe, managing it as the great powers did in the nineteenth century.

Some proponents do not make the argument so formally but advocate policies consistent with it. Owen Harries and Michael Lind do so in their opposition to the expansion of NATO.[9] They do not believe the United States can sustain its leadership role in Europe, much less in an expanded NATO. Although there is a Spenglerian quality to his argument, Harries explicitly denies holding the "declinist" view of U.S. power. Rather, Europe has become economically stronger, and while chances for a political union have receded for the moment, they will return as soon as Europe's economy turns again.[10] Lind chides the Russophobia of British emigres (e.g., Colin Gray) and Central European emigres ("mostly Polish") who fear Russian expansion, and he warns against criticizing Russia over its actions in Chechnya. The ethnic slight might come from a native born American, but the rest sounds like a voice for inaction from Oxford or Cambridge in the 1930s.

At a global level, some version of a new concert of powers makes sense. It is the only practical approach to a global order. But at the European level it makes only partial sense. Europe's security problems are primarily ones of internal instability and civil war, problems a balance of power approach will not solve. To give up NATO as the core institution for European military security would be to invite the very kinds of diplomatic competition that the "Let Europe Take Care of Itself" approach has meant in the past.

Finally, a balance of power approach alone is out of tune with American political values. The American concept for NATO at its creation was prevention of a return to the old *Realpolitik* game in Western Europe, and although the alliance balanced Soviet power, it was created as much to solve Western Europe's problem with Germany as it was to prevent Soviet expansion. In France and most other continental states in Western Europe in the late 1940s, the Soviet threat was little discussed in the debate on NATO. Only the United States and to a lesser degree Britain saw the Soviet Union as the major problem. In France, Germany was the problem. Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman saw NATO as an umbrella under which economic cooperation, eventually leading to political cooperation, would be possible because the military alliance would remove the old balance of power conditions. Konrad Adenauer

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[7]Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," *Washington Post*, December 19, 1994, op-ed page; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1995), pp. 26-42.

[8]Charles A. and Clifford A. Kuchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security* (Summer 1991), pp. 114-61, spell out the balance of power approach using international relations theory and the concept of collective security. In their scheme, NATO would have no role.

[9]Owen Harries, "My So-called Foreign Policy," *The New Republic*, October 10, 1994, pp. 25-31; and Michael Lind, "Let's Appease Russia!" *The New Republic*, January 9&16, 1995, pp. 28-31.

[10]A side theme in Harries' argument concerns the debilitating effect on European leaders and publics of letting the United States take the major responsibility for Europe's security. He is right on this point, but does it follow that Europe should be allowed to regress into diplomatic chaos, conceivably even war at some point, in order to reverse this debilitation? A few European intellectuals and elites would vote to take the risk, but European publics might feel quite otherwise.

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shared that view and also saw NATO as a device for recovering Germany's independence sooner.[11] Precisely this internal NATO mission in Western Europe is overlooked by those who see the collapse of the Soviet military threat as making NATO obsolete.

The NATO epoch has brought to Europe a significant degree of American idealism about international relations. On one level, it has produced a balance of power. On another level it has inspired ideals and cooperation unknown in modern Europe. Why should we risk the decay of this remarkable achievement in Western Europe? At the same time, collective security and balance of power make sense in dealing with the larger Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Democratic Peace

ANOTHER SET OF views on European security rests heavily on the idealist component of U.S. foreign policy. Bruce Russett makes a case on the empirical record that democracies do not fight each other, and explains this in terms of democratic ideals and public participation in policymaking.[12] The solution to Europe's security problems, it seems to follow, is more democracy. Variations of this view are to be found, and the "Russia first" approach is consistent with it. If there were democracies in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals—and virtually all countries in that expanse are trying to create them—then the security problem would go away.

It is easy to dismiss this prescription as excessively idealistic. Yet there is something to the argument, although it is sometimes articulated in a way that confuses effect with cause. In ambiguous cases where countries have gone to war—for example, America with Britain in 1812 and Germany with Britain and France in 1914—the state that initiated hostilities is written off as not really democratic. This is close to arguing that a country is not democratic if it initiates hostilities, a standard that would make the United States a non-democracy on a few past occasions. Or it is argued that one democracy in these cases did not "perceive" the other country as a democracy.[13] Valid though this analysis may be, it would leave future security to the vicissitudes of perceptions. These quibbles aside, one has to admit that the propensity of democracies to settle disputes short of war is a correlation too strong to be dismissed. It has been near perfect among the democracies within the U.S. postwar alliance systems. Economic interdependencies have mushroomed within the market economies of those systems, and international organizations have emerged to handle political, economic, and military cooperation among democratic states.

Some observers have called this postwar system an American empire. Paul Kennedy's warning that it will fall victim, like previous empires, to "imperial overstretch," is well known. American libertarians and other U.S. domestic groups repeat it, especially those who want to shift more money from the defense budget to social programs. Whether or not the American system is properly classified as an empire is debatable, but if it is, it is one of a very new type. Instead of impoverishing the United States through heavy military burdens, it has proven a money-making proposition. The net result of U.S. military expenditures has hardly been a deficit. Without them and the alliances they have sustained, the economic prosperity of

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[11]F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), offers many insights into European thinking about NATO's initial purposes that have too often been forgotten, especially in Germany and France.

[12]Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[13]John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125, makes this argument.

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the trilateral regions of North America, Western Europe, and Northeast Asia could not have occurred. In a speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in December 1994, the secretary of commerce stated that affiliates of U.S. corporations in Europe have sales of $850 billion annually and generate $30 billion in earnings. They also sell $650 billion in goods and services in the United States. U.S. exports to Europe amount to $110 billion, and about three million Americans are employed by European firms in the United States. Ted Galen Carpenter is appalled that U.S. defense expenditures for forces in Europe are about $90 billion. The true figure, when adjusted for costs that would be paid even if U.S. troops were not in Europe, actually is considerably lower. In any case, as an overhead expenditure for the largest part of the trilateral regions' security system, it is hardly in excess of the gains. Moreover, if the figures for the Asian part of this system of trading democracies were included as well as the impact of European-East Asian trade, the gains would be much larger.

Without the umbrella of the U.S. military alliances, this unprecedented postwar economic prosperity is unlikely to continue. As the Nobel Prize winning economist Douglass C. North has explained, when governments provide law, order, and ideological consensus, they lower the transaction costs for economic enterprise, allowing greater growth.[14] The U.S. alliance system has extended this phenomenon to an international level, effectively lowering the transaction costs for international trade in the trilateral regions. Those who would dismantle the old security system would be more likely to raise the transaction costs of economic interdependency than to sustain our present prosperity. And the proponents of a new balance of power system might find the military burdens of that system equal to or greater than the old burdens. Moreover, the economic transaction costs would almost be certain to rise for many trade patterns within a collective security system after U.S. military withdrawal from Europe and East Asia.

The points stands: this American empire is a profitable venture for all its members. That is precisely why outside states want in. Mexico has overcome its longstanding anti-U.S. feelings and fought its way into the North American Free Trade Agreement. Little wonder that several Central European states want to join NATO and the EU. When members of the American empire begin to leave it, we will know that the transaction costs of membership have risen greatly and that "imperial overstretch" would be a real problem if we tried to stop them.

There is more to the American involvement in Europe than idealism. It pays. It pays, in part, because idealism helps lower transaction costs, but at the same time it has a realist component. Much of Europe is not yet democratic, and parts of it are likely to fail in creating democracy. The power politics approach leaves out the idealism component. Russett's call for "grasping the democratic peace" raises the neglected issue. How much of Central Europe can NATO reasonably expect to bring under its umbrella and nurse through the painful processes of transitions to democracy and market economies? A corollary question is what will happen to the present NATO region and European unification efforts if no expansion is attempted, or if NATO is allowed to wither as the West drifts willy-nilly into a purely balance of power game in the whole of Europe?

Expand NATO Now

AGAINST ALL OF the foregoing views, of course, is the judgment that NATO must not only be preserved, but expanded. Senators Richard Lugar and Mitch McConnell, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, and Henry Kissinger

[14]See his *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), especially chapters 1-4.

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have been the most notable although not the only proponents of NATO's expansion. Like the other groups, the expansionists are not of one mind on the details of implementation. Their divergences are best understood in their answers to why, who, and when to expand NATO, as well as by what means.

Why? The key difference among the proponents of expansion lies in the emphasis that some put on external military security threats and others put on the internal development problems of prospective new members. The potential of a new Russian military threat to Central Europe concerns some more than others. Even if Russia poses no military threat, a new Russian diplomacy of meddling in Central Europe is feared. The new military threat is an extremely weak argument, unlikely to persuade anyone who is familiar with the state of the Russian military and its industrial base. Although a new Russian imperialism is already evident in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, the burden of that empire will impede a serious Russian military modernization that could actually pose a threat to Central Europe.

A much better argument for NATO's expansion is found in its inception: the concern of its proponents with internal political and economic affairs in Western Europe. While their national motives were at odds—Germany seeking early independence, France seeking to prevent a new German military threat—leaders in both countries realized that a U.S. military presence within an Atlantic alliance structure would create the security and political context for economic recovery and the building of new interstate relations. To play its role, the United States had not only to be a military hegemon; it also had to bring its political ideology to Europe. A purely realist American approach to NATO would have failed.

An expansion of NATO today can only occur under strong U.S. leadership, and it must have as its primary purpose the internal transformation of new member states. As they create successful market economies and liberal democracies within NATO, their foreign policies will also have to change. New Central European members cannot let themselves become the pawns of competitive diplomacy between Germany and Russia, between France and Germany or between Britain and Germany. Nor can they return to their interwar irridentism and patterns of ethnic politics. The expansion of NATO would be a failure if it did not break those old patterns, as it has already done in Western Europe.

To be sure, in principle external military security is also a purpose for an expanded NATO. But that challenge is nonexistent today, and to emphasize it as primary is to distort what is at stake and to frame the American debate in a way that stirs up unjustified fears of U.S. soldiers dying on the Polish eastern frontier. The military challenge could however reappear in the long run if NATO is not expanded.

Who? Answers range from three or four Central European states to all of them as well as the Baltic republics, Belarus, Ukraine, and even Russia. If the primary purpose of NATO is to extend a roof over new members under which they can more quickly make the transformation to the pattern of domestic and interstate relations of Western Europe, then it is easier to see which states are proper candidates for membership. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary seem to be solid prospects for such a transformation. Slovakia, often mentioned with this group, is more dubious, but because it would provide a contiguous border between the present NATO boundary and Hungary, it should at least be considered. Romania and Bulgaria are too problematic in their internal developments for NATO to bet on today. The same is true for Ukraine and Belarus. Although good arguments can be made for admitting the Baltic states, they should be excluded as assuming too great a reach.

Beyond these three or four Central European countries, the risks to NATO of bit-

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ing off more than it can chew are considerable. The more troublesome requests for NATO membership are likely to come eventually from Sweden and Austria, countries difficult to reject because they are solid democracies and also belong to the European Union. They would probably have to be accepted although there is no urgency for their early admission as there is for other cases, for example the Baltic states.

What about Russia? Kissinger and Brzezinski have made sound arguments against its membership, saying essentially that it would destroy the European character of the alliance and weaken its internal structure. Moreover, Russia shows no serious interest in joining. The task of accomodating Russia in a post-Cold War security structure is global, not just a European security issue. Here the proponents of collective security and a new concert of powers have the best argument, but the new system must include East Asia and the Middle East, not just a larger Europe to the Urals.

On the global level, Russia could be brought into the G-7, which is now the single global forum of liberal democratic market states. Although the G-7 was conceived to manage economic affairs, it has increasingly addressed political affairs. Unlike the UN Security Council, where the permanent members include China, a country that does not share Western principles of international relations to the degree they are shared in the G-7, and where the new strong powers of Germany and Japan are excluded, a G-8 would represent all the major powers committed to liberal democracy and market economics. The condition for Russian membership of that group should be continued progress to a market economy and democracy.

On the European level, a security committee could be created within the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), composed of Russia, Germany, France, Britain, and the United States. A consensus among these states to act to preserve the peace would be a strong foundation for European collective security. Without that consensus, OSCE could not act, and it should not. In such circumstances, NATO would be the fall-back for military action. In other words, a great power group within OSCE would provide Russia with the institutional opening to participate as cooperatively as it desired in the security of Europe and to block any OSCE action it opposed. For the next decade or so, that is about all that can be done in accomodating Russia. Its strong desire to join the G-7 suggests that if the limited expansion of NATO were coupled with both G-7 membership and a security committee in OSCE, Russian leaders might find NATO expansion less irritating. And it should not be overlooked that some Russian democrats have actually favored NATO's expansion to prevent a destabilizing vacuum in Central Europe.[15] The proponents of the "Russia first" approach fail to realize that their goal of a democratic Russia is more likely to be achieved by the "expand NATO" approach than by their own.[16]

It should be added that all three arrangements—limited NATO expansion, an OSCE security committee, and a G-8—should also improve the security climate for Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states. It would certainly be better than the situation today because it would give Russia stronger incentives to play by the collective security rules of the G-8 and OSCE.

When? Delay is not the answer, although some proponents argue for it. Including three, if not all four, of the Visegrad states should have been done at the NATO summit in 1993. Eduard Shevardnadze has said that it will be easier to expand NATO earlier than later. The Russian hardliners know this well,

[15]Sergei Blagovolin, "On the Foreign and Military Policy of Russia," *Svobodnaya mysl'*, no. 18 (1992), pp. 3-14; and Dmitri Trenin, "Will NATO Expand Eastward?" *Novoe Vremya*, no. 43 (October 1993), pp. 3-6.

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and that explains their tactic of threats, cries of alarm, and efforts to influence Western leaders and pundits. If they can delay the expansion long enough, not only do they hope to have recovered sufficiently to make it impossible for the Visegrad states to join NATO, but also to induce the old patterns of competitive diplomacy in Western Europe. Western hesitation based on fears of inciting political opposition to Yeltsin are actually strengthening that opposition. They, rather than Yeltsin, can already take credit for the delay, and they do.

What criteria? This question is tied to the "when?" question. Western military specialists tend to prefer more demanding criteria, but so do some political figures, including those in the Clinton administration who have helped move U.S. policy toward favoring expansion. By advocating criteria that include significant reform and upgrading of potential members' militaries so that they are near the level of NATO's, the day of expansion is delayed. Moreover, since potential new members in Central Europe are in poor economic shape, it detracts from their economic reforms to shoulder a larger military burden. There is no great urgency for the radical upgrading of Polish, Czech, and Hungarian military forces, certainly no more than for Spain when it joined NATO. If such military criteria had been invoked in 1949, NATO would still not be formed. The military criteria are a red herring.

Political and economic criteria are another matter. They must be a matter of judgment about the prospects for potential members to stay on the reform track. Again, if there were no risks in accepting a new member, the reason for admission would be weaker. Improving significantly the chances that a former dictatorship would grow deep democratic roots, rather than waiting until democracy was already deeply rooted, was the purpose in Western Europe in 1949 and should be the purpose in Central Europe today.

Putting emphasis on NATO's role in sponsoring internal reform does not mean that external security considerations should be forgotten. NATO could become too big to retain its internal military coherence. If it takes on too many difficult internal problems of the kind it has endured with the Greek-Turkish disputes, it could fracture. It should, therefore, expand first, and perhaps only, in Central Europe where the alliance has traditionally been the most vulnerable. No one can be sure that events in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus will not eventually produce a new wall in Europe. Thus NATO should position itself to insure that a divided Europe does not exclude the central continental region that has the strongest historical connections to Western Europe.

Can NATO Survive as It Is?

AMONG ALL OF these differing approaches to European security, one point of agreement seems to be shared. Senator Lugar put it most succinctly: "NATO must go out of area or out of business." The

[16]Liberal reform in Russia has never prospered in periods of East-West detente or when the West was conciliatory toward Russian autocracy and later communism. Russian Westernizers have only had a chance when Russia has been defeated militarily. Peter the Great's reforms came in response to military defeat, and Alexander II's emancipation of the serfs and his related reforms were catalyzed by defeat in the Crimean War. The October Manifesto in 1905 was largely a concession to a revolution prompted by military defeat by Japan, and the 1917 Provisional Government emerged from defeat in WWI. Finally, Gorbachev's perestroika was, among other things, a response to defeat in Afghanistan and in the qualitative arms race with the West. Liberal reform in Russia today will certainly perish without sustained pressure from the West. This historical record is entirely lost on the "Russia first" proponents.

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libertarians and the collective security proponents are explicitly prepared to accept that outcome. The "Russia first" proponents are not, and most of them may believe NATO can remain vital in its present boundaries. Fred Iklé is an exception in believing that it will go out of business if it does expand. Going "out of area," of course, is not merely a matter of expanding the membership. It also means being prepared to conduct military operations outside the traditional boundaries and for purposes other than defending against a Soviet attack.

Former Yugoslavia is the most conspicuous "out of area" challenge. The Bosnian crisis has not yet spilled outside of the former Yugoslav territorial boundaries, and Owen Harries may be right that it will not spread even if it festers for a long time. At the same time, it has spread in two other international dimensions. First, morally it has created an unhealthy climate in Western Europe and the United States as publics watch the slaughter on television and become accustomed to ignoring all responsibility for it, making a mockery of the idealist component in American and NATO foreign policy. Second, it has exacerbated diplomatic relations among Western European states, the United States, and Russia. For proponents of a new balance of power strategy, Bosnia can be dealt with by walling it off, and for the libertarians and those who would let Europe take care of itself, Bosnia can be ignored. For all other approaches, it presents an urgent problem.

Can NATO be expanded without dealing effectively with Bosnia? Some proponents of expansion appear to believe so, and the Clinton administration's new policy of advocating a gradual expansion has been launched as if the two issues can be separated. They probably cannot. Leaving the Bosnian affair to the Europeans has allowed U.S. leadership in NATO to decline and to suffer unprecedented criticism and scorn from European leaders. With such a mood inhabiting the alliance, Washington's capacity to convince all the European NATO capitals to support NATO expansion in Central Europe is sorely limited. In a real sense, therefore, the United States has to show effectiveness in dealing with Bosnia in order to restore European confidence that Washington knows what it is doing in pushing for NATO expansion.

Any solution to the Yugoslav disintegration must include at least the following elements: *First*, military balance on the ground must be changed, not just in Bosnia but in other parts of former Yugoslavia as well. That means introducing fairly large peacekeeping forces—150,000 to 200,000 troops, no more than one-third of which should be U.S. forces.[17] *Second*, the new military balance will have to be maintained for a long time, a generation or more. *Third*, intervention forces will at times have to play a "peacemaking" as well as a "peacekeeping" role. *Fourth*, control of military operations there cannot remain in UN hands but must be placed entirely in NATO's hands. *Fifth*, Western leaders must build domestic political support for such a policy. Following public opinion polls is not leadership. Changing them is.

The issue of NATO "out of area" military operations, of course, is larger than Bosnia. They may be required elsewhere in the coming decade. In virtually all conceivable U.S. military involvement in Europe, the Mediterranean region, and the Middle East, operations will have to be multilateral, as in the Persian Gulf War. Modern coalition military operations are extremely complicated. They cannot be thrown together overnight. NATO provides the single institution where the tedious, difficult, and highly technical details have been worked out. Thus the NATO military structure in this role is critical to maintaining the kind of extraordinary military power advantage that U.S. and other Western leaders have come to take for granted. If NATO ceases to work hard at this technical

[17] In earlier writings, I nominated figures of 300,000 to 400,000. These downward revisions follow conversations with ex-Yugoslav officers.

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military task, which is never complete and always changing in light of new military technologies, Western military power will decline significantly. The public and the media will not even notice the decline until a crisis arises and these military realities are forced into public view through feckless military responses.

Trying to maintain NATO more or less as it is seems doomed to failure. Its former strategic context has changed in fundamental ways that demand basic alterations in the Atlantic alliance. At the same time, political, strategic, and military-technical continuities demand that it not be altered too much. Some critics, calling for "new thinking," argue that the disappearance of the Soviet military renders NATO obsolete. But is that "new" or "old" thinking? Such a fixation on the Soviet threat was Cold War thinking. Truly new thinking requires looking for continuing and new purposes for NATO before dismissing it.

Is a Consensus Possible?

THE RANGE OF views on a proper U.S. approach to Europe is so wide that no consensus seems possible. Their incompatibilities are numerous and in some cases fundamental. In particular, the "let Europe take care of itself" school of thought stands apart as a sure road to U.S. isolationism, whether its proponents admit it or not. A critical look at all of the other approaches will identify overlapping conceptions and capabilities, all of which envision a U.S. policy of engagement in Europe. The "Russia first" strategy identifies an important goal that must be supported. Some variant of a balance of power strategy is the only option at the all-Europe level. The "democratic peace" strategy is equally compelling for the NATO states and the other stable European democracies. The "expand NATO now" strategy may prove a better way to encourage democracy in Russia than the "Russia first" strategy, and it combines the idealism of the "democratic peace" with the realism of balance of power. In principle, therefore, a basis for consensus exists.

Getting recognition of this ground for building a consensus, however, will require compromises, some very difficult to achieve. Perhaps the most intractable issue is between those who insist that NATO need not expand and conduct out of area operations, particularly in former Yugoslavia, and those who insist that it must. Some will insist that NATO can be expanded in Central Europe while the Bosnia crisis is essentially ignored—but that belief is likely to founder on European disenchantment with U.S. policy toward Bosnia—making them reluctant to support the recent U.S. initiative to expand NATO. Still, consensus should be built where it can be, and the sooner that is done, the sooner the debate on NATO expansion and out of area operations can be put in a common strategic context and better understood.

The present challenge is remarkable for the degree to which leadership lies almost wholly with the United States. No single European leader can force the political integration of Europe; nor can a single European leader insure that progress toward that goal is not reversed. No single European leader can insure democratic and market transitions in all of Central Europe. It appears less likely that President Yeltsin can insure the transition in Russia. U.S. leadership, in contrast, can prevent the reversal of some of these processes, and lacking U.S. leadership, most of them will be reversed—not suddenly, but over time.

The debate over the role of what E.H. Carr called "vast impersonal forces" versus the role of leaders in history is an old one, and often a false one. Both play their part, and although leaders are frequently overwhelmed by vast impersonal forces, strong leaders occasionally have an opportunity to master events. At the end of World War II, both Stalin and Truman had such an opportunity in Europe. Today, only the president of the United States has it. □

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Quantum Leap

Patrick Glynn

IT IS NO coincidence that the sweeping changes in international politics today have occurred side by side with an equally radical "paradigm shift" in the physical sciences. On the contrary, there is a causal link between the two developments. The radical changes we have witnessed in foreign policy, including the collapse of the Soviet Union, have come about largely as a result of the information revolution. This revolution, in turn, has come about largely as a result of a revolution in scientific understanding generated by quantum mechanics. At first glance, there might seem to be little connection between contemporary foreign policy dilemmas and the arcana of subatomic physics. But in reality the mysterious new laws governing the quantum universe closely parallel the new principles governing political life in the information age—and the new rules shaping the conduct of foreign policy in the post-modern era.

The analogy between politics and physics, between political experience and the scientific worldview, has always been a close one in the West. Modern political thought and experience were essentially born of a conscious marriage between politics and physics—a synthesis of Machiavelli's political insights with the new science of Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton. The very term "political science" commemorates this union. Several famous figures, including Francis Bacon and René Descartes, contributed to the new science of politics. But the scientific political vision was first fully crystallized in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, a thinker who still casts a heavy shadow on foreign policy analysis. Hobbes was the earliest modern thinker to posit that politics could be understood entirely mechanically, that society could be viewed as a massive artificial creation, a machine. The state, according to Hobbes, was an "artificial" body, analogous to the human body, in which, as he put it, the "heart" was no more than a "spring," the "nerves" but so many "strings," the joints, "wheels." Human society essentially resembled a "watch, or some such...engine" in which the "motion of the wheels" could be known through a kind of mental dissection.[1] Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Sir Isaac Newton's *Principia*—both published in the second half of the seventeenth century—together inaugurated the "modern" worldview, in which both the physical universe and the political world were seen as governed by mechanistic laws.

It is precisely the long-reigning

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[1]Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 81, 27.

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metaphor of mechanism that has been overthrown by physics in recent years.[2] And it is precisely the overthrow of mechanism—as the dominant mode of both political experience and political explanation—that defines the puzzling new world in which we now live. Mechanistic patterns and forces have not entirely disappeared from world affairs, but they are increasingly subordinated and submerged in a new and fundamentally different kind of order. This rapid shift from one basic paradigm to another helps explain much of the confusion in present day commentary on foreign policy, which continues to view "post-modern" international politics, anachronistically, through a basically "modern" or mechanistic lens.

In place of mechanism today we confront a new set of principles, in politics as well as physics, which can be summarized as *instantaneousness* or "*non-locality*," *observer participation*, and *holism*.[3] The application of these principles in the political world is readily apparent. Increasingly, national leaders—and especially U.S. presidents—are forced to operate in a holistic international environment where the full global ramifications of any foreign policy action (or inaction) are instantaneously known and fed back through a global information network, and where a global audience effectively "participates" in the drama, affecting its ultimate outcome. Such an environment necessitates a new style, and even a new concept, of leadership, and is pushing U.S. foreign policy in certain very systematic and novel directions. Indeed, it is changing the nature of foreign policy itself. This new political universe very closely parallels the new vision of the physical universe yielded by the quantum theory—a view of the cosmos, in effect, as a holistic "information system" in which events occurring in one locale in principle immediately affect events in a distant corner of the universe billions of light-years away, and in which observation affects, indeed in a sense "creates," our common reality. The common denominator, in both cases, is information.

Scientific vision, political thought, and technology move in tandem. The reality we "see" in the universe is also the reality we construct and experience in the human world. Newtonian physics gave us modern, mechanistic political thought as well as the machines that produced the Industrial Revolution. This marriage of powerful machines and mechanistic political thinking in turn produced modern mass society and the characteristic international politics of the industrial era: a politics, ultimately, of confrontation between great states and empires, mass mobilization, and total war. Quantum mechanics has given us the silicon chip and, through information technologies, a fundamentally new kind of political experience—as well as the necessity for a new kind of political thinking.

Newtonian physics is human-scale physics, ideally suited to the manipulation of objects in our immediate physical world. However, it is not a complete account of reality: it is valid only for medium-sized objects traveling at moderate speeds. As Albert Einstein showed early in this century, Newtonian laws of motion do not hold for

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[2]A very good summary of the paradigm shift in contemporary physics is to be found in Paul Davies and John Gribben, *The Matter Myth* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 1-29. George Gilder, *Microcosm: The Quantum Revolution in Economics and Technology* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989) was among the first to notice the changes in the distribution of military and economic power introduced by the information revolution.

[3]Accounts of the new physics written for the lay reader have proliferated in recent years. The best concise summary I have found is P.C.W. Davies and J.R. Brown, *The Ghost in the Atom* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986). See also Gary Zukav, *The Dancing Wu Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics* (New York: William Morrow/Quill, 1979), and Davies and Gribben, *The Matter Myth*.

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very large objects or very large speeds (i.e., speeds approaching that of light). If Newtonian physics grows inaccurate as we move to the large scale, then it also becomes irrelevant as we move to the tiniest scale, as quantum mechanics has demonstrated. At the subatomic level, the laws of Newtonian physics are broken, or, it may be more accurate to say, transcended. Through a combination of relativity and (especially) the quantum theory, we have moved from a mechanistic to a far more holistic and complete understanding of the universe. Something similar has happened in politics and foreign policy: today we "see" events immediately and in a much wider and more holistic context than before.

The theme of the Newtonian worldview was the subjugation and manipulation of matter and the physical environment—precisely the theme of mutual efforts at domination that characterized the international politics in the industrial age. The themes of the quantum worldview are information, observation, and holistic coordination—precisely the realities that dominate post-modern political life.

Indeed, under the influence of quantum theory, physicists have ceased to think of the universe itself as "matter" and more as "information." What we call matter, quantum mechanics has shown, is actually something rather fuzzy and without space-time dimensions, something that "unfolds" into three-dimensional solidity *as*, and *because*, we observe it. Matter normally exists in a fuzzy "wave" state which "collapses" into solidity only upon observation. Unobserved, for example, an electron exists as a wave—which is actually a multidimensional mathematical equation describing its probable location around an atomic nucleus. But the moment we try to "find" the electron, the moment we observe it, it "becomes" a particle and the wave disappears. (Physicists speak of "observation" as "the collapse of the wave function.")

Which brings us to the second major revelation of quantum mechanics, namely that reality is observer-dependent. In observing we both change and, in a sense, create what we observe (though this process unfolds according to very regularized probabilities).

Third, all matter is holistically coordinated on a massive scale. An observation of a photon or light-particle by a scientist on earth could in theory instantly affect an observation by a scientist on a planet in a distant galaxy billions of light-years away (though the two scientists could never coordinate their activities or communicate their findings to each other). A crucial 1982 experiment proved that "paired" photons coordinate their polarities or "exchange information" over vast distances instantaneously.[4] This faster-than-light coordination shows that the universe is knitted together by some fundamentally nonmaterial principle that we do not understand. "Information" is the best metaphor we have. That is, quantum mechanics reveals the universe as essentially an intelligently and intricately coordinated *information system* which unfolds into three dimensional space and time—into what we call "matter"—in the act of being observed.

What are the laws of the new "information universe" of international politics? I have alluded to several of them already. But the dominant principle seems to be *holism*—the increasing awareness of the interconnectedness and interaction among seemingly disparate considerations and geographically distant events (an awareness that expresses itself most clearly perhaps in the omnipresence of the term "interdependence" in current discussion of world affairs). The new information environment, in its very interconnectedness, militates against the kind of sharp, brute,

[4]The most thorough treatment (for non-physicist readers) I have found of the famous 1982 Alain Aspect experiment is N. David Mermin, "Spooky Actions at Distance: Mysteries of the Quantum Theory," in *Great Ideas Today: 1988* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1988), pp. 3-53. It is also discussed at length in *The Ghost in the Atom* and *The Dancing Wu Li Masters*.

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mechanical manipulation of events—especially through all-out confrontation and war—that dominated international politics throughout the modern era. Leaders of major states, including the U.S. president, are forced to coordinate their actions as never before—with each other, with their own publics, and with a global television audience which is in a position to follow the action on a play-by-play basis.

Take the Gulf War, the first major military struggle to be played out in this new, post-modern political environment. At first glance, there was much about the Gulf War that partook of traditional power politics. There was a confrontation, an ultimatum, and ultimately a massive application of military force. But the fact is that the Bush administration's efforts to manage the intricate global "information environment" around the confrontation proved almost as massive and strenuous as the military undertaking itself.

To confront and eventually make war on Saddam Hussein, without at the same time disrupting other crucial global processes or jeopardizing other U.S. vital interests, it was necessary to manage carefully and simultaneously a host of different regional and political relationships. Most crucial, of course, was the then-Soviet Union, whose support for the U.S.-led initiative against a Soviet ally was critical to forestalling a reversion to cold war. The price for Soviet support, in turn, was bound to be a collective-security approach and the formal approval of the UN Security Council. Beyond that, there was the problem of managing delicate relations both with various Arab countries and with Israel (with potentially damaging political ramifications at home). Then there was the vital need for NATO's active cooperation—for military-logistical and political reasons—and, ultimately, the political and financial support of Japan. And this was only the beginning, for during the several-month-long crisis the Bush administration was forced into a series of public relations maneuvers, dramatic diplomatic initiatives, and domestic political efforts to secure reluctant approval for the war from both the American, and to some degree, the global public. The effort continued through the end of the conflict: the war was finally terminated prematurely out of concern that the wholesale slaughter of Iraqi troops trapped on the famous "highway of death," and its depiction on television, would have adverse repercussions at home and abroad.

In short, the Bush administration was everywhere constrained by the necessity of immediately accommodating a host of domestic and global constituencies, and keeping the public apprised of its every move. It had to approach the crisis *holistically*, taking the entire range of global consequences and global audiences into account. The effort, by all appearances, was exhausting. One reason, it has been suggested, that the Bush administration was so reluctant to take on Yugoslavia—the second major challenge to its "new world order"—was sheer fatigue.

The Gulf War epitomized the new world in which foreign policy is now made. It is a world where developed nations are connected by a vast network of instantaneous informational links and economic interests; where national leaders enjoy close collaborative relations, as often as not bypassing foreign ministers and ambassadors by picking up the telephone or jetting to a foreign capital; and where just about everything of major international significance is instantly relayed to a global audience via CNN.

Such an environment places an enormous premium on cooperation, fine-tuning, and the avoidance of sudden, unilateral actions, or for that matter large-scale conflicts that could disrupt the total system. The restraint comes both from the ability to "see" the global ramifications of any action immediately, and from the ability of a host of different global constituencies to observe, and thereby also to participate in, the decision-making process.

International politics in the post-modern era is characterized by what may be called "the primacy of observation." In contemporary global politics, as in quantum physics, observation, and especially observation by television

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cameras, changes reality; indeed, it creates reality. On any given day, our shared global experience exists, in effect, as a kind of fuzzy "wave function," until the TV cameras begin to make their observations, and the wave function "collapses" into what seems a definite reality. What the cameras may observe is somewhat unpredictable on any given day, though we have enough experience of the media to sense what they will *probably* see in any given situation (much as quantum observations are probabilistic). There is, to be sure, a certain inconsistency resulting from this observational orientation: suffering in Bosnia *seen* on television is more *real* than unseen suffering in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nonetheless, because of the extensive feedback of information into the system—through such devices as opinion polling—all of us, even simply as television viewers (and potential voters), in some way contribute to the reality with which the president must cope. American scientist John Wheeler, describing the quantum reality, has spoken of the "participatory universe." Politics and foreign policy today also take place in a "participatory universe," one radically transformed by the ability of the average citizen to observe it so extensively and directly.

One of the most striking features of this "participatory universe" of contemporary foreign policy is that its logic ultimately seems altruistic—it tends to push national leaders, and especially American presidents, toward an increasing emphasis on humanitarian involvements and toward a minimization of violence. To be sure, during the Gulf War, Americans warmed to the spectacle of "smart" missiles zooming through the windows of Saddam's military complexes. But the spectacle was entertaining only so long as it remained sterile. The moment the cameras showed Iraqi civilian casualties—as in the case of the mistaken bombing of civilians in a command bunker/air raid shelter in Baghdad—there was a public relations crisis. General Colin Powell insisted on ending the war early—at some strategic cost—rather than risk taking responsibility for the sight of massive Iraqi *military* casualties on the "highway of death." By the same token, the Somalia intervention was popular when the footage was of a humanitarian character and became totally unpopular the moment it began to involve killing (especially the killing of American military personnel).

Interestingly, Boris Yeltsin, too, has gotten a taste in Chechnya of what it means to conduct an old-fashioned, brutal, Soviet-style war of suppression in the new information environment. Extensive and unprecedented Russian television coverage of the carnage has guaranteed that the episode will be a political debacle for the Russian president, whatever the military outcome. Thanks to the information environment, there is a kind of global consensus today—including among Russians—on the unalloyed folly of Yeltsin's action, placing his political future in serious, perhaps fatal, jeopardy.

In short, the information culture is "drawing us together" in more than one sense: it is removing some of the distance in human experience that makes it possible for us to caricature and dehumanize our enemies, and it is intensifying the sympathy we feel for human suffering in distant locales. The sympathies generated by television are "non-local," cutting across ethnic, racial, and national lines.[5]

In the process, much of the distance, secrecy, and formality that made traditional great-power politics possible has disappeared. It is

[5]We may contrast the manner in which closeness today tends to imply harmony with Rousseau's belief that the closeness of European states would generate *friction*—an assumption influenced by the mechanistic metaphor. The states of Europe, Rousseau wrote in 1756, "touch each other at so many points that no one of them can move without giving a jar to all the rest; their variances are more deadly as their ties are more closely woven." From "Abstract and Judgement of Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace," *Rousseau on International Relations*, Hoffman and Fidler, eds., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

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interesting to contrast the information environment surrounding the Gulf War with that surrounding the origins of World War I. In the heyday of great power diplomacy, governments communicated through laborious, formal, and secret channels, relying on foreign ministers and ambassadors to convey and receive messages. Notably, in the Sarajevo crisis of 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany deliberately exploited the communications lags among capitals, foreign offices, and ambassadors so as to escalate the crisis and confuse opponents. Messages were deliberately delayed and garbled. Deceptive replies were issued. Throughout the crisis, the publics in nearly every great state were essentially kept in the dark. Exploiting the "information-poor" environment of the day, Germany was able to intensify the European crisis while persuading the German people that Russia was to blame for the war that the German government deliberately unleashed. War came to Europe essentially as a surprise. World War II arose, and the Cold War transpired, in much the same sort of "information-poor" settings.

It is instructive that virtually every war raging on the planet today is transpiring in such "information-poor" environments—either in states too undeveloped to have a large media audience (e.g., in Africa) or in states such as Serbia and Croatia, where television is under strict state control and used for the grossest propaganda. (The one exception which, in a sense, proves the rule is Chechnya.) In such environments, lack of accountability goes hand in hand with a certain blindness, even stupidity, regarding long-range and holistic interests. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic may have conquered a third of Croatia and (by proxy) two-thirds of Bosnia, but in the process he has blackened the name of his country and brought Serbia's economy to its knees. Partial relief from international sanctions will not undo the damage. Saddam Hussein exhibited a similar blindness when he attempted to blackmail the international community into lifting sanctions against Iraq by mobilizing troops against Kuwait. North Korea, too, was on a path toward counterproductive confrontation, when it sought to become a nuclear state at the very time when the currency of economic and military power was shifting decisively to information technologies and global telecommunications. It has since altered course. Johnny-come-lately practitioners of power politics may do others a lot of mischief, but as long as they remain on a path toward confrontation, they cannot help themselves.

The great fissure line in international politics today is between those developed states that partake of the information environment and those states still locked in the mechanistic, information-poor world of traditional power politics. The days of the latter states are clearly numbered. We know from the fate of the Soviet Union that societies which strive to maintain themselves as information-poor, closed systems are not terribly survivable in this new holistic global world. Even Japan, whose elite continues to harbor a somewhat anachronistic, power politics view of interstate economic competition and to conduct business *sub rosa*, is gradually succumbing to the transparency of the information age. The "primacy of observation" has dealt some serious blows to its oligarchical ruling party in recent years, in the form of repeated exposure of corruption, and set in motion a virtual "participatory" revolution in governance.

But in the meantime, it would be a mistake to assume that the postmodern states—and especially America—can successfully employ the old-fashioned principles of power politics in subduing the genuinely hostile forces that remain around the globe. Such an approach overlooks the fundamentally new rules of the international game.

It is far from accidental that, since the Gulf War, the major calls for violent U.S. intervention against renegade states—calls for major air attacks against Serbia and Serb forces in Bosnia, for arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims, and for pre-emptive strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities—have gone unheeded. In every case, the information environment has militated against

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such abrupt actions. In every case, unilateral measures by the United States would have disrupted a host of more important relationships. And in every case, a "holistic" view of the problem has suggested that the potential negative consequences of such intervention would far outweigh any positive ones.

To be sure, when Saddam Hussein began massing Republican Guard divisions near the border of Kuwait, the United States—buttressed by a pre-existing international consensus—was able to rush forces to the Gulf. But it is not surprising that the Clinton administration sloughed off the many calls from experts for pre-emptive military action to "finish off" Saddam—however opportune the moment may have seemed. Such action would have exceeded the international consensus and damaged relationships with other states, especially Russia. The United States could still act against Saddam's forces, but only if he were to move his forces in a way that explicitly violated Security Council resolutions.

The situation has been clearest in the example of Korea. In many ways, it is astonishing that several prominent American foreign policy experts in 1994 urged a pre-emptive strike on North Korean nuclear facilities. In the first place, it was common knowledge that Washington lacked the intelligence on North Korean facilities to execute such a mission effectively. But beyond that, such an undertaking could only have brought disaster. One need only think of the "information environment" surrounding such a confrontation.

A president contemplating such an abrupt action would have faced the concerted opposition of Japan, Russia, and China—to say nothing of the South Koreans themselves, who were adamantly opposed to such a move. The moment such a raid were undertaken without the prior approval of these and other powers, he would have been besieged by phone calls from disconcerted Russian, Japanese, and European leaders. He would have put in jeopardy a host of U.S. interests in relation to these states, to say nothing of his personal relationships with their leaders. He would have faced lurid television coverage of the nuclear fall-out from damaged North Korean facilities likely to be blown over Japan. And he would have confronted day-by-day, indeed moment-by-moment, coverage of the horrendous civilian and military carnage, including U.S. casualties, resulting from the North-South war that would be almost certain to ensue. The disastrous economic impact of a war on the Korean peninsula would be immediately registered in stock prices and economic forecasts. Criticism—from Congress, from TV anchormen, from pundits, from foreign capitals, and from the hoards of talk-radio listeners—would be legion and incessant. Indeed, a president who deliberately provoked such a war would be regarded as a madman or a fool.

It of course remains possible (though increasingly unlikely) that North Korea could launch an unprovoked attack on the South, necessitating U.S. intervention on the South's behalf, but the president had better be in a position to demonstrate that the war is not his fault. No president today—Republican or Democrat—could have afforded to solve the problem of North Korean nuclear ambition by a premeditated, mechanistic application of force. In the present interconnected global environment, the costs of such action are simply too high. Moreover, the nature of the global information system is such that these costs are fed back to everyone in advance; they would be immediately apparent to every viewer of CNN. The compromise solution ultimately achieved with the North Koreans—trading verifiable bars to their development of a nuclear arsenal for economic considerations and an opening to the outside world—is precisely what one would have predicted under present-day circumstances.

Does this mean the new global environment always influences a president toward simple inaction or paralysis? Not necessarily: the media environment sometimes seems to push him toward action—as has been true

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intermittently in the cases of Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti. But, as a practical political matter, any action chosen must be harmonized not only with U.S. global interests, holistically understood, but with the desiderata of other major states with a stake in the situation. Of course, in theory, a president can always choose to go his own way and "take flak" from the international community, as Ronald Reagan so often did; but today, when the world is no longer divided into two camps and interests are so intertwined, the price for such unilateralism is becoming prohibitive. For example, an attempt by the U.S. unilaterally to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia might well result in parallel action by Russia and France toward embargoed Iraq, as indeed the Clinton administration has sometimes argued. The facts of international life are that the United States requires multilateral cooperation on a host of issues and simply cannot afford to go its own way on Bosnia.

In a holistic international system, the tendency of U.S. presidents, and other leaders of the developed world, will be to seek fine-tuned approaches to these pockets of instability, designed to isolate or contain the disruption at minimal cost and with minimal confrontation, while moving gradually through negotiation toward some kind of compromise solution. Whatever the differences in their respective tactical instincts or persuasive abilities, this is essentially the approach taken by both George Bush and Bill Clinton to such hot-spots as Bosnia and Korea. And certainly, Clinton's Haiti finesse neatly fits the model I have described (though how it may ultimately resolve itself is not clear).

Of course, as long as there remain "information-poor" corners of the globe, such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, the possibility of a major military conflict cannot be completely excluded. But it is becoming less likely. Information technology now increasingly dictates military power, leaving information-poor states at a decisive military disadvantage. Information-poor states are also unlikely to find allies or sponsors for aggression among the information-rich. States participating in the information universe have a powerful disincentive to engage in counterproductive confrontations with states outside it. And states outside the information economy have a powerful incentive, over the long run, to find their way in.

Despite all this, there remains a certain nostalgia among many foreign policy analysts today for the world of traditional great power or superpower politics—a world defined by the brute mechanisms of power balances, military competitions, and distinct national interests, a world in which the United States was free to pursue confrontational policies and take bold unilateral steps. This is no longer the world in which foreign policy is being made. The concept of "national interest" has not entirely lost its relevance, but, in a world made "non-local" by information, it is gradually being submerged in a much broader understanding of common global purposes. The American presidency, in its foreign policy dimension, is less a national office today than a global one, answerable to global constituencies—and ruled by global constraints. The definition of leadership itself has changed. What is required is no longer the heroic single-mindedness of the great power era, but conviction *combined with* technical mastery and, above all, an ability to accommodate the many constituencies or "stakeholders" that effectively "participate" in decisions and their outcome, whether leaders like it or not.

The new world of foreign policy is neither a unipolar world nor a multipolar world, but an integrated global system, in which the United States plays a central, but constantly tempered, role. The good news is that this new universe of foreign policy may also prove to be a more intelligent universe, one in which the massive stupidities of traditional power politics and interstate violence can largely be avoided. □

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The Philosophy of "Europe"

John Laughland

"The rational organization, at the global level, of human existence...is clearly an absolute necessity."

—Eduard Shevardnadze, 1992

THERE ARE MOMENTS when the swirling mists in which modern European political speech seems deliberately to envelop itself are dissipated by sudden, perhaps unintended, flashes of linguistic clarity. Two remarks made in 1994 have illuminated, if only in silhouette, the broad outlines of current European geopolitics and political culture.

The first came in May, when Boris Yeltsin paid a state visit to Germany. The theme of his visit was the entry of Russia into all European organizations, ultimately including NATO and the European Union. As a priority, though, Yeltsin concentrated on a theme dear to the Russian heart, the strengthening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to which Moscow would like NATO to be subordinate. The Russian president declared to an eager audience—using words that would have been music to the ears of the former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, as well as to many contemporary politicians—that he wanted a "politically, economically and spiritually unified architecture for our continent, which must not isolate countries or groups of countries *or separate them according to the criteria of friend or enemy*..."[emphasis added].

The second came in November. A few months previously, the ruling Christian Democratic parliamentary group in Germany had published a policy document entitled "Reflections on European Policy," which contained striking proposals for the future political architecture of the European Union. It called for the federal political union of a hard core of five countries in the European Union (France, Germany, Benelux). The document, which Chancellor Kohl has welcomed and defended, and perhaps even surreptitiously encouraged, threatens that if political union does not occur on its own terms, Germany might go it alone in Europe, overturning the whole apple cart of postwar European cooperation. According to this scheme, otherwise known as the "concentric circles plan," all European Union policy would be made by the hard core—or more precisely, by the hard core of the hard core, France and Germany—and followed in variable participatory arrangements by other member states. On a tour of European capitals to peddle the plan, the CDU's foreign policy spokesman, Karl Lamers, expressed the

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regret that many people in Europe were reluctant to take such a bold leap toward political union, because they experienced "the emotional difficulty of abandoning revered and cherished institutions and notions even if, *like the concept of national sovereignty, they have long since become an illusion*"[emphasis added].

What do these remarks tell us about the likely evolution of Europe's political architecture after the end of the Cold War? One thing is immediately clear: Germany and Russia are the two largest and most powerful countries in Europe. If there is to be a truly united Europe, and not just a united Western Europe, then one of the most important axes along which it will develop will be Berlin-Moscow. The Germans, more than any other Western Europeans, are aware of this. Indeed, the CDU document emphasizes that the European Union's primary foreign policy objective must be to ensure stability in Eastern Europe by constructing an "all-encompassing partnership with Russia." Similarly, Mr. Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister, has often spoken of the "special relationship" between Germany and Russia.

It is preoccupying, therefore, to observe in these remarks by political representatives of both countries a clutch of ideas which displays a striking contempt for the philosophical bases of democracy and the rule of law. It is even more preoccupying to realize that these remarks are utterly typical of contemporary European political discourse. Indeed, they have become its common currency. Slogans such as "United Europe," "falling borders," "convergence" and "integration" trip lightly off the lips of all post-Cold War European leaders. They are the foreign policy counterparts of similar slogans about "protection" and "social security" which have become the staple diet fed to voters at home. These clichés are disturbing because they are manifestations of the extent to which European politicians have lost a sense of the true meaning of politics itself.

Friends and Enemies

POLITICS IS THE necessary prerequisite for democracy because it is only within a certain polity, a state, where the rules of the game and the common reference points are understood, that democratic debate and democratic accountability can be assured. Democracy inevitably presupposes constitutional independence or national statehood because, before the democratic mechanisms of control over political power—a legislature, an independent judiciary, a free press—can be put in place, the basic right of the state to rule—its authority—must first be recognized. It is only from this fundamental recognition of legitimacy that the rule of law can flow. If a people agrees that the state has the right to rule, then that people is constituted as a political entity. Without politics, therefore, there can be no statehood, and if politics and statehood disintegrate, as they are doing in Europe, then democracy will disintegrate too. Politics is the realm of human freedom.

Yeltsin's proclaimed desire not to separate countries according to the criterion of friend and enemy recalls the famous definition of politics made by the right-wing German jurist, Carl Schmitt. According to Schmitt, writing in 1932, areas of human activity like morality, aesthetics, and economics each have their own criteria: good and evil, beautiful and ugly, profitable and damaging. Politics, he insists, is an area of human activity distinct from the others, and its criterion is the distinction between friend and enemy. Anyone who tries to overcome that distinction, as Yeltsin is, is trying to overcome politics itself. Yeltsin is not saying, "I was your enemy, now I am your friend," he is saying that the distinction itself should no longer apply.

What does Schmitt mean? First, he does not mean that a state always has enemies, although this may be so, but that politics only exists where there is conflict, and that both foreign and domestic politics consist in

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making the distinction between friend and enemy. An enemy need not be evil or ugly or economically damaging: he does not have to be hated or despised. The distinction between friend and enemy in this sense is merely intended to indicate the difference between association (with a friend) or dissociation (from an enemy). This is not a bellicose or aggressive way of defining politics, it is a factual one: where there is no conflict there is no politics, only management. The term enemy is by no means limited to the military sense, nor is the definition intended to assimilate politics to war. On the contrary, war is not the continuation of politics by other means, but something different from politics, with its own separate set of rules.[1]

Nor does this definition rule out peace between peoples or states, or even neutrality. The decisive issue is that political life is the domain in which the possibility of making the distinction obtains. Indeed, far from peace being the absence of an enemy, one can make peace only with an enemy. Just as there is no peace without an enemy, there is no politics without the possibility of knowing who one's (political) enemies are.

Indeed, peace is not the absence of antagonism or conflict, but the absence of war. This fact underlines the essential difference between politics and war: it would clearly be contrary to the essence of politics as such to want to suppress one's enemies, or to dissipate the distinction between friend and enemy into obscurity. This is precisely because politics lives off enmity, the opposition between parties and interests and ideologies, the antagonism between different opinions, values and goals, as well as the divergence between different solutions which are proposed in order to attain the common good. In a European continent where "consensus," "cooperation," "stability," and "negotiation" are widely proclaimed as the cardinal virtues (most notably by the British foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, who often seems to believe that diplomatic negotiation is a good thing even if it does not produce any results, as in Yugoslavia) this fact is almost universally misunderstood.

As Publius wrote in the Tenth Federalist Paper, "the principal task of modern legislation...involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government." It is the purpose of good government to contain and to channel this inevitable facet of human behavior. But the *negation* of the enemy in domestic politics, in the name of universal tolerance for instance, is nonsense precisely because tolerance is a matter of behavior between men—one tolerates one's political enemy—and not a relationship of ideas. The irenic notion of universal tolerance is therefore not evidence of bad judgment, it is the absence of judgment. It is irrelevant whether we approve or disapprove of the distinction between friend and enemy, for it is an incontrovertible fact of human (i.e. political) existence. It is only in Utopia—i.e. nowhere—that the *distinction* between friend and enemy does not apply.

The same is true of foreign policy, where peace denotes a certain relationship between states. No law enjoining peace can maintain itself in mere virtue of its status as law, without the political will of two or more distinct parties—enemies—expressed in a peace treaty. The notion of peace without a treaty representing the expression of genuine convictions of those parties and the rules by which they agree to abide is nonsense. Similarly, in domestic politics no constitution within a state can maintain itself if not supported by citizens who recognize its political authority. If peace is not the absence of conflict, the difference between peace and war is simply that in peace, a state or a person does not seek to destroy the enemy, but rather recognizes him as an equal in all his difference. Accordingly, any so-called procla-

[1]Clausewitz in fact did not write what everyone knows he wrote. What he asserted was, "War is nothing but the continuation of political intercourse mixed with other means." *Vom Kriege, III. Teil*, Berlin, 1834, p. 140.

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mation of peace which implies the suppression or the negation of the enemy is in reality a camouflaged declaration of war. This is the danger in Yeltsin's remark. To put it bluntly, if the price of peace with Russia after the Cold War is the disappearance of the states of Western Europe as genuine political entities in any meaningful sense, then that price is too high.

The Primacy of Stability

THE SOVIET UNION long sought to remove the American presence in Europe, and to instigate instead a pan-European political and military organization. The CSCE, which arose out of a proposal made by Ceausescu to de Gaulle on Brezhnev's behalf in 1968, comes closest to what Russia wants. This is because the CSCE—which in January became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—is not a military alliance like NATO. Instead, as the chairman of the recent Budapest conference of the CSCE made clear, "The CSCE is a unique organization, because it deals not only with relations between states but also within states, with the relationship between the state and the citizen." In other words, the CSCE blurs the very distinction between friend and enemy by obscuring that between internal and external affairs.

This is because the so-called "Moscow Document" signed in 1991, introduced a series of commitments governing the relationship between states and their citizens, including such things as the rights of women, migrant workers and disabled persons, as well as more general commitments to democracy and the rule of law. It also included an important provision relating to the rights of minorities by making reference to a report on national minorities which thereby achieves normative status within the CSCE. That report declares that, "Issues concerning national minorities...are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective State." States which are deemed to have minorities problems might be required by the CSCE to do anything from providing education in minority languages to establishing local autonomy.

First, this interest in minorities is germane to Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union has been followed by the creation, not only of the Commonwealth of Independent States and a forum for economic "cooperation" between its "member states," but also by the rallying to the CIS of initially recalcitrant states like Moldova, on the pretext that the Russian minorities there need protecting. Similar influence has been exerted over the Baltic states, especially Estonia. Americans who are preoccupied with the rising problem of "group rights," which seems to be undermining their own constitution, will recognize the *de jure* classification of individuals into ethnic groups as an instrument of state control and social management, because groups are more easy to control and to speak for than individuals.

Second, it is a consequence of the CSCE's unique combination of internal and external competencies that, whatever the outcome of the legal debate on the precise status of the Helsinki Final Act and the associated documents, the CSCE in total is "the source of an overarching European constitutional order which sets the standards to which all national legal and political institutions in Europe must conform."[2]

Therefore, far from being a defense alliance like NATO, which is directed against a potential outside aggressor and intended to preserve the internal integrity and peace of the signatory states, the CSCE's pretense that it can pacify the whole gamut of political antagonism from workers' rights to national minority questions—itself a mistaken aim, as anyone who has digested the above argument about

[2]Thomas Buergenthal, "The CSCE Rights System," *The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics*, vol. 25, no. 2, 1991, p. 380.

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the nature of politics will see—risks making it more like a transcontinental military police force. The use of CSCE "peacekeeping forces" is one way in which it proposes to do this, and a precedent was set in December when such a force was dispatched to Azerbaijan. A moment's thought should suffice to realize the enormity of this: imagine NATO troops being called in to impose a military solution to a disturbance—or even to preempt a potential one—within a NATO member state. Indeed, such principles, which attribute the highest value to stability, might even legitimate the use of a national army against its own citizens, as in Chechnya.

In case any of these fears seem exaggerated, it should not be forgotten that three of the key architects of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, François Mitterrand, Jacques Delors and John Major, have all made extraordinary remarks about the primacy of stability over democracy. The two Frenchmen initially welcomed the Moscow putsch in 1991, Delors saying that it could have "positive aspects." Indeed, he even declared to the European parliament just after it occurred that, "We cannot unite the states of Western Europe and at the same time encourage the breakaway of Soviet Republics," by which he presumably meant that the European Union and the Soviet Union were similar institutions. The pro-Serb policy of London and Paris is similarly predicated on a preference for large political entities over the bothersome multiplicity of small nations. No politician has given clearer expression to this than John Major, who declared in 1993 that, "The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the discipline that that exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia"—a grotesque contortion of the truth, not only because Yugoslavia ceased to be under Soviet "discipline" in 1948, but also because communist leaders like Slobodan Milosevic, Thodor Zhivkov, and Nicolae Ceausescu, to name but the worst and not to mention their contemporary epigones, were themselves rabid nationalists, whose regimes—by virtue of their very collapse!—were not stable.

It is in exactly the same vein that the Russian foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, has already said—and many have echoed his thought—that the main threat to security in Europe is from "nationalist extremists." He has realized, by observing his Western counterparts, that if a politician can claim that "populism" is likely to erupt at any minute, then he can justify almost endless amounts of governmental control over society. Kozyrev's idea is that the CSCE will quell any such threat. But, as we have seen above, peace denotes an equilibrium of forces between parties. A legal order cannot be maintained without authority, that is, without the meta-legal force accorded to it by citizens or states. An organization which pretends that such force does not exist is perhaps merely trying to camouflage the inevitable fact that it does. In any case, one man's nationalist extremist is another man's freedom fighter, as the violent overthrows of democratically elected Presidents Gamsakhurdia in Georgia and Elchibey in Azerbaijan have shown.

To protest against all this is not to claim that sovereign states have the right to abuse individuals or groups within their borders. Rather, it is to insist, against the current drift towards the internationalization of government, that international law or policy is not necessarily any wiser than that made by national governments. Very often it is far more stupid, as the debacle over Yugoslavia shows. Indeed, the CSCE's conference in Budapest in December failed even to mention the Yugoslav war in its communique, an illustration of how surreal international bureaucratic government quickly becomes. Nor is international policy any less political. Moreover, at least national politics might be democratic, and controllable by a national parliament, while international politics, by definition, never is. It is the task of all states to maintain peace within their borders by policing their citizens, and to defend that internal

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peace from external aggression. The CSCE's confusion of these two roles means that it wants to assume state-like power, but without explaining in whose name it acts.

The CSCE is also the focal point of a series of bilateral treaties signed between the Western powers and Russia, many of which require that the relationship between the signatory states *be governed* by the commitments laid out in the CSCE documents. This is a curious manner of submitting free foreign policy decision-making to the say-so of an international committee. But it explains why Kozyrev has called the CSCE and the lattice-work of treaties a "net" in which the states of Europe are to be "entangled," arguing that it is only through such an entanglement that stability can be achieved. In other words, foreign policy, which for many philosophers is a paradigm at the international level of the kind of free political action that existed in the Greek polis, where democracy was founded, is to disappear as a forum for free action and instead be smothered under a bureaucratic and pseudo-legal "mechanism."

Like other utopias, this one spells the end of politics and law, for it assumes that foreign policy can disappear. It is absurd to think that either domestic or foreign politics can be managed by a committee, and that disputes can be resolved by international-bureaucratic mechanisms. Such absurdities are in reality little but the institutionalization of political cowardice, for they all derive from a desire to shield politicians from ever having to take a decision for whose unwelcome consequences they might be held responsible. Courage, as Churchill said, is the greatest of all political virtues because it presupposes all the rest. Political existence requires a constant, courageous struggle. If a people loses the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, this does not mean that politics disappears from the world. It merely means that a weak people disappears from the world, and that its constitution is subsumed into someone else's.

It is precisely because politics is the realm of freedom that politics cannot be governed by prescriptive rules. It is depressing to realize that the lesson learned by Britain and America in the economic domain in the 1980s—that economies cannot be planned—has been spectacularly unlearned in the political domain by continental Europe since the Cold War. It is a modernist, constructivist conceit to believe that political life can be planned in advance. (The CSCE's aims to engage in "conflict-prevention" is a perfect example of this mentality.) This is not just because political life, like economics, is very complex. It is above all because statesmanship, like law, contains as its fundamental principle the possibility of genuine decision-making, i.e. the possibility that political decisions might leave the normal framework of rules to create something exceptional. It is hardly surprising, given that Europe's share of world trade has declined by 25 percent in the last ten years, that Europe's economic backwardness should spill over and influence its political reasoning too.

For, as that other great German jurist and philosopher Leo Strauss realized:

> What cannot be decided in advance by universal rules, what can only be decided in the critical moment by the most competent and conscientious statesman on the spot, can be made visible as just, in retrospect, to all; the objective discrimination between extreme actions which were just and extreme actions which were unjust is one of the noblest duties of the historian.

Indeed, it is precisely the genius of the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition to have preserved, unlike continental Europe, the Aristotelian notion that justice inheres in individual decisions and actions, and not in general principles. It is only in such sovereign decisions that true statesmanship is revealed, just as it is only in sovereign individual decisions that the virtue of the citizen is revealed.

Sovereignty, Properly Misunderstood

WHY SO MUCH attention to the CSCE, an organism which is at best

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in an embryonic stage of development? The reason is that another organization, the European Union, which is in a very mature stage of development and apparent growth, draws on many of the same unwelcome principles. Like the CSCE, for instance, the Maastricht Treaty is full of "mechanisms" to enable governments to decide this or that, especially in the domains of foreign and defense policy, as if decision-making were a procedural matter. But, more profoundly, the German plans for federal political union within the European Union fit inside the CSCE's overall plans for the entire continent like a Russian doll. This is for the same philosophical reasons as have been outlined above.

Karl Lamers' conviction that national sovereignty has long since become an illusion counts as one of the great accepted truths among the Europhile *cognoscenti*. Indeed, the comments made about sovereignty in the European Community are generally of an almost unimaginable crassness and infantility. It is almost impossible to find any modern European politician who can correctly define—or even betray an instinctive understanding of—national sovereignty, and there are plenty of European intellectuals who will tell you that it is an outdated concept. Those in favor of European integration, for instance, will tell you, in the same breath, that sovereignty is a meaningless concept and that the nation-states have already lost it anyway.

The argument usually goes like this: the nation-states of Europe are economically interdependent and must react to events outside their individual control. Therefore they are no longer sovereign. The only way to regain their lost power (or "sovereignty") is to join forces and act together. The former British foreign secretary, Lord (then Sir Geoffrey) Howe, has expressed this thought by writing that "sovereignty is a nation's practical ability to make its influence felt in the world."

All this is deeply misguided. Far from being meaningless, sovereignty is the definitive quality of a constitutionally independent state. If a country is constitutionally independent, it is sovereign. A country does not become less sovereign if it becomes less powerful. To say that "sovereignty" is meaningless is to say that "constitution," "independence," and "state" are meaningless concepts as well. It is rather like wanting to overcome the distinction between friend and enemy.

Far from being a call for all-powerful national government, defense of the concept of national sovereignty is the most important defense of democracy in modern Europe. De Gaulle used to say that he considered national sovereignty and democracy to be the same thing. The point about national sovereignty is not that the state is either internally or externally all-powerful (although there can, by definition, not be a higher constitutional authority than that of a sovereign entity), it is rather to clarify the source of the authority which the state exercises. If the state is democratic, that source is the people or the nation. At bottom, this inability to understand sovereignty, and the concomitant view that it is "an illusion," is based on a simple and worrying confusion between authority and power, a distinction which is the cornerstone of all legal reasoning. It is extremely worrying that all modern European politicians, almost without exception, make this error.

This is why the CSCE's pretense to be the source of a new constitutional order for the whole of Europe dovetails with the proclaimed aim of some very powerful players in European politics, most notably the German governing party, to subsume national constitutions in a European one. Let us be clear: the weasel words about "uniting Europe while protecting national differences," and the widespread refusal (such as that of the French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur) even to address the question of sovereignty, means that what is an offer is not a clearly proclaimed intention to replace the states of Western Europe by one super-state, but instead a legal and political order predicated on the blurring of those fundamental concepts which are the building blocks of law, democracy, and freedom.

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The rhetoric about borders reinforces this dovetailing. It is fashionable to say that borders are coming down all over Europe, and unfashionable and seemingly narrow-minded to want to maintain them. In the moments when Russia expresses hostility to the eastward extension of NATO, for instance, it protests against "the creation of new lines of division in Europe." But, like the others, this political slogan ignores the legal importance of borders, whether national or regional, as de-limiting domains of jurisdiction. In ancient Greek, the word for "law," *nomos*, is derived from *nemein*, to distribute, to possess (what was distributed), or to dwell—to the extent that Heraclitus could pun on "law" and "hedge," as in, "The people should fight for the law as for a wall." The law, indeed, was originally identified with the boundary line between properties (later, between cities), and even if the concept of law has evolved since, it is clear that a domain of jurisdiction must be spatially defined for it truly to exist. It is only in the communist mind that a border need be a barrier.

To abolish borders (rather than to open them) or to make them so vast and vague as to be non-existent ("from Vancouver to Vladivostock") is ultimately to undermine the rule of law, for it risks abolishing even the possibility of statehood. In the EU, outright federalists and crypto-federalists are united by their failure to understand the legal and political significance of borders. In the CSCE, there is no proposal to abolish national borders (indeed their inviolability is one of its central commitments) but rather the aim is to make them irrelevant. But states, as the subjects of international law, must exist as such if international law is to exist, and they must also exist if domestic law is to exist.

The advantage of national sovereignty over supranational sovereignty is that it is based on a reality, namely that pre-existing political entity which is the nation. Nations are not founded, they grow. Even if a state has a formal foundation date, the nation on which it is based will already have contained a whole tapestry of habits, conventions, rules, and historical and cultural reference points which will enable it to exist as a political entity. It is only when the cultural basis for political discourse exists that democracy can obtain. A good constitution, like good law, is one which reflects reality and does not seek to destroy it. This is why the notion that the European parliament can ever replace national parliaments as the holder of political legitimacy, or even as a forum for political accountability and democracy, is naive.

The widespread misunderstanding of the inherently conservative nature of democracy is reflected in the strikingly undemocratic nature of the German proposals to construct a federal union of a "hard core" of states. First, the proposals ride a coach and horses through the principle of national self-determination, by insisting that all European policy henceforth be made by majority vote between the member states. Indeed, they even promise to provide the "hard core" with its own autochthonous constitution, and to abolish the national veto on any further constitutional and institutional developments.

This would be bad enough, were all the European Union's present institutions not already undemocratic. The Commission, the most powerful organ in the Union, is composed of unelected officials, and is the sole initiator, and in some cases, executor of policy. It is constitutionally independent, i.e. accountable to no one. The Council of Ministers is also unaccountable, and it represents as thorough a confusion between executive and legislature as it is possible to imagine. Composed of ministers from each member state, it is the supreme legislative body of the Union. No doubt part of the reason why European national governments are all so keen on the EU is that it enables them, as governments, to sit in the Council of Ministers in a legislative capacity, for the Council is subject to no parliamentary control whatever. It is unelected as a body (although most of its members are elected in their home countries), and it answers neither to the European parliament

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nor to national parliaments. Its meetings take place in secret and decisions are taken by majority vote, which extinguishes all national parliamentary control over its activities, because, if ever called to account for a vote by his national parliament, a minister can always plead that he was in a minority. Indeed, in general terms, it is always convenient for national politicians to have "Europe" either as a vehicle with which to propagate their more unrealistic promises or as a whipping-boy for their own failures.

Meanwhile, the judges of the European Court of Justice, the approximate equivalent of the Supreme Court of the United States, are very often not even judges by training at all. Perhaps this is why the Court has a thirty year history of bending Community law (which takes immediate and total precedence over national law) in order to force a greater and greater degree of legal and political centralization.

The final window on national democracy will be shut if, as proposed, Europe adopts a single currency. This will be managed by an independent Central Bank, which is supposed to be sealed off from national governments, parliaments, and electorates. As the Maastricht treaty and the German government make absolutely clear, monetary policy is extremely political, for it presupposes that the whole gamut of other policies—fiscal, budgetary, social, foreign and even defense—be subordinated to its commitment to the undefined goal of "price stability." As Lamers himself has said, "monetary union is the highest and purest form of integration." In other words, the Maastricht treaty, which obliges member states to join a monetary union, proposes to transfer the power currently exercised by national governments accountable to national parliaments to two unaccountable institutions, the Council of Ministers and the Central Bank. This means that power currently exercised democratically and within the framework of national constitutions will be transformed into totally discretionary power. But government is not about administering society—an impossible task—it is about upholding the law. Unfortunately, most Western European states have such a moribund political and civic culture that most voters seem actually to *want* the state to control their lives at the price of personal liberty, all in the name of security.

When Germany ratified the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, it awarded itself two rights which no other country has within the present European legal order. The Federal Constitutional Court at Karlsruhe proclaimed itself the final arbiter in any disputes in interpretation of European Community law between itself and the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg. This flies in the face of thirty years of Community jurisprudence, which insists that Community law always takes immediate and direct priority over national law, even over national constitutional law.

Secondly, Germany awarded itself the right, through an extremely imaginative reading of the treaty, to withdraw from its commitment to engage in the process of monetary union. Its supreme judges argued that the treaty committed it only to maintaining price stability, and that if that as yet undefined goal were to be unfulfilled, then Germany could withdraw from the monetary union. The court even evoked the possibility that new, stronger political institutions might be necessary in order to make the monetary union work, noting that in the past, such as in the transition of Germany from North German Federation to German Empire in 1871, political union had been the prerequisite for monetary union. In other words, the CDU is saying that monetary union must occur on Germany's terms, and those terms are the adoption of a federal political union of five countries, in which Germany alone will represent 50 percent in terms of population.

This is why the CDU document hovers between threats—"Without such a continued development of (West) European integration Germany could be required, or as a result of its own security needs, tempted, to ensure the

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stability of Eastern Europe alone and *by traditional means*"—and professions of European faith. It is also striking that the document calls explicitly for France and Germany to exercise a hegemony over the peripheral states: "No substantial action in foreign or European policy may be taken without prior Franco-German agreement." Mr. Lamers, who, in a rather Kozyrevian phrase, calls the British Euroskeptics "national ideologues," glosses the same thought by saying that the "hard core" would exercise "an irresistible force" on the peripheral states, and that any attempt to resist that force would be "self-centered and ultimately irrational."

Perhaps the most striking remark in Lamers' writings is the claim that Germany had understood the lessons of European history better than other states because of "the catastrophe of 1945." This is a surprisingly common remark in modern Germany. One would expect Germans to say that they have learned their lessons from what happened in 1933 or 1939, not 1945. Most Europeans, like most Americans, see May 1945 not as the date of the victory of the Allies over Germany, but of the victory of democracy over dictatorship, and thus no catastrophe. But if modern German policymakers say that it is from 1945 that they have learned the lessons of history, then the lesson in question can only be that Germany can never succeed in dominating Europe on its own, and conversely, that hegemony can only be exercised together with others, because it is at its weakest when surrounded by enemies. Germany's need for allies is due to its vulnerable position in the center of Europe: its power is augmented when a clutch of allies is gathered on its frontiers, especially if for economic or political reasons they are obliged to toe the German line. This is what is happening both in the proposed creation of a hard core for Western Europe and with the eastward extension of the European Union to include all Germany's former client states in Eastern Europe.

It is striking that no French politician seems to understand how badly Germany needs France in order to clothe its hegemony in Western Europe in respectability. France is the decent apparel with which German power can gird its loins, for if France were not in the hard core, then the European Union would clearly be a German empire. It is noteworthy, therefore, that Germany proposes to exercise its power behind a French (or European) fig-leaf, a convenient way of not assuming its responsibilities.

It is in this vein that most German politicians call for the old doctrine of the "balance of power" in Europe to be overthrown. It is odd that this view should be politically correct these days, for German leaders from Kaiser Wilhelm II to Hitler have sung the same song, arguing that the balance of power in Europe is nothing but a perfidious British (or sometimes American) policy to ensure that the continental European powers remain weak. Proposals to reinforce political union in Europe—whether in France or in Germany—are nearly always accompanied by an expression of desire for Europe to affirm its power against America and Japan. But what such explicit or implicit attacks on the balance of power conveniently obscure is the fact that those countries which have supported the doctrine of the balance of power have never had any hegemonial ambitions on the continent, unlike those which reject it. What could be a better principle for the government of the European continent than that a certain equity or balance be maintained between the major powers? We have already seen that peace and the maintenance of law depends upon such an equity. Indeed, the doctrine of the balance of power is one of the wisest and most profound insights into the way the European continent should operate, and it is sad to see it being scorned yet again. If the myth of destabilizing European nationalism—and the concomitant view that it can be contained only within supranational organizations—continues to cast its spell over the decisions of Europe's political architects, then it will prove to be a self-fulfilling fantasy. □

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Repeating British Mistakes

Jonathan Clarke

NOW THAT WE have passed the second anniversary of foreign policy under the Clinton administration, critics have sated themselves on easy pickings. But more recently a new direction has crept into view, as commentators turn away from well-practiced lambast in favor of more sympathetic attempts to explore—or even to validate—the underlying patterns beneath the surface chaos. The tentative indications of a more assured grasp of national priorities in the White House in early 1995, notably the quietly effective diplomacy with regard to North Korea and Vietnam, further encourage erstwhile critics to ponder whether a new foreign policy rationale is emerging.

This revisionist approach is sure to produce any number of interesting theories as to why foreign policy seems to be less accident prone, but one that does seem worth further investigation is that, in terms of operational practicality, post–Cold War experience is teaching that American foreign policy succeeds best when its practitioners acknowledge—whether explicitly or implicitly—that American power is a much more ambiguous quantity today than it was during the Cold War. An aggressively robust foreign policy is impossible when both congressional and popular opinion are steadfastly opposed to voting the resources or tolerating the casualties that render such a policy sustainable. Even when an operation is apparently progressing well or is of vital importance to the United States—as in Haiti or over Mexico—the first instinct on Capitol Hill is to set a date for termination or to bicker over the details. Given the absence of foreign policy focus in the November 1994 election and subsequent Republican concentration on domestic policy, the change of party control does not appear likely to overturn the fundamental premise that resources and stamina for foreign policy will continue to be meager—in point of fact, they may have to be reduced even further, if a balanced budget is indeed to be achieved early in the next century.

The good news is that, properly handled, this does not necessarily matter very much. The world is a much friendlier place. The bad news is that all too many of those who operate the levers of foreign policy—including not only government officials but journalists, commentators, think-tankers, academics, and lobbyists—stubbornly continue to resist making the necessary psychological adjustment to these new conditions. They encounter great difficulty in discarding the habits of undiscriminating global engagement formed while confronting—supremely successfully let it be said—the daunting challenges of the Cold War. Unfortunately, their reluctance to accept change may cause

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the inevitable reordering of America's role in the world to be transformed from a controlled process in which American influence is retained into an out-of-control, fully-fledged decline.

To speak of "decline" is still not *pukka* or kosher within the foreign policy elite, any more than it was in 1987 when Paul Kennedy's *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* touched a raw nerve in the American body politic, acting like a gratuitous injury to a great athlete, a *memento mori* that America's best playing days might be behind it. So it is necessary to tip-toe around this concept. Nonetheless, the case can be made that, through its crucial psychological failure to come to terms with the sharp reduction in the resources available for foreign policy projects, this same foreign policy elite has failed to meet the challenge of guiding the nation through the current transition to a post–superpower age. Refusing to acknowledge intellectually and emotionally that times have changed, they persist in over-promising what they cannot deliver—a habit that has caused endless chaos and poor policy choices as rhetorical excesses run ahead of hard reality.

In his book *Diplomacy*, Henry Kissinger describes the United States as "an island off the shores of the large landmass of Eurasia." This brings to mind another offshore island where another foreign policy elite of a similar temperament and outlook to their modern American counterparts made the same mistake of preferring prestige over substance in the wake of its greatest triumph in war. The story is well-known, but may still be worth retelling today—not as a straight-line predictor of what will happen in the United States but as a cautionary tale of how foreign policy miscalculations can exact harsh penalties on domestic welfare.

Some thirty years ago, Dean Acheson made his famous remark about the British—for it is, of course, of them that we are speaking—as having lost an empire and being unable to find a role. Today, the United States finds itself in a similar predicament. It too has "lost" an empire—the Soviet Union, opposition to which provided the defining mold for three generations of policy-makers. Civilized people everywhere have good reason to be grateful for the fortitude of American purpose displayed during this period. Gratitude, however, cannot disguise the fact that, with their mission accomplished, today's Americans, like the British before them, are struggling to find a new role.

The British struggle took many false turns and even today the deep ideological fissures in the ruling Conservative party over European policy show that it is far from fully resolved. Unfortunately, there are disquieting signs that American officials—aided and abetted by the wider foreign policy community—seem inclined to repeat the central British failure to bring resources and aspirations into a sustainable equilibrium.

The Folly of Make-Believe

IF THEIR STATUS as two offshore islands were their only common characteristic, Britain and America would have little to learn from each other. They are very different countries and the history of one does not transfer automatically to the other. In terms of raw statistics of military power, wealth, size, and population—the variables populating the equations of systems analysts—any comparison between Britain and the United States seems risible.

With regard to foreign policy attitudes, however, the parallels are striking. The psychological culture of the foreign policy elites in London in the immediate aftermath to World War II and in Washington in the wake of the Cold War triumph are notably close. Selwyn Lloyd, foreign secretary at the time of the 1956 Suez debacle, has portrayed the British foreign policy debate in the 1940s and 1950s in terms very similar to those now playing out in the United States: whereas in Britain the conservatives accused the Labourites of "scuttling" on imperial respon-

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sibilities, in this country Republicans accuse Democrats of abandoning "leadership" and exempt defense spending from the budget knife; whereas British socialists set out in the 1950s to bestow their vision of good governance on the nations emerging from colonization, today's American liberals talk of "democratic enlargement" and the reconstruction of "failed states." At a remove of half a century, the British would immediately empathize with their American colleagues in their struggles to reinvent their global roles.

The British mistake—and the implicit warning for the United States today—lay in choosing to play a game of diplomatic make-believe, fooling the British themselves and the rest of the world for the best part of fifty years. Even when in 1947 the British were informing the Americans that they would no longer be able to sustain their position in Greece and Turkey—in retrospect the defining moment in British postwar diplomatic history—they were preening themselves on their superior brain power, as in the well-known doggerel:

> In Washington Lord Halifax
> Once whispered to Lord Keynes,
> It's true *they* have the money bags,
> But *we* have all the brains.

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan voiced this attitude in his smug remark that "we are Greeks in their American empire," adding—after some disparaging comments on American culture—that the British should run this empire as "the Greeks ran the operations of the Emperor Claudius." In a slightly different way, Margaret Thatcher made the same point in her memoirs when she wrote that the Gulf War proved that "the ties of blood, language, culture, and values which bound Britain and America were the only firm basis for U.S. policy in the West."

This assumption of superiority at the peculiarly British style of diplomacy to which it gave rise—at once arrogant and indigent—has intensely irritated some of those who have encountered it: German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, for example, once compared Britain to "a rich man who has lost all his property, but does not realize it." He characterized British foreign policy as "one long fiddle."

Many more, however, have made a virtue out of it. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd takes delight in declaring that Britain "punches above its weight" in international diplomacy. When Iraqi tanks rolled toward Kuwait in October 1994, he hurried out to the Gulf (ignoring the debate on Europe at the Conservative party conference that carried far greater long-term importance for British interests) and demanded that the tanks turn back, for all the world as if Britain were the managing partner of the Gulf coalition.

The British sleight of hand has gained many admirers in this country. Despite the fact that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's anti-European histrionics robbed Britain of a potential leadership role in Brussels, in the United States she remains probably the most admired British politician for what is seen as her gutsy defiance of the world's dictators. But whether that defiance was always well considered and necessary in terms of core British interests is another matter.

Immediately after World War II, there was a chance that Britain could have escaped this self-deceiving error. At that time, Britain's leaders did not entertain any illusions about the economic straits in which it found itself. Prime Minister Clement Attlee wrote that "Britain was facing a difficult position as a great power which had temporarily been gravely weakened." Referring to the United States, Churchill lamented to his physician, "They have become so big and we are so small. Poor England!" As the costs of the British commitment to Greece began to rise in 1946, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton minuted that "I regard the Greeks as a poor investment for the British taxpayer."

But clear-headed though they might have

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been about the precarious state of the nation's finances, the psychological hurdles were too high. Britain's leaders were too embedded in a tradition—and the victory in World War II was too recent—for them to draw the appropriate conclusion regarding global activism, namely, that a prohibitive price would have to be paid on the home front. So Britain persisted in painting her destiny on a global canvas for many years after the financial crisis of the winter of 1947 should have brought home once and for all her incapacity to sustain such a role. The Suez expedition of 1956; the maintenance of large overseas garrisons; the Falklands war; the unbridled British enthusiasm for the Gulf War—all these events share a common denominator in what the British commentator Peregrine Worsthorne has described as "ancestral voices," or what General de Gaulle called a penchant for the "open sea." Given the choice, the British preferred (and continue to prefer) a foreign policy that produced occasional glory on distant foreign fields rather than the hard slog in the nearby trenches of Europe.

The cost has been great in terms of diminished domestic standards of living and, ironically, even more diminished influence—particularly in Europe. Instead of being one of the richest members of the European Union, Britain falls below the EU average; instead of being a leader in Europe, the British are forced to react to whatever the Franco-German axis serves up, and—even when they have logic and sound political judgment on their side—have difficulty making their case heard. This point finds recent expression in the cool take-it-or-leave-it tone concerning Britain's European options in the September 1994 position paper issued by the ruling CDU party in Germany.

The Fateful British Mistake

THE SEEDS OF the British post–World War II mistake were sown early. A Foreign Office minute of 1943, commissioned to examine Britain's place in the postwar world, observed that:

> If we did not fulfill our world wide role, Britain would sink to the level of a second-class power and become either a European Soviet state or a penurious outpost of American plutodemocracy or a German *Gau* as the forces might dictate.

This led to the strategic error of holding back from developments on Britain's doorstep. In a famous speech in Zurich in 1946 Churchill called for a United States of Europe, of which Britain, rather than being a member, would be a gracious "friend and sponsor." Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin warned his Cabinet colleagues that "the United Kingdom—because of its overseas connections—could never become a fully European nation."

The illusion could sometimes go even further. A 1949 Conservative Party document entitled *Imperial Policy* stated that "it is sometimes forgotten that the potential strength of the British Empire and Commonwealth is greater than that of the United States and USSR."

In a series of other speeches, Churchill deepened this sense of self-deception or—to put it more kindly—the British passion for a global destiny. In his "Iron Curtain" address in Fulton, Missouri in 1946, he outlined a future of global British glory—this time in partnership with the United States: "If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States...there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure." He followed this with his depiction of Britain as lying at the center of three concentric circles: the Commonwealth and Empire; Europe; and the United States—a view of things that, far from representing an advantage, was to result in uncertainty and vacillation in determining how the three should be related to each other and which circle should be given priority.

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These sentiments were in marked contrast to those that de Gaulle was expressing across the Channel. No less absorbed with glory than the British, he advocated an entirely different approach:

> Our planet as it is today shows two masses both of which are intent on expansion but are driven by wholly different internal forces and also by different ideological currents. Although one may hope that they will not become enemies, America and Russia are automatically rivals...In view of our situation, the preservation of our independence becomes the most burning and decisive issue.

Churchill's words set the tone for the evolution of British postwar diplomacy. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in October 1947, Anthony Eden, then a member of the Conservative opposition but destined to succeed Churchill, wrote that Britain was both "a part of the European continent and separate from it." He added with evident approval that the "average Britisher is probably more conscious today that London lies at the heart and center of the British Commonwealth and Empire than he is even of his European neighbors."

Relative status in the world, but particularly vis-à-vis these same European neighbors, began to obsess British statesmen from both left and right. In 1948 the Labour Minister Herbert Morrison said that the issue of the day was "whether we are going to be a great power or a small one—a leader or a hanger-on." In 1950 the British ambassador in Washington, Oliver Franks, reported to Prime Minister Clement Attlee that "far from being one of the queue of European powers, we clearly are one of the two world powers outside Russia." Two years later Churchill—once again prime minister—recorded that "I love France and Belgium, but we must not allow ourselves to be dragged down to that level." In the same year Eden, now again foreign secretary, said in a speech at Columbia University:

> Forming a European federation is something we know in our bones we cannot do...Britain's story and her interests lie far beyond the continent of Europe. That is our life. Without it we should be no more than some millions of people living on an island off the coast of Europe in which nobody wants to take a particular interest.

From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that Britain missed the significance of the events that led up to European Community. In 1955 the British ambassador to France Gladwyn Jebb made light of the seminal European meeting in Messina with the comment, "No very spectacular developments are to be expected as a result of the Messina Conference...the principal progress will be purely verbal." In the same spirit, Jean Monnet's early advocacy of European cooperation—advocacy which eventually led to the Treaty of Rome in 1957—was dismissed by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan with the words, "I have known Monnet for a very long time indeed and he is a charming man. But he has an incurable weakness for blueprints and constitutions. I would not take them seriously." It is also not surprising that the signing of the Treaty of Rome saw Macmillan closeted with Dwight Eisenhower in Bermuda, talking global grand strategy and nuclear politics and so far elevated above this decisive moment in European history that he did not even mention the treaty ceremony in his diaries.

The debate of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent is characterized by these same concerns about status. Lord Cherwell, Churchill's scientific adviser, wrote that without the bomb Britain "would rank with other European nations who have to make do with conventional weapons." Advocating an independent British nuclear weapons program, he added:

> If we are unable to make the bomb ourselves and have to rely on the United States for these

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vital weapons, we shall sink to the level of a second-class nation, only permitted to supply auxiliary troops, like the native levies who have been allowed small arms but not artillery.

This reasoning drew a sharp retort from Henry Tizard, the chief scientific adviser at the Ministry of Defense:

> We persist in regarding ourselves as a great power, capable of everything and only temporarily hard pressed by economic difficulties. We are not a great power and never will be again. We are a great nation, but if we continue to behave like a great power we shall soon cease to be a great nation.

These words encapsulate the test facing Britain at the end of World War II. In many ways, it must be said—admittedly with the benefit of hindsight—that Britain failed that test. In his memoirs, former Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, writing of the late 1950s, when he had been viewing Britain at a distance as high commissioner in Australia, put it charitably:

> Looking from abroad...it was obvious that Britain had, or shortly would have, no Imperial or quasi-Imperial role left, and very reduced international authority as an independent nation without it. Today these statements seem pretty obvious, but they have taken a long time to penetrate.The second reason for my conviction that our future lay in Europe was my appreciation—and again it seems very obvious today but was a great deal less so even a short time ago—that militarily as well as economically we were pretty small.

Overemphasizing Military Prowess

THE CENTRAL MISTAKE for Britain—a mistake that should resonate for the United States today and for the Republicans in particular, as advocates of high defense spending—was that those in charge of its affairs overemphasized military power as the defining measure of national greatness. Symptomatically, this was the one area in which Britain could claim some successes for its early European policy, notably the founding of the Western European Union which became the vehicle for Germany's integration into NATO. Britain has consistently played a dominant role in NATO, providing intellectual leadership and taking many more senior positions than were her proportional due; and since 1989 the British have been among the most energetic and imaginative advocates of NATO's preservation.

Margaret Thatcher personified this line of thinking. She was always more comfortable in NATO rather than European Commission settings. Michael Butler, who served as Britain's ambassador to the European Commission under Thatcher, has recorded that she "showed a deep seated prejudice against the European Community" which, according to her biographer Hugo Young, she regarded as a branch of NATO. In her autobiography she writes:

> The significance of the Falklands War was enormous, both for Britain's self-confidence and for our standing in the world. Since the Suez fiasco in 1956, British foreign policy had been one long retreat...Victory in the Falklands changed that. Everywhere I went after the war, Britain's name meant something more than it had.

Emphasis on military accomplishments as the chief determinant of national identity brings with it an attachment to a crude form of sovereignty that severely complicates any relationship with a supranational authority. In 1951, Attlee said, "We are willing to play an active part in all forms of European cooperation on an inter-governmental basis. We cannot surrender our freedom of decision and action to any supranational body." Later, Macmillan said that Britain would never allow a European body to "close British steel

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mills or coal pits." His argument echoes today in the American debate over the World Trade Organization.

Unfortunately, however, military prowess and a global reach have proved to be less central to national success than most Britons in the early postwar years expected. The British have placed unusual emphasis on military expenditure and adventures—in 1950 Britain was spending more per capita on defense than the United States and as late as 1964 still maintained more forces on the ground in Southeast Asia than any other outside power. Even today Britain spends a larger percentage of its GDP on defense than any other European member of NATO other than Turkey and Greece. Experience has shown that these policies have not proved to be a good investment in terms of British domestic welfare.

This is perhaps why, in his comparison of de Gaulle's and Thatcher's contributions to their countries, Desmond Dinan comes down hard on the latter:

> De Gaulle looked to the future; Thatcher harked to the past. De Gaulle espoused a 'European Europe;' Thatcher embraced U.S. hegemony. De Gaulle battled against bipolarity; Thatcher was a creature of the Cold War.[1]

An Island off Eurasia

"CREATURE OF THE Cold War:" this returns the story to the United States. In an age when, for the first time in nearly half a century, we are having to reconsider foreign policy's first principles, does American thinking remain captive to Cold War norms in the way that British attitudes remained so long in thrall to imperial habits? Does the British difficulty in coming to terms with its reduced post-imperial role hold any lessons for the United States as it struggles to define its place in the world?

The proposition that the United States may have to work out its destiny against a background of decline—let alone one as sharp and palpable as that of Britain—may not at first sight seem persuasive. After all, events seem to be moving ever more decisively in favor of the United States. The Soviet Union has disappeared. A new bout of political and economic sclerosis grips Europe. Japan remains mired in domestic recession, no matter how much its exporters sell. Commentators like Harvard professor Joseph Nye (a recent head of the National Intelligence Council) who have labored to "debunk the myth of decline" feel themselves triumphantly vindicated.

The same view has gained ground overseas. In France, Alfredo Valladão's best-selling book *Le XXIème siècle sera américain* (The Twenty-First Century Will Be American) has forecast that the United States will dominate the next century through its control of international corporate and media networks. In September 1994, the Swiss-based World Economic Forum anointed the United States as the world's most competitive nation.

Unfortunately, there lurks in these apparent advantages a trap similar to the one into which the British fell. Surveying the smoldering ruins of defeated or occupied Europe and with the British armed forces and empire still intact, Britain's postwar leaders were blinded to the need for a fundamental reordering of British priorities. They misread British financial woes as merely temporary. As the United States savors its Cold War triumph, it seems now embarked on a parallel course to that already charted by Britain. Basking in the warm glow of apparently unmatchable military superiority, American leaders are evading the task of foreign policy reassessment in favor of continuing on a business-as-usual course that will keep the United States, in the words of

[1]Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener, 1994). Dinan is professor of European Studies at George Mason University.

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keep the United States, in the words of Assistant Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "fully engaged abroad."

Since 1989, the "sole remaining superpower" or "unipolar" notion has established itself in the United States as the short-hand description of the nation's place in the world. According to this notion, American ascendancy—especially in the military sphere—is so marked that the United States can have its way effortlessly with the rest of the world. One commentator has even spoken in terms of an American master and world donkey, with the former applying occasional sharp raps on the latter's back.[2] In the October 10, 1994 issue of *The New Republic*, Owen Harries, the editor of this journal, set out the reasons why this notion may not be the surest foundation on which to build today's American foreign policy purposes.

The superpower concept has resulted in a continuing, almost reflex, embrace of American global activism. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in September 1994, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake declared a Cold War-esque *jihad* on "extreme nationalists and tribalists, terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, rogue states, and all those who would return newly free societies to the intolerant ways of the past." General Colin Powell has said that "the vital interests of mankind are the vital interests of America, no matter how far from our shores." Speaking of aid to Russia, former Secretary of State James A. Baker said that "only America can do it."

Whose Interests?

IN 1952, THE British historian Denis Brogan wrote about the "illusion of omnipotence," saying that "this is the illusion that any situation which distresses or endangers the United States can only exist because some Americans have been fools or knaves." American activities over the past two years show that this illusion is alive and kicking today, at a time when the American slice of the world's GDP is roughly half what it was when Brogan wrote. And more than rhetoric is involved. During this time forces have been deployed to Somalia, Macedonia, Haiti, the skies over Iraq and Bosnia, the waters off Cuba. An American military presence on the Golan Heights is envisaged. A near-war situation on the Korean peninsula has expanded the American commitment there, and there have been war games in Poland. The rules of selectivity (widely invoked though they may be) hardly seem to apply.

But do these activities reflect a rational calculation of the core interests of the American people in whose name they are conducted? Or do they—in the manner of British over-ambition—spread the United States so thinly and needlessly across the globe that these same interests go unheeded? Fixing the correct place in the global scheme of things for an enormous country like the United States is a difficult enterprise. So is the determination of a rational scale of priorities among so many competing special interests. As we saw over Haiti, the range of opinions is vast—from those who think remaking Haitian democracy is well within the capabilities of the United States to those who assert that this task lies beyond American power.

In the days when systems analysis enjoyed a vogue in the study of international relations, researchers developed a pseudo-scientific approach to rank nations: they set up multiple variable equations involving such factors as population, size, and popular willpower. By assigning numerical quantities to these factors, they were able to determine a nation's precise rank in the international pecking order. Vietnam exposed the limitations of this approach as a useful instrument for operational deployment. As in tennis, top seeds could still be felled by journeymen players having a good day.

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[2]William Safire, "Carrots and Sticks," *New York Times*, November 29, 1993, p. 17.

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For present purposes, the methodology of coming to a correct placement is less important than the consequences of getting it wrong. If conflict arises between a nation's global aspirations and the real resources it is willing or able to devote to their fulfillment, the result will surely be an unstable foreign policy. Under such circumstances, policymakers will tend to ignore the nation's central interests in favor of will-o'-the-wisp enterprises. They will fail to make the necessary adjustments to bring foreign policy back on an even keel. Which in turn means that the return on the national foreign policy investment will be negative. Sooner or later this will lead to diminished domestic welfare.

The idea that the quality of foreign policy decision-making has a direct impact on domestic well being is still rather new in the United States. In its 1992 report *Changing Our Ways*, the Carnegie Endowment comments that foreign policy can affect the price of a mortgage. But such a recognition is the exception. Foreign policy in the United States—as in most countries—is an elite occupation. The notion that their decisions could render their fellow citizens better or worse off is not central to the considerations of this elite. No calculus is made, for example, of whether the funds expended in Somalia or Haiti have or have not created a better life for those from whom this money was compulsorily obtained in the form of taxation. The expenditures are justified according to the codeword precepts of foreign policy "leadership" or "reliability."

This thinking is in fact quite typical of great powers. For them, a concern about status, rather than the accountant's slide rule, represents the governing motivation of foreign policy. There may be nothing wrong with this—so long as the resources are available, whether coerced by an absolute monarchy or freely given by a democratic citizenry. For France under Richelieu or Great Britain under Palmerston, this act can be carried off effectively. The same was true for the United States under Eisenhower—or perhaps under all post-World War II presidents until the fall of the Berlin Wall. The difficulties start to multiply when their successors try—as is the case today—the same tricks without the benefit of substantive props.

Herein lies the crux of the argument. Arguing against aid for Mexico in January 1995, a Republican congressman from Texas stated bluntly, "We're broke." This may be an exaggeration, but the resources available for foreign affairs are unquestionably on a long downward cycle. With regard to foreign development aid, for example, the United States now ranks bottom among OECD nations in terms of aid as a proportion of GDP. Beyond this, military prowess—the central element in the "sole remaining superpower" thesis—appears to have limited use in terms of today's problems. That this is the one area in which the new Republican leadership foresees an expansion of foreign policy resources may therefore have little utility.

To take policy toward Asia as an example, in the past two years, the United States has quarreled with India over Kashmir, the ASEAN nations over Burma, Singapore over caning and freedom of speech, China over human rights, Japan over trade, and North Korea over nuclear proliferation. In theory, a superpower should have won all these quarrels—pretty much regardless of the tactics it used. This is not what happened. Looking back, it is difficult to argue that the American position is stronger or more widely accepted than it would be had these quarrels not taken place or had they been conducted in less proconsular style.

When in 1969 President Richard Nixon tried to bring home to an Asian audience that they would have to provide more of their own defense, he encountered a plaintive cry from Japan: "Please don't run away from us." At the time, the United States dominated the relationship with Japan. In March 1994, the visit of then Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa provided a vignette of how things had changed. As a grim-faced President Bill Clinton announced the breakdown of trade

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talks, Hosokawa stood at his side, discreetly smiling, far from cowed. He later left the meeting to receive congratulations from Japan on standing up to the United States. In September 1994, much the same pattern was repeated as Japanese trade negotiators withstood enormous American pressure to open their automobile markets.

These episodes represent a growing number of incidents in which the United States is unable to impose its will easily. Decline may still be too strong a word to describe this phenomenon, but at the very least a shift in relative power has taken place. This requires a corresponding adjustment in diplomatic posture. If this adjustment can be made smoothly, American power and influence will be maintained for many more decades—probably to the great benefit of global welfare and human liberty. If it is resisted, then the example of Great Britain may be instructive—not as a literal forecast of what will happen in the United States, but by way of illustration of some of the hurdles to be overcome in this very difficult adjustment process. That, of course, is precisely the point of this cautionary tale. As Henry Tizard so sagely remarked, a great nation does not have to be a great power in the sense of feeling responsible for each and every event from Abkhazia to Zaire. During the global competition marked by the Cold War, it may have been excusable to disregard this advice. Afghanistan, Angola, and Grenada were all cut from the same cloth. The mistake lies in trying to continue with an unchanged policy today.

Now, there may come a time when the United States will have to use force again to defend American interests (in fact it would be very surprising indeed if it does not come). But the moral of the British analogy is that if—as many of the foreign policy elite advise—forcefulness, either in the form of actual deployment of force or in a general dependence on it to command foreigners' deference, is seen as the main ingredient of American foreign policy, then disappointment lies ahead. As they grow accustomed to their new power on Capitol Hill, the new Republican leadership will need to be particularly sensitive to this potential error.

The real problems with which American policymakers have to grapple lie in areas where force has little application but where sustained and subtle consensus-building maneuvering is everything. Maintaining commercial access to Japan and East Asia; accommodating the rise of China to superpower status; creating structures in Europe to prevent the Europeans from succumbing yet again to their self-destructive passions; forming a sensible relationship with evangelical Islam; building systems in the western hemisphere that insulate the United States from the effects of fissiparous tendencies, particularly in Mexico and Canada; fostering stable arrangements for global trade—these are the issues which should attract leadership time and attention. They are, of course, not "imperial" in character and certainly do not provide what George Ball once called the "satisfactions of power." Yet they are the bedrock. The future welfare of this nation does not depend on facing down minor opposition like Raoul Cedras or Saddam Hussein, but in attending effectively to the small number of really important issues. Much of this work will be unspectacular, short on military glamour, and wholly untelegenic. In their time the British, bewitched by nostalgia for conditions that had vanished and a role that was no longer appropriate, neglected these nuts-and-bolts aspects of their foreign policy and paid the price. If the United States now makes the same mistake, not only will its own interests be set back, but a great opportunity to determine the whole character of the post–Cold War era will be lost. □

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Russian Aid (II)

David J. Kramer

AMID THE POST-election scramble to see who can cut the most from the federal budget, foreign aid has become a prime target. "We ought not to be funding anything abroad that we would feel uncomfortable funding [in the United States]," said Senator Mitch McConnell last December, echoing the sentiment of many on Capitol Hill. In particular, aid to Russia is being reconsidered in light of the brutal and costly handling of the Chechen crisis, growing strains in relations between the United States and Russia, and uncertainty about the future of Russian political and economic reform.

Such a reconsideration would merely accelerate trends already at work. First, the amount of aid is shrinking, as Charles Flickner noted in the last issue of this magazine. Assistance for the Newly Independent States (NIS) collectively has fallen from $2.5 billion in the 1994 budget to $850 million in 1995.[1] For next year, the figure is expected to be around $800 million.

Second, this shrinking pie is being carved up differently. Responding to criticisms that its policy has focused too much on Russia at the expense of the other states, most notably Ukraine, the Clinton administration has scaled back the amount of aid going to Moscow for this year to $380 million, roughly 45 percent of the total for the NIS. Last year, fully 65 percent of the NIS assistance budget went to Russia. In the past, it would have been pointless to have given substantial aid to Ukraine while the Kravchuk government was failing to implement any reform at all. Since President Leonid Kuchma assumed office last summer, the Ukrainian government has shown a serious determination to launch a reform program, and the United States has responded by increasing aid to Kiev: from less than 10 percent last year, it is projected to receive nearly a quarter of the 1995 NIS assistance package.

Third, in addition to diversifying scarcer aid dollars, the administration is increasing its emphasis on the promotion of trade and investment. Roughly 3 percent of last year's assistance went to the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). This year, these two agencies account for 9 percent of the total NIS package. In addition, the Export-Import Bank, which helps finance and promote the export of American goods and services around the world, was allocated $300 million in 1994 from the NIS aid budget to be spent over two years. This comes on top of the several billion dollars that the bank and OPIC allocate for activities in Russia from their own budgets. As well, Enterprise Funds, non-profit

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[1] See Charles Flickner, "The Russian Aid Mess," *The National Interest* (Winter 1994/95). An additional $400 million for Nunn-Lugar legislation to help Russia dismantle its nuclear weapons falls under Pentagon appropriations. Statistics cited in this paper are drawn from the U.S. State Department's NIS assistance budget, as of January, 1995.

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corporations designed to attract private sector investment in the NIS, receive $90 million from the NIS assistance budget.[2]

Helping Others, Helping Ourselves?

PROMOTION OF TRADE and investment in Russia, defenders of the policy argue, goes hand-in-hand with technical assistance. Russia's strategic importance, combined with its poor business climate, compel the U.S. government to create incentives for American corporations to explore opportunities in Russia. Moreover, the argument goes, such a policy serves U.S. economic interests by creating more export opportunities and jobs for American workers.

Not surprisingly, promotion of trade and investment is very popular in the House and Senate as a means of funneling assistance to corporations in members' districts. Some congressmen, such as Senator McConnell (since the Republican takeover of Congress, the new chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations) want to devote even more resources to the promotion of trade and investment. He has called for the trade agency to be merged with OPIC, and the budget for the combined organization to be nearly quadrupled. "We can strengthen popular support for foreign aid," McConnell said last December in unveiling his plan for overhauling the U.S. foreign assistance program, "by making it more clearly serve American business interests." The problem with this suggestion is that it does not constitute foreign aid; it is corporate welfare.

Clearly, American trade and investment are crucial to the success of Russia's economic reforms and its integration into the world economy. But first the Russian government and parliament—as well as local legislatures and administrators—must, among other things, continue to pursue privatization of enterprises and land, enact clear foreign investment legislation, pass banking and securities regulations, and reduce the overall barriers to doing business in Russia. Foreign investment in Russia will not materialize to any significant degree unless Russia improves its business environment. Until it does so, U.S. government efforts to promote trade and investment in Russia will be futile.

Do Away With TDA

IN ITS EFFORT to drum up American corporate interest in Russia, the Clinton administration has offered millions of dollars to U.S. businesses since 1992 through TDA, OPIC, and the Export-Import Bank. In the 1995 aid package, TDA gets $17 million and OPIC $60 million. The trade agency, although the smallest of the three, is nevertheless the most egregious waste of taxpayer dollars. A little-known independent government agency, TDA provides funding through non-reimbursable grants to American firms for feasibility studies overseas, including, since late 1991, Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. Agency guidelines state that individual projects should have the potential to generate $50 to $100 in exports for each $1 of assistance. According to a 1993 General Accounting Office report, however, most projects supported by TDA have generated fewer exports than expected. In fact, the report concludes with the skeptical observation that "it is difficult to determine if these exports would have occurred without TDA's assistance."[3]

TDA exemplifies the worst in corporate welfare. Feasibility studies are an important part of the process for getting project funding, but they should not be done at the

[2]These funds are coordinated by the Agency for International Development (AID), which itself accounts for two-thirds of the total NIS assistance package.

[3]See "U.S. Trade and Development Agency: Limitations Exist in its Ability to Help Generate U.S. Exports," General Accounting Office Report, GAO/GGD-94-9.

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expense of the American taxpayer. The federal government does not fund corporate feasibility studies for projects in the United States. To paraphrase Senator McConnell, if we don't do it here, we shouldn't be doing it in Russia—or anywhere else for that matter.

Nor are these feasibility studies redeemed by the value of their product. TDA provides grants to small and medium-sized companies and numerous "Beltway Bandits," that is, Washington-area consulting companies. It also awards grants to Fortune 100 companies and corporations with an established business presence in Russia. Examples of highly questionable awards include a $400,000 award to IBM for a study on developing a modern automated banking system in Kazakhstan; a $435,000 grant to Marriott International for a study on the construction of a Marriott hotel to replace an Intourist hotel in downtown Moscow; and a $200,000 grant to Caterpillar (which in January reported record earnings for the fourth quarter), for a study on upgrading diesel engines with Zil, a Russian enterprise that is close to shutting down all twelve of its plants. Other major recipients include General Electric, Raytheon, Owens Corning, McDermott, Westinghouse, and Ernst & Young—all multi-billion dollar companies that should pay for these studies themselves. Even more inexplicable are three grants totaling $940,000 to the World Bank, and five grants totaling more than $1.1 million to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Finally, the trade agency's rationale for its work is flimsy. "Russia remains a risky place to do business," acknowledges Daniel Stein, TDA's regional director for the NIS. "It is not surprising that even the largest U.S. companies are reluctant to commit the extensive corporate financial and human resources that are needed to pursue a commercial opportunity that may or may not actually exist."[4] Regrettably, TDA is not as reluctant to gamble with U.S. taxpayers' dollars.

Describing the agency's feasibility study funding as "modest"—grants range from $1,000 to $1 million—Stein argues that the "political message sent by TDA involvement at the initial stage of a project is often as important as the financial assistance provided." A strange message indeed for an agency that purports to encourage free enterprise. While Stein tries to inject a "political message" into business investment decisions, shouldn't the U.S. be encouraging Russia to de-politicize its grossly over-politicized economy? Investment flows should be determined by market forces, not by the political whims of TDA bureaucrats.

Competing Against the Private Sector

GIVEN THE RUSSIAN government's poor track record on debt-payment—both foreign and domestic—it is not surprising that many American private-sector insurers and financial institutions avoid Russia. But those private institutions that are willing to venture into the Russian market find OPIC and the Export-Import Bank—government agencies—competing against them.

Because its grants are non-reimbursable, TDA depends on annual congressional appropriations and allocations from the NIS assistance program for new money to dole out. But it has not cornered the market on taxpayer-financed largesse. OPIC, by comparison, is a self-sustaining government agency and annually turns a profit. The practice of allocating funds to OPIC from the NIS assistance budget, therefore, is unnecessary and a waste of scarce resources. McConnell's proposal for a massive increase in funds for a combined OPIC-TDA is similarly misguided.

OPIC uses its profits to offer new loans and guarantees abroad. Its record of success

[4]Letter to the editor, *Los Angeles Times*, October 15, 1994.

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is likely to be tested, however, in the NIS. In 1994, OPIC approved project financing and political risk insurance of more than $2 billion to support U.S. investments; of that, nearly $1.5 billion is for political risk insurance which covers expropriation and political violence. OPIC also provides investment guarantees to support the debt portion—up to 75 percent—of private equity funds such as the Russia Partners (managed by Paine Webber) and the First NIS Regional Fund (run by Baring Brothers, International.).

The Export-Import Bank has supported $1.5 billion of U.S. exports to the Russian Federation. The program for the NIS, roughly one-tenth of the bank's total export-financing support, essentially insures the American exporter, or its bank, against risks of nonpayment by a foreign buyer or bank. For Russia, the bank operates mostly on a sovereign risk basis, typically through the state-owned bank for Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank). The 1993 Russian Oil and Gas Framework Agreement, under which hard currency proceeds from Russian energy sales are placed into collateral accounts, provides additional security for Export-Import Bank loans made to energy-sector companies.

If the climate for trade and investment in Russia further deteriorates—and recent events in Russia suggest this is a real possibility—the Export-Import Bank and OPIC could be faced with arrearage problems from frustrated American corporations. With talk by some Russian officials of renationalizing privatized assets, and with political uncertainty in Moscow and the threat of violence spreading beyond Chechnya, concern about the liability of OPIC and the bank is growing.

OPIC and the Export-Import Bank, the defenders argue, promote American foreign policy interests in Russia by providing incentives for American investors and exporters. But, again, the best way to interest American corporations in Russia is for the Russians themselves to improve the business environment. Are we not trying to reduce the role of the state—both U.S. and Russian—in Russia's economy? Don't the growing roles of TDA, OPIC, and the Export-Import Bank contradict that effort?

More Bang for the Ruble

THE U.S. AID program for the NIS, and in particular for Russia, is under attack. Recent developments in Russia are not making it easy to argue for continuing funding to Moscow. In light of cutbacks in foreign aid in general, the Clinton administration needs to fashion an effective NIS assistance program that can win congressional support.

Barring a major shift in Moscow's political situation, the U.S. should continue to pursue a low-profile program of support for economic and democratic reform. This program should revolve around two main objectives: support for continued economic restructuring and privatization of Russian enterprises, and promotion of democracy. It should not include promoting trade and investment in Russia. This is not to suggest that American corporations should not explore trade and investment opportunities in Russia, but simply, that they should not do so at the expense of the American taxpayer.

The rewards should be incentive enough: Russia, with its educated labor force and vast natural resources, holds considerable potential for foreign investors. It is also an extremely risky place in which to do business. A sensible set of policies would recognize both realities. In general, five reforms recommend themselves.

First, stop allocations to TDA, the Export-Import Bank, and OPIC from the NIS assistance budget. Also, the administration should limit commitments by OPIC and the bank in Russia in order to lower their potential liability.

Second, concentrate assistance from the Agency for International Development on two main objectives: promoting economic restructuring and democratization. As the principal agency responsible for foreign aid, AID currently manages thirteen projects in the NIS. With less money to allocate than in the past,

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AID cannot afford to spread itself too thin. One of the first areas to be cut should be the Enterprise Funds, which not only go beyond AID's provenance but overlap with OPIC's activities. AID-assisted privatization has been a success in Russia, though much remains to be done, most notably land reform and overall economic restructuring. On political reform, work by the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, the Free Trade-Union Institute, and the International Republican Institute deserve continued support.

Third, eliminate the $5 million from the NIS assistance budget for State Title VIII, administered by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department. This money goes to American academic institutions that study Russia and the former Soviet Union. This, simply, is not foreign aid.

Fourth, maintain funding for exchanges. This is the best way for Russians of all stripes—bankers, politicians, farmers, etcetera—to learn from us, and us to learn from them.

And *finally*, continue shifting more support to the non-Russian states with the same focus that should govern aid to Russia; emphasize political pluralism and economic restructuring.

U.S. aid to Russia should promote U.S. foreign policy interests and help the Russians help themselves. The private sector should be drawn to Russia as Russians improve their business climate, politically and economically, not through subsidies from U.S. government agencies. □

Asia: Skepticism about Optimism

Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal

WOULD IT NOT be marvelous if the inhabitants of Pacific-Asia had not only invented Won Ton and the Walkman, but also invented a formula for peace? James Richardson, in his thoughtful critique of those such as ourselves who suggest that Pacific Asian peace and stability is at risk, argues that the governments of Pacific Asia can trust in their culture and economic interdependence to prevent serious instability or conflict. He thinks that Cassandras such as Buzan and Segal are too steeped in European traditions to understand that people in Pacific Asia are not subject to the habits of international behavior that seem to apply everywhere else in the world.

Professor Richardson rejects the idea that European history has any lessons to offer for the rising new powers in Asia. He places much emphasis on the judgment that Pacific Asian culture has evolved new ways of settling disputes. He talks of informal dialogue, consensus building and non-governmental networks as if they replace or bind relations between states. All we need are "habits of dialogue." But it takes a huge dose of amnesia to forget the ways in which Pacific Asian culture settled disputes not too long ago. We still read of newly uncovered details of Japan's atrocities in its Asian colonies, Chinese human wave tactics as late as the war with Vietnam in 1979, or Indonesian brutality to opponents of the

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the unparalleled brutality of the Khmer Rouge?

The concept of unique Pacific Asian notions of dispute settlement is a little like the trendy talk of Confucian social values. Not too long ago people used to see Confucianism as a reason for China's failure to develop. So-called Confucian values (which are little different from Victorian values) interact with other aspects of policy to produce a given outcome. When Confucian values are mixed with open markets and greater political liberalism, then the result is more growth and prosperity. But mix them with Marxism/Leninism and you get Pol Pot, Kim Il Sung and the Cultural Revolution. What matters is the mix. Neither Confucian values nor informal dialogue is a stand-alone solution.

But perhaps now that Pacific Asians have moved from Marxist to market economics, the logic of economic interdependence has made arms racing and power rivalry less sensible and less likely. On balance, it is probably better for Pacific Asian stability that economic interdependence is growing, for it does give more people a stake in peace and may well lead to greater political liberalism. But once again the problem is taking one factor in isolation. In and of itself, economic interdependence may, as it did in most of the world before the Cold War, lead to rivalry and war. Geopolitics and geoeconomics are also about why people and states compete for resources and markets. The competitive aspect is especially strong when the international system itself is being destabilized by vigorous changes in the top ranks of world power.

In Pacific Asia it is the biggest powers that are rising and falling. The falling powers, Russia and the United States, are either well established or fledgling democracies. Japan, a recent and sometimes wobbly convert to democracy, is uncertain about whether it has peaked as a power. Most worrying of all, China, a massive rising power, is undemocratic, deeply certain about its own unity, and equally deeply determined to change the status quo in the international economy and the wider balance of power. The parallel with nineteenth-century Germany is very striking, and we think it would be foolish to ignore the all too familiar risks inherent in this type of situation. When the rising power has an authoritarian government, economic interdependence is more likely to be a cause of conflict. China is set to become the world's largest importer of food and fuel, two trends that will feed and fuel a desire to reorder the outside world to its advantage. It is incumbent on those such as Professor Richardson to suggest why Pacific Asia will buck the near unanimous verdict of history that these are highly unstable conditions. And we have not even mentioned rising military spending in Pacific Asia or a worrying range of unsettled territorial disputes. It will take more than habits of informal dialogue to handle these stresses.

What worries us is the apparent unwillingness in Pacific Asia to confront the magnitude of the problem. Australia carries a small stick and so understandably has to speak loudly. The dependence of Professor Richardson's vision on the continued benign engagement of the United States looks increasingly fragile as that country marches steadily towards a more self-interested and introverted stance.

In the current euphoria about the Pacific Century, it is hard to engage in realistic discussion about the risks of military rivalry. When Europeans remind Asians of pre-1914 euphoria about Europe's future, they are dismissed as Eurocentric scare mongers. Curiously, the most persuasive (though unmentionable) reason to think that 1994 is different from 1914 is the presence of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. There are three declared nuclear weapon powers in the Pacific, with the likes of the Koreas, Japan, and Taiwan not very far away from nuclear status if they wish to begin a crash program. Dare one suggest that Pacific Asians reacted in such a relatively blasé fashion to the devel-

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opment of North Korea's nuclear program because they recognized the unstated virtues of nuclear deterrence?

A less cynical approach, and one that might bring out more convergence with Professor Richardson, would be to judge the prospects for stability of Pacific Asia on the basis of whether the peoples there are empowered with democratic rights. The truth is that democracies very rarely go to war. West Europeans have understood that the key variable for peace is democracy, not just free markets and interdependent economies. Free societies seem to come with free markets, but not necessarily the other way around.

There are signs, most notably from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and even Hong Kong, that this belated Enlightenment is dawning. Yet in all but the South Korean case, it can be argued that democracy may, at least in the short term, bring greater risk. Consider the peril if the Taiwanese elect a government committed to independence. The key to peace in that scenario is not the economic interdependence between Taiwan and China. Witness the way China looks set to sacrifice parts of the Hong Kong economy for the values of sovereignty. The key to peace is democracy in China. If Professor Richardson wants to promise us a democratic China, then even we may become more optimistic about a pacific Pacific. □

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Wrong for Superior Reasons

Neil McInnes

J.A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942), 381 pp.

In 1947, Harper & Brothers published the second edition with a chapter added by Schumpeter. In 1950, a third edition was published by Harper & Brothers. It includes "The March Into Socialism," published previously as a paper for the American Economic Association's *Papers and Proceedings*, (December 1949). In 1952, the fourth edition of *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* was published in London by Allen and Unwin. Several editions of the book are still available.

LAST SUMMER, the university in Czernowitz (a city that after various name changes finds itself in Ukraine) held a Schumpeter summer school to celebrate the ideas of the Austrian who became associate professor of economics there, at age twenty-six, in 1909 (when Czernowitz was the easternmost bastion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). So, a scholar widely known for predicting a painless transition from capitalism to socialism is today studied in the East for clues on how to get back from socialism to capitalism. The paradox has parallels in the West, where Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* is still extensively read long after it became evident that its forecasts of "the march into socialism" were wide of the mark.

There is something of a puzzle about the perennation, in sixteen different languages including Hindi, Persian and Korean, of a book published in 1942 that is full of false prophecy and personal quirkiness. Schumpeter, after all, was the rich man's Karl Marx and by now his *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* ought to have gone the way of the Communist Manifesto. But Schumpeter was wrong for superior reasons, and in social theory it is the reasons, not the predictions, that count. Marx's prediction that capitalism would lead to socialism was founded on the supposed impoverishment of the majority by a dwindling minority, a falling rate of profit, and a class-conscious proletariat. Before the beginning of this century it was already obvious, notably to the Revisionists, that none of these things was happening, so Marxism has been dead at the roots for a hundred years. In contrast, Schumpeter's forecast that capitalism would pass away was grounded in the perception that business enterprise tends to gel lumpily into monopolies which seek to routinize research and development until they become unenterprising, unpopular and fettered by regulations. It is unimportant that Schumpeter drew the incorrect conclusion from this—that therefore business would end up being run by a few office workers appointed by the government. What is important is that his reasons for saying that still provide the best place to start understanding capitalism—a much better place than, say, models of pure competition and static equilibrium. So even when he gave the wrong answers Schumpeter was asking the right questions; as S.G. Winter said in 1984, "Today, as on any day in living memory, it is

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easy to admire Schumpeter's taste in problems."[1]

All the same, you would think that *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (hereinafter CSD) would be coming to the end of its prodigious shelf-life if its importance derived, as Tom Bottomore said in his introduction to the 1976 edition, from "the great social transition of the present age, from capitalism to socialism." Few people other than Bottomore believed in such a transition in 1976, and yet even in 1992 in his book *Between Marginalism and Marxism: The Economic Sociology of J.A. Schumpeter* he was still of the view that "the confrontation between capitalism and socialism continues to be a major element in social and political conflicts." Bottomore's enduring engrossment with CSD because of this supposed central issue is somewhat pathetic, for he is precisely the sort of anti-capitalist, fellow-traveling, utopia-prone intellectual that Schumpeter pilloried in the book. No one would read it today for his reasons.

What has saved CSD is the revival of interest in Schumpeter's general economic system, a system in which CSD occupies an eccentric, marginal place—a parergon (or by-blow), he called it. The revival dates from the eclipse of Keynesianism in the 1970s' stagflation; it gathered pace with the formation in 1986 of the International Schumpeter Society and the subsequent launching of the *Journal of Evolutionary Economics*, devoted to lines of inquiry Schumpeter started as long ago as 1912, in his *Theory of Economic Development*. There is a lot of enthusiasm and maybe some exaggeration in this belated apotheosis. Peter Drucker in 1983 claimed:

> It is becoming increasingly clear that it is Schumpeter who will shape the thinking and inform the questions on economic theory and economic policy for the rest of this century, if not for the next thirty or fifty years.

In 1984 H. Giersch, in the *American Economic Review*, hailed "The Age of Schumpeter," and in a 1988 miscellany on *Evolutionary Economics: Applications of Schumpeter's Ideas*, Gunnar Eliasson spoke of "the Schumpeterian revolution that currently appears to be replacing the Keynesian revolution in economics."

This revolution consists of a move away from the mainstream economist's analysis of maximization and equilibrium, rational expectations and stability toward a dynamic theory of economic development, which is found to be not incremental but disruptive, episodic, and disequilibrating because firms are not competing on price but on innovations. These new products, new ideas and new organizations are introduced in a gale of creative destruction, no matter whether by new-entrant entrepreneurs or by established big firms, so the economist's curiosity must be about the supply side of the micro level. What room is left for policy formulation will concern only the long term, "the climate not the weather." We thus move from the rarefied abstractions of neoclassical economics where, although technology is no longer a free good, it is assumed not to change; and we enter a jungle which bears an uncanny resemblance to the real world of business. There, Paul Samuelson said in 1982:

> The countervailing power that runs Schumpeter's jungle is the competition of giant seller against giant seller. And even a pygmy can challenge a giant and hope to become a giant.

Now CSD does not contribute much to this theory, which Schumpeter had worked out thirty years before, except such colorful phrases as "the perennial gale of creative

[1]An author and a date throughout mean that the reference can be found among the 2,176 items listed in Massimo Augello, *Joseph Alois Schumpeter: A Reference Guide* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1990). It goes down to October 1989, so only later items need detailed mention.

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destruction." J.K. Galbraith reported in 1977 that Schumpeter had said *CSD* "inspired his special loathing. It lacked, he said, scientific depth and precision." What is true, as contributors to the 1988 volume on Evolutionary Economics noted, is that

> *CSD* is of course sociological and does not proceed in terms of economic analysis. In addition, it is more in the nature of science fiction that does not discuss the actual capitalist economy, but the capitalism of the future.

Still, although professional economists nowadays tend to dismiss it sniffily as "more of a political tract than a work of economic theory," *CSD* is the easiest access to Schumpeter's economic ideas, some of which get a fresher, sharper definition there than elsewhere, notably the notion of "trustified capitalism."[2]

What it contains (for those who may have forgotten) is a section on Marx, which looks out of date because written before the rediscovery of the young Marx; a section on "Can Capitalism Survive?" (The answer: "No. I do not think it can"); a section on "Can Socialism Work?" (No surprise: "Of course it can"); a section on socialism and democracy, which argues that they are perfectly compatible; and finally a history of the socialist parties. It is the second, on the decay of capitalism, that is justly celebrated, not only for the economic material on the sources and processes of innovation and the role of market power ("monopoly") in protecting them, but rather for the dazzling combination of that material with sociological and frankly political analysis of social leadership, ideology, intellectuals, and the decline of the Buddenbrooks writ large in twentieth-century history.

This virtuoso combination of economic and sociological insights yields six main ideas. First, the entrepreneurial function is becoming obsolete because innovation increasingly comes from bureaucratized research and development and anyhow consumers no longer resist new products, so economic progress becomes depersonalized and automatic, thus robbing the business class of its social function and prestige. Second, capitalism has spread rationality which, in social matters, encourages skepticism about order and the family, on which capitalism is founded. Third, capitalism is destroying its own institutional framework by expropriating little businesses into bureaucratized behemoths that no one feels they own, and so no one defends them. Fourth, the case for capitalism, while no doubt excellent, is too complicated for the masses to understand, let alone turn into a faith or ideal. Fifth, businessmen are politically inept and cannot govern without the protection of those elites (e.g. aristocrats) whom they eliminated. Sixth, the intellectuals, who are ungrateful and hypocritical smart-alecks, attack a vulnerable bourgeoisie and capitalism.

Needless to say, the publication in the darkest days of the war, and by a Harvard professor who made no secret of his sympathy with the German and Japanese peoples, of a book calmly forecasting the eventual demise of capitalism and its succession by socialism provoked a *succès de scandale*, and yet no real hostility. One must remember that the essay, "Can Capitalism Survive?" was first drafted in 1935, and is redolent of the spirit of the New Deal and the Popular Front, a spirit that survived well into the war. Kisch recalled in 1979:

> To judge by the reviews, the tone and the thrust of the book struck a most responsive chord among Americans in the midst of war and concern about the future of civilization after the Axis powers had been defeated.

Joan Robinson's 1943 review was in the same mood, and she declared that *CSD* "is worth the whole parrot-house of contemporary

[2]Harold Lydall, *The Entrepreneurial Factor in Economic Growth* (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 68.

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orthodoxies, right, left or center." Of course, what she liked best was the section on monopoly: "In this chapter Professor Schumpeter is at his most brilliant, and his argument blows like a gale through the dreary pedantry of static analysis."

The learned gave it "four years of critical appreciation" before a second edition brought it to the general public, which by then included liberated Europe. Recalling how it hit Europe, H.W. Lambers said, "We were overjoyed to hear a voice from the free world again...erudite and ironic" and strictly relevant to the tasks of postwar reconstruction. In several countries, notably France, that reconstruction was being undertaken in a mood of smoldering resentment against the capitalism that had served so ill before the war, and Schumpeter's cynicism about its prospects was welcome. All the more striking then was the denunciation of the Soviet Union that he added to the 1946 edition, with a prescient warning about the massive military machine that Moscow was about to build. Thus to his other contradictory qualifications he added that of one of the first fully paid-up Cold Warriors.

In the early 1980s, Herbert Zassenhaus remembered how confusing it all was:

> ...when it [*CSD*] first appeared, it resisted the attempt to identify it with any familiar orthodoxy. It seemed to be on both sides of too many issues; it refused, irritatingly, neat rubrication...Now, as perhaps it should have been then, this is rather one of its attractions.

What readers in the 1940s found confusing, Zassenhaus said, was an arch-conservative admiring Marx; deploring the passing of family capitalism but saying socialism would work quite nicely; poignantly describing Soviet terror but maintaining that socialism and democracy could go together; praising the entrepreneur but pouring scorn on the bourgeois.

> It was all a little hard to take...and though we did not mind at all participating in one of Schumpeter's favorite sports, to *épater le bourgeois*, he seemed to run the danger to epater everybody else as well.
>
> Today all this and much more has retained its fascination and lost much of its irritation.

That studied ambiguity must have had something to do with the fact that by the time Schumpeter reworked it (and added "The March into Socialism") in the year he died, 1950, *CSD* had become "an enormous success." Daniel Bell's explanation is:

> Schumpeter's appeal for the old 'left' intellectual is apparent. Here was a rarity: an economist with a tragic sense of life. Moreover, his doctrine allowed capitalism's critics to have their cake and eat it too: capitalism [had been] good, but it had now become depersonalized and bureaucratized—the very charges they had themselves levied against the system.

Another explanation was that Schumpeter was kidding and *CSD* was an elaborate hoax. D.M. Wright said:

> I am often asked in America: 'Did Schumpeter really take his pessimistic conclusions regarding the future seriously or is *CSD* a clever propaganda device?' No definite answer can be given. I doubt if he knew himself...Schumpeter, I suggest, in a sense dared not publish a frontal defense of capitalism—perhaps he merely thought it futile—but he was eager to seize any sign of a favorable outcome and left himself one tremendous loophole: 'in these matters 100 years is a short time'...To some extent *CSD* is an example of what I have called the Mark Antony technique. By coming first to 'bury Caesar not to praise him' (capitalism is doomed) he was able to get people to read him who would otherwise not have sat still for a moment under his teaching. 'Brutus' moreover is 'an honorable man' (socialism is workable). Having conceded that much he was then able to insinuate one of the most able defenses of capitalism ever published. How much he hoped to accomplish I cannot say.

Ambiguity and paradox to that degree were bound to appeal to the young, of whom Schumpeter must have been thinking when he

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said, "All of us prefer a sparkling error to a trivial truth." Lambers testifies that

> after forty years he still inspires young people. While talking things over after many an oral graduate examination, I have often heard remarks like 'To be honest, the one stimulating book was Schumpeter'...That is the opinion of radical and conservative students alike.

No wonder, if their professors were telling them, as institutional economist Warren J. Samuels told his:

> Schumpeter was one of the awesome giants of economics and, indeed, of the social sciences...*CSD* is one of the truly profound analytical and interpretative works of the twentieth century. It is one of the few books in economics—are there more than a dozen?—with which every aspiring economist must come to grips.

Outside the academies, *CSD* seldom encountered so much favor. Soviet economists, for example, took a copious and critical interest in it although it was never translated into Russian (though the *Theory of Economic Development* was in 1982). Schumpeter had made clear that the socialism toward which he warned the United States was drifting had nothing to do with the spread, by force of arms, of the Soviet system, which he took as an example of his argument that socialism could develop fascist traits. Soviet economists responded in the 1960s that the theory of the self-liquidation of capitalism was Western propaganda, and during the 1970s they denounced his notion of socialism as bourgeois. Western Marxists were more grateful. Paul Sweezy, in *Socialism*, seized on the key idea that innovation could be routinized, and proclaimed, "Since capitalist enterprise tends to automatize progress...we conclude that it tends to make itself superfluous. The socialist could claim no more." Some French socialists have never forgotten their debt. As late as 1988 one finds Jacques Attali (whose complicity in the disastrous economic policies of Mitterrand's first term is notorious) invoking Schumpeter's authority, in his book *Au propre et au figuré*, for the delusions that the market can be combined with collectivism, and collectivism in turn with parliamentary democracy.

Schumpeter received more discriminating treatment in France from François Perroux, who introduced Schumpeter's ideas to that country. Better, he developed them in a way that has present consequences. Schumpeter had observed that innovations occurred in swarms or clusters, and he made this the basis of his theory of the business cycle. Perroux pointed out that they clustered in space as well as time, and he made this the basis of his theory of development nodes or poles. This helps make Schumpeter's doctrines relevant to Third World economic development, a subject that he never took up himself. Contemporary "evolutionary economists" are making up for that.[3]

The attitude of the left of course did nothing to prejudice Schumpeter's standing with Catholics, which has been consistently high. He did them the extraordinary favor of granting, in *CSD*, that corporatist utopias might actually work. He said:

> For instance, a reorganization of society on the lines of the encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, though presumably possible only in Catholic societies or in societies where the position of the Catholic Church is sufficiently strong, no doubt provides an alternative to socialism that would avoid the 'omnipotent state.'

Nor was this an aside. Schumpeter gave an address to Toronto Catholic business leaders that was indulgent toward corporatist fancies, and he is known to have favored Franco's

[3]Donald L. McKee, *Schumpeter and the Political Economy of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1991).

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regime for as long as he thought it was about that. So Catholic interest in *CSD* appears in the literature from the 1950s. W.R. Waters could declare in 1961, "*CSD* alerts the Catholic, as no other piece of literature does, to the importance of arresting the tendency to socialism." That interest has never flagged, and the winter issue of *Review of Social Economy* is dedicated to Joseph Schumpeter.

More consonant with the general tone of the work is the use conservative social critics have made of *CSD*, for they found it easy to accept Schumpeter's praise of enterprise and innovation while disputing his prophecies of decline and decay. Daniel Bell showed them how to separate these strands in a clever piece of analysis:

> In his brilliant book, Schumpeter talks of 'capitalism,' rather than, like Keynes, of 'economies.' He does not talk, however, of concrete capitalist societies. It was thus not easy to notice that in his analyses he selected the economics of American industry and the sociology of European society and derived his justifications for capitalism from the first and his apocalyptic visions as to its fate from the second.

Presto, Americans could accept all the adulation of the bold innovating businessman, and disregard the sad foretelling of his doom as applicable only to Europe. As it happened, the Europeans, in the person of the Oxford economist John Jewkes had already, in *Ordeal by Planning*, found the weak point in Schumpeter's case—which is also the point that has led, as we shall see, to masses of research by the economists: can innovation really be routinized? Or as Jewkes put the question in a chapter-head, "Is the Business Man Obsolete?" Answer no, and you are free to pick out all the good bits about enterprise in *CSD*.

One advantage of doing so, the conservatives noticed, was that to make "exogenous innovation" the vital requirement for sustainable economic growth "provides a rationale for less policymaking and [for] much caution in arguing for centralist manipulation of the economy. This revelation probably will be the main thrust of the 'Schumpeterian revolution'...." Schumpeter would have appreciated the irony that after being accused of making a case for socialism, or even of being socialist, his book came to be used against the sort of centralized policy-mongering that flowed from Keynes' work. That is perhaps why the bible of supply-side conservatism, *Wealth and Poverty*, by George Gilder, published in 1980, was so complimentary to Joseph Schumpeter, although Gilder was skeptical about the routinization of innovation. As we have seen, years before that Schumpeter's gloomy view of capitalism's future had, for a time at least, been discounted in the United States. In a 1959 article, J.R. Schlesinger and A. Phillips noted that, although *CSD* "has received widespread recognition and considerable acceptance in the postwar years," its forecasts of the disintegration of capitalism "have been ignored." Those forecasts, they said, dated from "a period of ferment in American history, when the very principles of capitalist social organization were being questioned" (i.e. in the New Deal). By 1959 that was all old-fashioned:

> The Eisenhower Administration has been a symbol of the restoration of faith in the stability and future of the capitalist regime...many of the traditional beliefs, practices and lines of authority have been revived. Little discontent is to be observed on the social scene...the entrepreneur has once again achieved a position of esteem.

Schlesinger and Phillips knew that halcyon days do not last, and they warned that "despite the superficial stability of society today, Schumpeter's thesis, with proper qualifications, is still valid." That was because the long-run factors that Schumpeter had identified were still at work. The drift was against

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free enterprise and its bourgeois framework. Because the leftward acquisitions of each anti-capitalist crisis are never wholly surrendered, they are cumulative, and thus

> society moves towards greater centralization, towards an elimination of the independent and unregulated role of the entrepreneur [and] the growing disappearance of those features which formerly characterized capitalist society. The name may remain but the facts and mode of organization change.

Indeed within a decade it seemed, for a while, that such fears were to be realized, and in a way so familiar from *CSD* that Schumpeter was given credit for a gift of prophecy. At the time of the student rebellion of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Paul Samuelson said that Schumpeter had foreseen that the swarm of discontented intellectuals would attack capitalism, that "efficient but unlovable system with no mystique to protect it." Arnold Heertje too averred that May 1968 was "a prophecy come true." It was indeed a time when many intellectuals, especially in California and Paris but in various other places as well, showed themselves in the unfavorable, caricatural character that Schumpeter had given them. Unlike Keynes, who toadied to the Bloomsbury set, Schumpeter loathed intellectuals—much too much to be able to give a reliable group portrait of them. He was right to say that some intellectuals wield rationality with destructive intent and turn against the very economic system that makes possible their existence in their present numbers. But he was wrong to think that those people had great influence in society, least of all over the less educated classes. The truth in this matter is better represented by the memorable picture of Sorbonne students, fresh from trying to burn down the Bourse, pleading through the firmly locked gates of the Renault auto plant for the "starving" workers to accept their alliance. The only social scars of 1968 are in the universities, and they are grievous, but capitalism has long since learned to live with the disapproval of teachers, journalists and clergymen.

Moreover, as critics have been pointing out since the alarm of 1968 subsided, Schumpeter was wrong to imagine that even on the anti-capitalist left there was a "consistent and progressive radicalization of intellectuals...which in itself tends to undermine capitalism." Radicalism comes and goes in waves. For now it has gone, and large numbers of intellectuals are given over to the utterly apolitical arcane frivolity of theory and deconstruction, and are content to make faces at capitalism.

But for conservatives, Schumpeter's depiction of the iconoclast intellectual was too good to drop, and so we have reports of Daniel Patrick Moynihan telling Harvard freshmen in 1972 that they must read Schumpeter's *CSD*, "a work of analysis and passion on a level few can sustain." In that book, he told them, they would learn that socialism was the "autotherapeutic attitude of the unsuccessful many" and that the intellectuals were intent on destroying economic and political liberalism. Their efforts must have been well advanced, for Moynihan was soon claiming to see "the utter collapse of libertarian defenses in the second half of the twentieth century."[4] When neoconservatives have an urge to embrace anti-intellectualism they could as well turn to Pareto or Sorel, but Schumpeter's "sociology of the intellectuals" in *CSD* remains their favorite, being free of the least fascist taint.

The neoliberals too found that Schumpeter could serve them as talisman. The neoliberal trend that began in the Democratic Party from 1980 used the invocation of Schumpeter to signal the break with Keynes, and the new respect for the entrepreneur after a long preoccupation with Big Labor. Their chronicler said,

[4]Peter Steinfels, *The Neoconservatives: The Men Who are Changing America's Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980).

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"Schumpeter is their favorite economist, not Keynes; they favor a politics of investment, not redistribution."[5] Their understanding of Schumpeter seemed somewhat approximate, for it is represented thus: "Innovation is the essence of economic progress; profit is a motor of economic growth; capital formation is essential for investment, which finances the productivity increases necessary to generate new wealth." Schumpeter of course denied that innovation was financed from accumulated capital; he thought it was financed by (temporarily) inflationary bank lending. No matter, Robert Reich's *The Next American Frontier* was, as George Gilder contentedly noted, "an unabashed case for Schumpeterian 'creative destruction' and economic rivalry and growth."

CRITICS WHO DELVED into *CSD* seldom missed the occasion to chide Schumpeter for his mistaken prophecies (as I shall do), but it is chastening to see, in reviewing the literature, how many of their own confident assertions have been proven wrong even more quickly. Schumpeter insisted that, in the history of massive social structures like capitalism, socialism, and democracy, a century was not a long time, and he pitched his prophecies to run for forty or fifty years, maybe longer. Whereas the wit has said of Keynes' most famous remark, "He's dead and we're living in his long run," one cannot be sure we are in Schumpeter's long run yet.

On the other hand, we can already be confident that Bottomore was astray in criticizing Schumpeter in 1976 for overlooking a third alternative to capitalism and socialism: the Yugoslav model of self-management, praised as "a viable and promising form of publicly owned enterprise." Bottomore still had not adjusted his aim in 1981 when he persisted in idealizing Yugoslav socialism. In that same year, Robert L. Heilbroner asked, "Was Schumpeter right?" He replied that Schumpeter was not because he had failed to understand socialism as revolutionary class struggle and "the historical process as revolutionary." In 1995 that sounds more dated than most things in *CSD*. And it was a common line of criticism in the early 1980s that Schumpeter failed to anticipate how happily we would all accept widespread public ownership, and that more nationalizations were likely in the future, but that no one bothered anymore about such labels as capitalist or socialist. In the age of massive worldwide privatizations you could hardly be proven wrong more quickly.

At least some of the reaction to *CSD* that has been recalled so far was at the level of popular debate, and it is proper to balance that by referring to the considerable scholarly research that *CSD* has provoked. It occurred in three principal areas: the "Public Choice" theory of democracy, anti-trust regulation, and the theory of innovation.

Schumpeter's theory of democracy broke with what he called "the classical doctrine," which dealt in notions of "common good" and the "will of the people," and he offered instead this definition: "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." He called this for short the "competitive theory of democracy," referring to the competition between self-interested politicians to capture votes, usually for short-run, even shortsighted, programs. He likened it to economic competition, including with respect to the use of advertising and of unfair or fraudulent tactics.

He was not to know it, but the competitive theory of democracy had been adumbrated by Antonio Gramsci, in *The Modern Prince*, where he argued that the function of universal suffrage was not to count everyone's opinions but to measure the social efficacy of the opinions and the propaganda of

[5]Randall Rothenberg, *The Neoliberals: Creating the New American Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984).

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political elites or active minorities. Therefore democracy did not drown the educated by giving the mob the same weight but rather it measured which educated group was most effective in spreading ideas. But with Schumpeter this idea gets an economic twist, by highlighting the political entrepreneurs who deal in votes the way businessmen deal in oil, with the advantage that their customers are even less rational in political than in economic affairs.

A common reaction has been to find this theory cynical. Joan Robinson said in 1943 that Schumpeter surely "is not really as cynical about democracy as he pretends;" almost a decade later Jean Weiller gave it as an example of Schumpeter's "*style de cynisme délibéré*;" and Tom Bottomore was still calling it a "cynical" travesty of democracy in 1992. Jeffersonians have been particularly shocked; D. McCord Wright said it showed that Schumpeter did not understand either common law or the American institutional tradition and its ethical foundations. Yet Friedrich von Hayek consistently approved of Schumpeter's formulation and quoted it (e.g., *The Constitution of Liberty*) to argue that democracy is simply a means and not itself an ultimate value.

What is more interesting is the fact that Schumpeter here prefigured or inspired Public Choice theory. Its practitioners are divided between "prefigured" and "inspired." Anthony Downs said in his pioneering *An Economic Theory of Democracy* that "Schumpeter's profound analysis of democracy forms the inspiration and foundation for our whole thesis, and our debt and gratitude to him are great indeed." Gary Becker recalled that it was reading *CSD* that stimulated him to write his 1958 paper on "the economic approach to political behavior." Bruno Frey said *CSD* was "a revelation [that] contains the essence of what has been developed in Public Choice."

Against that, R.D. Coe and C.K. Wilber find only "intellectual similarities," while in a careful two-part study William C. Mitchell emphasized the differences between Schumpeter and Public Choice, and the scant use its theorists have made of his work (he said they could profitably make more). In sum, it seems accurate to say that Schumpeter sparked off Public Choice theory but that he would not have followed it very far, especially since "public choice under the leadership of American economists has largely degenerated to the application of neoclassical orthodoxy to the realm of political questions." Schumpeter had an elitist contempt for politicians (and even more for their electorates), so he would have had no patience with notions of rational choice and the "calculus of consent." His cynicism, with the occasional touch of arrogance, would have no place in a theory that treats political agents as rational utility-maximizers. As Mitchell concluded, "Suffice it say that Schumpeter regarded politics as slightly insane and therefore in conflict with market behavior"—and he did not even analyze market behavior in neoclassical terms.

This is the place to point out that Schumpeter's conception of democracy is so mechanical, so instrumentalist, that when he maintained in Part Four of *CSD*, "Socialism and Democracy," that the two were compatible, he was not claiming much. Socialism, he said, could be despotic, even fascist as in the Soviet Union, but in other circumstances it could accommodate a free vote and free competition for leadership. As D.M. Wright put it:

> *All* that was meant is that the naked political mechanism of ruler selection might possibly hang on if, among other things, the vast majority of the people were such convinced socialists, and so agreed on fundamentals that they could allow a great deal of competition for the job of administering the system.

That says nothing about tolerance, justice, participation, autonomy or personal freedom (which for most people are what democracy suggests), and thus Schumpeter was obliged

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to allow that "socialist democracy may eventually turn out to be more of a sham than capitalist democracy ever was." Raymond Aron's comment in *18 leçons sur la société industrielle* was that whether planning was compatible with a regime of rival parties depended on what was in the plan: if planning decisions were marginal adjustments, parties could well compete, but if 30 percent of GNP was to go to armaments, rival parties were unthinkable.

Schumpeter's impact on anti-trust doctrine was curious: he destroyed its logical foundations but it refused to fall over. From Joan Robinson in the 1940s to Gottfried Haberler four decades later, economists hailed the broadside against anti-trust politics in *CSD* as a tour de force. Peter Wiles wrote:

> The four chapters that establish the importance of technical progress, and so destroy much of the then fashionable argument for competition, were a revolution in economic theory, too long in reaching the textbooks.

Von Hayek thought Schumpeter went too far in his defense of monopoly but conceded he had exposed the arbitrariness of U.S. anti-trust policies. E.S. Mason, a specialist in the field, said that "his powerful attack on the limitations of static economic analysis as an intellectual foundation for a public anti-trust policy is highly salutary and profoundly correct."

What *CSD* did was to bring down the two pillars of anti-trust ideology: one, that market power enables exploitation, and two, that competition ensures the efficient use of resources. Instead, Schumpeter argued that market power is necessary for innovation and innovation is the source of all effective competition. To cite examples he could not know but would have recognized, it was IBM that broke Xerox's monopoly (giant against giant) and Silicon Valley that broke IBM's (pygmies against giant), and trust-busters came nowhere. As Raymond Aron said, Schumpeter's demonstration that competition is not excluded by the concentration of producers was "brilliant and convincing." Supported by subsequent research that has shown how little monopoly restricts output, Schumpeter's case is now established: that perfect competition, apart from being impossible, would not be the best arrangement anyhow. To admit as much would do some regulatory bureaucrats out of a job, but even they have had to broaden their thinking beyond competition in one industry to competition between products, beyond competition on price to competition on innovation.

Schumpeter's work on innovation has provoked considerable research, as well as some confusion. For example, in a recent work, *Technopoles of the World: The Making of 21st Century Industrial Complexes*, M. Castells and P. Hall ascribe to Schumpeter the view that the individual inventor has been quite replaced by big industrial laboratories in major corporations. Yet M. Binks and P. Vale claimed, in *Entrepreneurship and Economic Change*, to be correcting Schumpeter's obsession with the pioneer entrepreneur by showing how much innovation now comes from synergy within groups inside corporations. Maria Brouwer, in *Schumpeterian Puzzles: Technological Competition and Economic Evolution*, surveyed a mass of empirical testing of Schumpeter's theory of innovation and concluded that his "ingenious analysis" cannot yet be "definitively assessed."

In fact we can find two theories of innovation in Schumpeter: in 1912 he gave credit to the lone visionary who in a flash of genius sees a new way of doing something; in 1942, in *CSD*, he spoke of innovation routinized, bureaucratized, even "automatized" within corporations. This shift was not due, as George Gilder seemed to think, to hardening of the arteries but to a change in the facts. As S.G. Winter said, "In Schumpeter's writings, the contrast between the two appraisals of

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the process of economic development is largely a contrast of historical stages." In this century there occurred:

> a major historical shift in the sources and processes of innovation, with large firms and their R&D establishments playing a much more important role now than they did in the late nineteenth century. But entrepreneurs are not a threatened species...

It was the social consequences of this shift that concerned Schumpeter, and if he got his overall prediction of capitalism's future wrong, it was because he misread those social implications. He at no point fell into the error of saying that large firms are more innovative than small ones, so this is not a matter to be settled, as some researchers imagine, by statistics on the number of patents taken out by corporations of various sizes. On the contrary, Schumpeter says in *CSD* that "mere size is neither necessary nor sufficient," just as he had written in *Business Cycles* three years before that "innovation is independent of the size of the innovating firm," and just as he wrote three years after that entrepreneurship can be found at "the humblest levels of the business world." His question was: Given widespread attempts to routinize research and development, will development become so automatized that the social prestige of the entrepreneurs will be diminished, to such a point that the whole ethos of society is changed?

The question is about social prestige and leadership, not about economic efficacy. The undermining of capitalism that Schumpeter foresaw was a moral and institutional fact, which possibly could be accompanied by improved economic management under socialism. The entrepreneurs and their families were social leaders as long as they exercised an important function, one that required extraordinary ability and effort. Once that function becomes routine team work, allotted to "organization men" in grey flannel suits, it is no longer daring or unusual, so it loses prestige. Entrepreneurs lose social leadership because they are no longer exemplars of creative force. "Corporations will continue to innovate, Schumpeter believes, but once innovation is divorced from the personal force and responsibility of select individuals and reduced to the level of the mundane, capitalist society undergoes a fundamental change."

Now we can agree that something of this has happened since the days of Henry Ford, the Krupp dynasty, and the Schneider and the Lever brothers. But it has not gone far enough to undo capitalism, nor threaten bourgeois society, for two reasons.

The routinization of innovation has indeed been carried to an extraordinary pitch of perfection in the laboratories of big firms like IBM, as previously in AT&T's Bell Laboratories, but perhaps pre-eminently in the research labs of the major pharmaceutical companies in Switzerland, Germany and the United States. The procedure was capable of being copied and refined, and was by the Japanese industrial giants NEC, Toshiba and Hitachi. Thus on every hand we see realized the prediction Schumpeter made in 1912, when he first identified innovation as the motor of economic change: that innovation can be socialized, and will one day be bureaucratized. Nor does this happen only in high-tech areas or on the basis of new inventions; the mass package-tour industry is a perfect example of Schumpeterian innovation, quite distinct from the prior invention of the jet airplane.

But all that says nothing against the continued emergence of individual entrepreneurs, Schumpeter's "new men with new ideas," small firms with a unique product that gives them a (temporary) monopoly and soon real market power. Burton Klein, in *Dynamic Economics*, took fifty of the most significant technical breakthroughs of the twentieth century and claimed that there was a "leadership lag" in every one of them, i.e. the big firms were outdone by smaller, often new entrants. Gilder said, "IBM lagged behind other compa-

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nies in adopting most major innovations in business machines, from copiers to word-processors." How IBM was outfoxed by unknown computer hobbyists in the development of the home computer and software has become one of the legends of the age. Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs working from a garage in Menlo Park to produce the Apple computer, and Bill Gates developing Microsoft—these are the Schumpeterian exemplars of our day; and of course such men have accumulated huge personal fortunes and built major multinational corporations.

Nor did these business geniuses come from nowhere. They usually came from failed attempts to internalize innovation in big firms. Castells and Hall quote a study of the Greater Boston industrial area in the 1960s which shows that:

> One hundred seventy-five new Massachusetts firms were created by former employees of MIT's research laboratories. The same study showed that another thirty-nine firms spun off from an older electronics firm, Raytheon, itself an early spin-off from MIT in the 1930s.

The same story of breakouts from routinized innovation was repeated in Silicon Valley, in fact created Silicon Valley. When Nobel Prize winner William Shockley went from co-inventing the transistor to Palo Alto he took with him a team of Bell Laboratory technicians but he could not hold them together, and eight quit to form Fairchild Electronics. That firm co-invented the integrated circuit but could not maintain the innovative teamwork.

> By 1965, ten new firms had been created by former Fairchild engineers...Thus, about one-half of the eighty-five major American semiconductor firms were created as direct or indirect spin-offs from Fairchild...All these companies set up shop in Silicon Valley, moving to the next available nearby location to continue work on the same programs and almost with the same people.

By moving out, many quickly became multimillionaires and changed the way we live. They were typical Schumpeterian innovators and gained the corresponding social prestige. In sum, the routinization of innovation does happen in big firms and it has worked some modern miracles, but it has done nothing to stop the appearance of new-entrant innovators. Quite the contrary, some bureaucratized laboratories seem to turn out more entrepreneurs than inventions.

The second way in which things have not turned out as Schumpeter expected is the extent to which business has continued, despite the managerial revolution and the "technostructure," to throw up social leaders, even candidates for the highest political offices. In place of the propertied dynasties there has emerged an active meritocracy, well able to defend itself and its economic system not only from the dreaded intellectuals but from the state itself; and they do so without the protection of aristocrats or other political elites. Schumpeter undoubtedly was misled in this matter by his scornful attitude to "mere" business administration as against heroic innovation. He literally said that business administration (i.e. the management of uninsurable risk) was something anybody could do, and hence it was a calling without social prestige. To be sure, he did not underestimate it as grossly as Adam Smith and Ricardo, who just ignored it among the "factors of production," nor as contemptuously as Karl Marx, who mocked it as mere cunning and exploitation (dressed up as "spiritual labor" in France and England and as the "labor of Spirit" in Hegel's Germany). But even Schumpeter devalued it to something "depersonalized and automated," requiring little personality or willpower.

That was why he argued that as the capitalist-entrepreneur was inexorably metamorphosed into the managerial bureaucrat by the growth of scientific knowledge and control, by calculation and rationalization, so too the bourgeois mind would be corroded and capitalism would lose faith in itself and die away

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into socialism. It is this notion that economically successful capitalism can be killed by spiritual dry-rot that critics have called Schumpeter standing Karl Marx on his head.

In reality, it is enough to think of the adulation of Lee Iacocca when he rescued Chrysler, or the power of the late Sir Keith Joseph (of Bovis) as Margaret Thatcher's minder, to see that modern business has not lost prestige and leadership, even though it has suffered—like almost everything else in our societies—the ravages of bureaucratization. Admittedly, there have been corporations, some big and famous, that settled into the unenterprising ways that Schumpeter described, but they soon went the way of Soviet ministries, which operated on similar lines. There was indeed, as Schumpeter thought, only one place for routine managers, a socialist society, and it has collapsed. □

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An Old Age is Out

J.W. Friend

Pierre Péan, *Une jeunesse française, François Mitterrand: 1934-1947* (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 564 pp., 160 fr.

Emmanuel Faux, Thomas LeGrand, and Gilles Perez, *La main droite de Dieu*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), 262 pp., 110 fr.

Edwy Plenel, *Un temps de chien* (Paris: Stock, 1994), 187pp., 95 fr.

Jean Montaldo, *Lettre ouverte d'un "chien" à François Mitterrand au nom de la liberté d'aboyer* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994), 170 pp., 78 fr.

Jean Montaldo, *Mitterrand et les quarante voleurs...* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994), 276 pp., 120 fr.

John Laughland, *The Death of Politics: France Under Mitterrand* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 324pp., £18.99 and $35 Can.

AS FRANÇOIS Mitterrand's long tenancy of the French presidency moves toward its close, negative verdicts on his career multiply. Intense coverage of the scandals disfiguring his second term was connected with the suicide in May 1993 of his last Socialist prime minister, Pierre Bérégovoy. Mitterrand attempted to reject accusations both against himself and his party *en bloc* by charging at Bérégovoy's funeral that he had been driven to suicide, exclaiming "all the explanations in the world do not justify throwing to the dogs a man's honor and, in the end, his life, as his accusers doubly renounced the basic laws of our Republic, those which protect the dignity and the liberty of each among us."

Two investigative journalists felt themselves directly attacked. Edwy Plenel of *Le Monde*, (a left-wing paper which has shown decreasing enthusiasm for Mitterrand in recent years) and a more right-wing writer, Jean Montaldo, who might be termed the French Jack Anderson, both rapidly produced new attacks whose titles picked up the word "dog." Shortly before, Montaldo had published another and longer book entitled *Mitterrand and the Forty Thieves*.

The president has not responded to these assaults, but during late 1993 and early

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1994 he gave an unusual series of private interviews to journalists who wanted to question him about other controversies—his service with Marshal Pétain's Vichy regime, and his continuing association with and tolerance for members of the extreme right. The resulting books drew much more attention —and sold better—than Plenel and Montaldo's books, in part at least because the president was finally admitting details of his earlier career which he had long denied or sought to retouch.

The biggest success has been Pierre Péan's *Une jeunesse française*, which describes Mitterrand's right-wing politics and connections in his student years, his army service and time as a POW in Germany, and minutely examines the controversial twenty-two months he spent as an official of the Vichy government before going underground into the Resistance. A storm of public comment obliged Mitterrand to give a long explanatory interview to the editor of the conservative daily *Le Figaro*, following up with a television interview.

The interest in *Une jeunesse française* stems from current fascination with a period long repressed in French recollection and history—the four years of Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain's French State, which turned its back on the compromised democracy of the Third Republic and sought collaboration with Hitler's New European Order. Mitterrand had never denied that after escaping from a German POW camp in late 1941 he took a government job in Vichy—but he had earlier elided this period with his formal entry into resistance activity in late 1943—as if he had become a resister shortly after his return to France.

In admitting that he was a right-wing activist in his student days and initially a strong believer in Pétain's quasi-fascist regime, the Socialist president shocked many younger voters with continuing affinities to the left who knew little about his biography, although for the older generation it was no secret that he had begun on the right. He had, however, touched up some of the details of his biography to make his transition from Vichy official to resistance fighter seem more rapid and less complex than in fact it was.

The controversy on Mitterrand's early beliefs and activities has two themes, both beginning with the Occupation and Resistance. The first concerns the sincerity of a man who has moved from right to left and back to rather less left. If Mitterrand now admits beliefs and actions he had blurred during most of his political career, when was he sincere? When he became a resistant after being a Pétain enthusiast? In the 1970s when as first secretary of the Socialist Party he denounced capitalism and talked of the exploitation of man by man? (Mitterrand's predecessor as head of the old Socialist Party, Guy Mollet, sneered, "Mitterrand has not become a Socialist, he has only learned to speak socialist, which is not the same thing.") Was Mitterrand sincere at any point in his career, or only a skillful opportunist?

The second and parallel theme is Mitterrand's life-long hostility to Charles de Gaulle. Becoming involved in the Resistance in early 1943, and rapidly assuming a leadership role, Mitterrand looked to General Henri Giraud, an important figure in Algeria in early 1943 (backed by the United States as leader of the Free French). Giraud himself professed loyalty to Pétain until September 1943. His personality allowed those in France who wanted to fight and still keep faith in Pétain to maintain some coherence. Péan's book is very good on this difficult and confusing period.

In December 1943, young Mitterrand arrived in Algiers, via London. It was his bad luck to arrive there as a Giraud partisan just at the point (as Péan points out) when de Gaulle had definitively out-maneuvered Giraud as head of the Free French. When Mitterrand was introduced to de Gaulle, their relationship began badly, turned worse at the Liberation, and remained bad in the years after de Gaulle's return to power in

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1958, which Mitterrand opposed. That opposition marked his conversion to the left.

Mitterrand has always incurred the hatred of the Gaullist right, far more than that of the Vichyite right. *La main droite de Dieu* speaks of "a recurrent theme [which] runs through his two seven-year terms, one of national reconciliation borrowed from the extreme right, which permits a discreet drawing of the veil over old wounds, and treats the fighters on opposite sides as equally complicit in a story now over and done with."

Strong Gaullists like current Interior Minister Charles Pasqua see in Mitterrand's justification of his youth using the theme of national reconciliation a continuation of his long war against de Gaulle. Breaking on June 18, 1940 with a government legally established and recognized by all major states, de Gaulle had to treat Vichy as illegitimate from the beginning—or else he was a rebel.

Both to justify himself and give new spirit to a defeated France largely liberated by foreigners, de Gaulle created a myth which, in the words of the historian Henry Rousso:

> did not so much glorify the Resistance (and certainly not the résistants) as it celebrated a people *in resistance*, a people symbolized exclusively by 'the Man of June 18th,' without intermediaries such as political parties, movements, or clandestine leaders. This image was to be superimposed on the far more complex and inconsistent realities of the Occupation.[1]

The communists adopted a parallel myth, claiming almost the entire credit for the Resistance as the "party of the 75,000 *fusillés*." (The total of French men and women shot by the Nazis is reckoned at 29,600.) Resistance members like Mitterrand who had been first pro-Pétain, then pro-Giraud, were caught between the two prevailing myths: liking neither de Gaulle nor the communists, they could not defend the original legitimacy of Vichy; the regime had ended by totally delegitimizing itself. But they have continued to question the validity of the Gaullist myth.

For long the dominant version of French history in the 1940s, that myth has undergone much examination and criticism in recent years, and many people can at least vaguely apprehend that Vichy was more complicated than de Gaulle's version had it, and understand Mitterrand's youthful positions without approving them. More shocking to more people than admissions about his youth was the president's refusal to condemn the major protagonists of the Vichy period. Much disapproving comment had ensued when it was learned that he had annually sent a presidential wreath on Armistice Day to Pétain's grave on the prison island where the old soldier had died—so much so that in 1994 he desisted.

Other self-justifying interviews Mitterrand decided to give in 1993-1994 helped produce *La main droite de Dieu* (The Right Hand of God). The title is a pun on one of Mitterrand's nicknames, given him by a television program in which he was caricatured as a pompous green frog who called himself "God," but the word "right" refers to a whole series of right-wing actions: Mitterrand's amnesty of the generals in Algeria who rebelled against de Gaulle in 1961, the aid he quietly extended to extreme rightist Jean-Marie Le Pen (the better to split the right); the wreaths he had placed on Pétain's tomb; and continuing right-wing associations throughout his career, especially his friendship with the former secretary-general of the Vichy police, René Bosquet.

Arrested after the Liberation, Bosquet was tried and acquitted in 1949, going on to a considerable career as a banker and director of the powerful and mildly left southern newspaper *La Dépêche du Midi*. Charges based on offenses to human rights were lev-

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[1]Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 18. All other translations by the author.

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eled against him again in 1989, as the organizer of the now-notorious Vélodrome d'Hiver roundup in 1942, in which Vichy's police arrested thousands of foreign Jews and handed them over to the Nazis. Few returned. Mitterrand admitted to his interviewers that he maintained friendly relations with Bosquet, arguing that he had been acquitted in 1949. He dropped the contact only in 1986 when it turned out (Mitterrand dixit) "that his responsibility was perhaps greater than was said at the time," notably in the Vél d'Hiv affair. Mitterrand however, tried after that to keep Bosquet from coming to trial. In the event, Bosquet was murdered in 1993 before the trial could take place—by an apparent lunatic.

The Montaldo and Plenel books appearing in 1994 concern Mitterrand's relation to the already much discussed Socialist corruption. When entering into power in 1981 the Socialists argued (and even believed) that the conservative parties in office for twenty-three years were corrupt, while they themselves were not only clean but incorruptible. The scandals of the past few years demonstrated the contrary, as Socialist politicians and officials were hauled into court. But the books by Montaldo and Plenel aim at the chief executive, who can only be hauled into the court of public opinion.

Plenel mixes his tale with so many high-falutin literary references that one wonders whether anyone ever taught him the journalist's trade of telling a straight story; Montaldo is a bulldog who goes straight for the bone and crunches on it, but his books are written in such a breathlessly accusatory style that it is hard to keep up with all the characters and charges, or to assess them. Both authors take up a number of scandals, but their central figure is Roger-Patrice Pelat, an old friend of Mitterrand's whom he first met in POW camp, and who served with him in the Resistance and then went into business. The principal informant against Pelat for both writers was François de Grossouvre, a longtime friend of Mitterrand's, though no Socialist, who served him in a number of confidential capacities before becoming disenchanted. De Grossouvre committed suicide in his office in the presidential office complex in April 1994.

In 1982 Pelat sold his company, Vibrachoc, to the recently nationalized *Compagnie Générale d'Électricité*. According to Montaldo, pressure was exerted from on high to force the sale of a company which in any case was worth far less than the 110 million francs paid for it. Pelat is also alleged to have benefited from a hotel built in North Korea by a French company, where he served as middleman thanks to his close relation to Mitterrand. Montaldo charges that over the years Pelat paid large sums to Mitterrand, first in the form of a dummy retainer as his lawyer (until 1981) with Mitterrand's younger son replacing him thereafter, and then to help President Mitterrand buy property for his mistress of many years and their illegitimate daughter.

The best authenticated scandal concerning Pelat occurred in 1988, when the nationalized French aluminum company Pechiney purchased Triangle-American Can. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission noted that large blocks of American Can stock had been purchased just before the announcement of the company's sale at over five times its previous stock quotation. SEC investigations rapidly ascertained that Pelat, along with several associates, had made profits of several million francs from insider trading. The precise informant has not been identified, but Alain Boublil, then director of the cabinet of finance and Economy Minister Pierre Bérégovoy, were implicated, along with Max Théret, a prominent businessman who had been one of the financial backers of the Socialist Party. Pelat died of a heart attack in early 1989, shortly after being indicted.

Thus when it became known in 1993 that Bérégovoy, then prime minister, had benefited in 1987 (when out of office) from a million franc interest-free loan from Pelat to

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help him buy an apartment in the fashionable sixteenth arrondissement, the story was not only damaging in itself, it reopened other stories about Pelat and connected the presidency with a whole series of financial scandals and still more scandalous charges, most of which involved dubious financing of the Socialist Party. There is little doubt that this whole complex helped to create the overwhelming vote against the Socialists in March 1993.

John Laughland's book, subtitled "France under Mitterrand," is less an examination of Mitterrand's France than a philippic against the whole French system of government:

> For the last two hundred years or so, people have been saying that the British constitution is archaic and that it ought to be reformed along European, usually French lines. Usually such views go hand in hand with a desire for more administrative government, and a dislike for the apparent anarchy of parliamentarism and democracy. Now that Britain faces the prospect of being governed by a French or a Franco-German style European government, it is time to crawl inside the political system of France to see whether the grass is really so much greener on the other side of the Channel.

Most of Laughland's investigation is a denunciation of Mitterrand's administration root and branch, but without kind words for the president's rivals or probable successors either. The tide of criticism of Mitterrand's conduct of his office has risen so high that Laughland has an embarrassment of riches in choosing devastating quotes, from whatever sector of French political life. When he can bring himself to say something approving about Mitterrand, he is unwilling to let it stand. Thus he notes that Mitterrand "effectively reduced the once-powerful French Communist Party to political irrelevance," but complains that Mitterrand's tactics depended neither on consistency nor logic, because Mitterrand shaped his tactics in the late 1970s to steal the communist vote away from the Communist Party. "In other words, for Mitterrand, the real problem about communism was not that it is totalitarian, but that it represented an electoral threat to him. Only the propagation of similar illusions would enable him to overcome that threat."

In his haste to score a point Laughland here misses a real criticism; the "similar illusions" concerned not "totalitarianism," on which increasing numbers of communist voters nourished doubts, but an unrealistic economic program conceived in the boom years, which Mitterrand refused to drop—and which caused immense trouble when he was elected in 1981 and attempted to put part of it into action.

Since Laughland's main purpose is to emphasize that Britain not only has nothing to learn from France but in closer association in the European Union has much to fear from French and European administrative and political practices, he devotes much space to politics—not without extensive citations from the various books on scandals, however. There is some good stuff on the bureaucratization of French politics and elitism in the role of the top civil servants, the *énarques*.

Laughland attacks Mitterrand for remaining in power in "cohabitation" as "an ultimate perversion of the constitution." This is an arguable position, although others have seen it as proof that the constitution can survive a change of legislative power without kicking out the executive. An American is perhaps less shocked by the idea of this cohabitation of opposing parties in the executive and legislative than is an Englishman—especially one determined to be shocked.

Laughland attacks Mitterrand's weakening of the already declining prestige of the prime minister, but again overreaches, charging that Mitterrand "has changed prime ministers as a man might change his shirt. He has had seven prime ministers in twelve years...more than his three predecessors over

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twenty-three years, [who] had only two each." Aside from the minor fact that de Gaulle had three, this judgment glides over the fact that two of these changes resulted from election defeats. Mitterrand did fire Michel Rocard abruptly, after three years, for being a success, and Edith Cresson after less than one, for being a failure, and judgments are in order—but not necessarily Laughland's.

A number of inaccuracies, mostly minor in themselves, suggest that Laughland is less familiar with his material than he should be. Numerous dates are a few years off. In a criticism of the Constitutional Council, which corresponds roughly to the American Supreme Court, he says that its current president, Robert Badinter, is an old ally of the president (correct) and a professional politician (inaccurate; he was a famous criminal lawyer), having served as minister of the interior (inaccurate) and of justice (correct). "The idea that the council should have a 'President' who leads from the front is itself strange, that the post should be occupied by a man who is an old friend of the President of the Republic, even stranger." In other words, what is not British is not right.

Of the clutch of books discussed here, four are intensely polemical. Laughland has delivered a sermon for the congregation of British Eurosceptics. While *Une jeunesse française* and *La main droite de Dieu* are far from non-judgmental, they are sufficiently balanced to aid in the verdicts on François Mitterrand and his presidency which are yet to come. Much in the charges of corruption in other books is thus far unproven, though quite enough remains to leave a strong smell hanging over the political landscape. A period which began with great excitement (and fear) in 1981 ends fourteen years later with a whimper. One of the better things in Laughland's book is the epigraph, from one of Dryden's last poems, "Tis time the old age was out, and time to begin a new." □

Julius W. Friend is adjunct professor of history at George Washington University.

The DNA Code of Civilization

Anthony Hartley

John Hale, *The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 648 pp., $35.00.

THAT THE PERIOD of the Renaissance—the turning point between the medieval and the modern—is of great significance in the history of Europe is beyond dispute. But its exact character and the true nature of its significance are the subject of endless discussion. Just how far perspectives have changed over one hundred and fifty years can be seen by the degree to which John Hale's considerable new work differs in its approach from Jacob Burckhardt's classic *The Civilization of the Renaissance*. For, unlike Burckhardt, Hale is no longer concerned simply with Italy. The northern Renaissance along the Rhine and the Loire, the Atlantic trade routes spreading out in the sixteenth century, the part played by the Fuggers and the Hanseatic towns, alongside their Italian banking colleagues, in the establishment of new patterns of

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European commerce—all these steps toward a recognizably modern world are included in the new book.

The purely Italian conditions that Burckhardt analyzed so penetratingly still form the starting point of Professor Hale's magisterial account of the changes that the Renaissance brought about and which, in their cultural form, could be symbolized by an English nobleman writing sonnets in Italian or a French king trying to lure Leonardo da Vinci into his service. There is something special about the phrase "Italian Renaissance"—a thrill that can suggest wild beauty or profound wickedness. Its fascination is lasting, since it includes creative achievements of permanent power.

The number of books written on the Italian Renaissance provides testimony as to the attraction it has exercised over civilized Europeans down the years. Yet have we in the past—do we now—altogether approve of the Renaissance? The Elizabethans saw the peninsula as a land given to adultery and assassination, not ill represented in Webster's "Duchess of Malfi"—*inglese italianato, diavolo incarnato*. The Victorian lady, who purchased her reproductions of Donatello or Della Robbia to grace the vicarage on her return to England, would hardly have regarded the doings of many Renaissance men or women as particularly genteel. More recently a BBC television film introduced a Renaissance pope as he was calling on his entourage to "bring on the whores."

Recently, too, the extreme individualism that informs the Renaissance has become unfashionable in a brave new world where we are told that we should be glad to be Beta children accepting an effortlessly democratic mediocrity. Figures like Colleone's statue in Venice appear so dominating as to be threatening to egalitarian aspirations. It was the energy of Renaissance man that gave him the confidence to undertake great deeds and carry them through. "Oh age! Oh letters! It is a joy to be alive," exclaimed Ulrich von Hutten at the beginning of the century, adding, "Woe to you Barbarians!" to display his pride in the culture he had acquired and his scorn for those who had not done likewise. The modern self-deprecatory language of the professionally modest was unnecessary for those who had no doubts about their own values. Renaissance men felt no reason to refer their actions to the judgment of others. Consultation, committees, consensus played little part in their lives. The idea that it might be sensible to collect the maximum number of opinions before taking a decision would hardly have occurred to them.

Much of what is positive in Europe's intellectual life originated at the time of the rediscovery of antiquity. It is true that, as Whitehead pointed out, the great period of scientific discovery was the seventeenth century, not the Renaissance, and that scholastic philosophy was more conducive to a philosophy of science than neoplatonism. Nonetheless, it was the Renaissance that saw individuals interesting themselves for the first time in natural phenomena. There grew up then an attentiveness to nature which meant that, sooner or later, its secrets would be discovered and linked with one another. A start was made on many things that a less self-confident age would hardly have dared to undertake.

Reading first Burckhardt and then Hale, the scope of what we describe as the Renaissance is astounding. It includes the recuperation of antiquity, the development of discovery and commerce, the pursuit of beauty, the setting of standards in literature and the arts, consciousness of the state and its activities (governance, diplomacy, war) and the analysis applied to these by a Machiavelli or a Guicciardini, the adoption of rational arguments in political matters and the decreasing use of religious imperatives of the kind produced in the Middle Ages to justify action. The modern mode of politics began at the Renaissance, as can be seen by anyone who reads an historical analysis by one of the great Renaissance historians.

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Indeed, in discussing the impact on our culture of the period, it is most relevant to speak of its creation of the historical consciousness. For this is its greatest gift to Western civilization, which is why accounts of the Renaissance have traditionally begun with its rediscovery of Greece and Rome.

This was almost thrust upon the princes, clerics, poets and scholars of the day. The fall of Constantinople sent Greek teachers and manuscripts to the West. The revival of Greek made Italians aware of a classical Latin heritage and opened to the humanists a new world whose values intruded into their medieval surroundings with an effect that is often bizarre. For instance, Filippo Strozzi follows the classical example of Cato of Utica by killing himself after a failed plot against the Medici. But he also makes the far from classical gesture of asking that a black pudding be made from his own blood and sent to his enemy Cardinal Cibo. Catiline and Brutus appear constantly as the models of tyrannicide. Not only scholars, but also men of action find in an heroic classical past examples that show them the way. Out of the soil of Italy itself emerges the monumental past of Rome.

The discovery of that past necessarily brought with it the discovery of history, the consciousness of the existence of an era that was other than the present. In that fact was implicit the possibility of change—of times separated from ourselves in past and future. It is not so much the books of the so-called "scientific" Italian historians from Machiavelli to Fra Paolo Sarpi that illustrate the connection of the Renaissance world with history—though they do, of course, do that—as it is the spreading awareness of the existence of another world in that past that contrasts with and informs contemporary society. History presented itself to the Italians of the Renaissance as antiquity and, hence, as an ideal. From the study of Greece and Rome emerged the high idea of contemporary history expressed by Benedetto Varchi.

But if the realization of ancient times as something distinct from the present brought with it an increased respect for the craft of historian, the existence of history implied a heightened consciousness of self. The moment an attempt was made to define another age, to endeavor the definition of one's own became a possible ambition. And such an attempt was accompanied by the establishment of standards that followed the inevitable comparisons between past and present—and, finally, by the postulating of absolutes in excellence which could be passed down from age to age, and, indeed, imitated by other civilizations.

Thus, the recovery of antiquity and the attention paid to the classical past brought with it, not only the new concept of history and biography, but also a new aesthetic, based on a heightened individualism and the growing feeling that no level of excellence was out of reach. Such self-confidence is the dynamic that has informed modern civilization—more particularly, its literature and art. This conviction, however, containing as it did the danger of delusions of genius, opened the way to the excesses of modern romanticism, where abundant merit is claimed for works that spring merely from the author's own belief in their validity. While it remains true that only a trust in his own talent can inspire the effort needed by the artist or writer to give of his best, this trust must be accompanied by standards stemming from an historical appreciation of art and literature, and be capable of being understood by those who attempt creation of this kind. Artistic creation cannot be a mere lifting of oneself up by one's own hair. It must be aided by a knowledge of the past and an ambition to imitate it. For all the originality of the Renaissance, its production of creative work went under the name of *mimesis*.

As Sir Joshua Reynolds put it:

> He who resolves never to ransack any mind but his own, will soon be reduced, from mere barrenness, to the poorest of all imitations; he will be obliged to imitate himself, and to repeat what he has before often repeated.

But this is precisely the position of a modern writer who seeks for originality at all costs,

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and who asserts that he cannot be criticized since he himself knows what he means. In the same way a critic who claims to know what Shakespeare or Milton meant, whatever the text may imply—indeed, that text can be made to mean anything—is not simply trudging around the grooves worn in his own brain, but is undermining a literary tradition dating from the Renaissance.

The rather odd critical exercise known as "deconstruction"—it could well be called "demolition"—is one such attack on civilization. In order to view the culture of the past through the prism of ephemeral political or ethnic prejudices, it destroys the respect for history that the Renaissance left us. In order to claim originality for the crass misunderstanding of a text, it gets rid of the humanist belief that a text can be understood at all. Instead of the painstaking process of interpretation that began with Renaissance scholarship it imports into the study of literature the language and reasoning of daily newspapers. Characters and events must be judged in the light of late twentieth-century values, a process that condemns us to distorting both.

"Deconstruction" and the arbitrary and politicized view of the past that comes with it are, indeed, an "anti-Renaissance," an attack on European civilization with the aim of destroying what it gained from humanism and the recovery of antiquity. The ostensible motive of such an assault is that the past and tradition are no longer "relevant," but this is to make the barbarian assumption that the citizen can neither learn nor enjoy learning. Renouncing history in the name of pedantic egotism, the contemporary critic is in danger of losing the individualism in whose name he laid claim to his right to distort meaning. For to cut loose from the past is to become detached from the definition of self which a knowledge of that past developed. What is at stake is not only the autonomy of culture—the right of the work to be understood on its own terms—but the capacity of human beings to exist independently, to know themselves and live according to that knowledge.

The importance of the invention of history by the Renaissance is now clear. That history contains the DNA code of civilization. For this portion of history gives us a clue, albeit an enigmatic one, as to how European civilization arose and also as to how it might fall. The famous objects of the Renaissance—the Virgin of the Rocks or the Laurentian Library—are not merely beautiful but also significant in the creation of a tradition to be followed.

Other periods too, of course, have been of enormous significance to Western Europe. The Middle Ages lasted over five hundred years and imposed on the length and breadth of what came to be called Christendom a stamp of religion whose external forms have endured until the present day, though its content was also changed by the Renaissance. But the Middle Ages were not conscious of themselves as an historical period. Their chronology was eschatological rather than historical. The joke in the parody of an historical play—"*Nous autres, hommes du Moyen Âge, qui partons pour la Guerre de Cent Ans*"—depends precisely on there being no such realization, (while the famous stage direction in Max Beerbohn's *Savanarola Brown*—"Enter Boccaccio, Benvenuto Cellini, and many others, making remarks highly characteristic of themselves..."—satirizes a bombastic accumulation of fame which is indeed a feature of the Renaissance).

Thus if Western civilization is to survive in a recognizable form, it is Renaissance values that we must defend. The means of ensuring that these values are passed on we call education, which is only effective and civilizing when it conveys a pedagogic tradition and rejects the parochialism of the present. But much of what is called education now is an attack on any tradition at all, in the name of some short-lived and superficial ragbag of beliefs, and on the ground that tradition is by its nature stultifying. "Didactic," we are told, has become a bad word among schoolteachers regardless of the fact that with

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it disappears their own particular mission and status in society. Certainly, in Britain the descent of schoolteachers in social esteem has accompanied their abdication of the right to teach.

For all their defects—their self-importance, their brutality, their spitefulness in controversy, their vanity, their frequent superficiality—the humanists of the Renaissance laid the foundations of a modern culture which has astonishing achievements to its credits. They were not yet scientific, but they were curious, and their writings afforded access to the classical past, which, in turn, brought to them the consciousness of history. What comparable gift is available from the poor ushers who are concerned to teach children (sentimentalized as "kids") their own teenage culture, a parody of themselves? Deprived of the knowledge of a cultural tradition, they are also deprived of self-knowledge.

In the notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci there is a passage, visibly inspired by Plato, where the writer speaks of sitting in front of a dark cavern and, all at once, experiencing two conflicting sensations: "fear because of the dark threatening cavern and desire to see if there were any miraculous thing within it." It is the source of the dynamism of Renaissance man which Leonardo describes so attractively here—an intellectual energy that cannot be lost without putting an end to the vigor of European civilization. Beauty and curiosity combine to build a tradition that has endured. Those who would have us turn our eyes away from the cavern take an appalling responsibility since they are demanding the destruction of the incentive to know. They are the worm at the heart of the fruit. Professor Hale's book is especially welcome at a time when we urgently need a renaissance of our own, a rebirth of knowledge and a reforging of our links with our past. □

Anthony Hartley is a contributing editor to *The National Interest.*

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Stasi Files:

AS I HAVE BEEN doing research based in part on documents drawn from the archives of the East German Ministry of State Security, that is, the Stasi, I read Frederic L. Pryor's "On Reading My Stasi Files" from the Winter 1994/95 issue of *The National Interest* with considerable interest.

Professor Pryor writes that he has "heard of no other prisoners with a full-time informer in the cell; most of the political prisoners were in solitary confinement. Apparently my case was special." Though every case is special, the use of a full-time informer as a cellmate was not unprecedented. I have read the Stasi file concerning Paul Merker, a member of the SED politburo purged in the 1950 Noel Field Affair. In December 1952, following the Slanski trial in Prague, Stasi agents arrested Merker and placed him in "investigative detention." He remained there until March 1955 when, in a secret trial in the East German Supreme Court, he was convicted on bogus charges of participation in an espionage conspiracy in the service of American imperialism, "foreign Jewish capitalists," and Israel.

From December 1952 through March 1953, the Stasi placed an agent in his cell. He recorded his conversations with Merker. Readers interested in further details may consult my article on this subject in the Fall 1994 issue of the *Journal of Contemporary History* as well as a Spring 1994 lecture dealing with the issue available from the German Historical Institute of Washington, D.C. Wolfgang Kiessling, a former East German historian, has published extensive portions of Merker's conversations with the cellmate-informant in his just published *Partner im Narrenparadies: Der Freundkreis um Noel Field und Paul Merkor*, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1994).

Between the time of the Merker case in winter 1952-53 and August 1961, when Frederic Pryor was arrested, there were on average eleven thousand East German political prisoners in any given year. Given such numbers and the use of a cellmate in the Merker case, it is likely that by the time of Pryor's arrest in 1961, the use of a cellmate-informant was part of the Stasi's standard operating procedure.

With full access to the files, historians in Europe and the United States will be able to illuminate this and other important issues. It is therefore most unfortunate that Professor Pryor asks whether "from a public policy perspective does it make any sense to open them?" The primary beneficiaries of closing or limiting access to the files now are the former political leaders and their police servants whose political repression they document.

Contrary to the impression left by Pryor, pressure to open the files did not come primarily from West German politicians seeking to discredit former East German political figures. It came, above all, from East German citizens. Wolfgang Gauck, for example, director of the German government office charged with handling access to the Stasi files, is a former East German human rights advocate.

Frederic Pryor was able to examine the details of the injustice inflicted upon him. Surely he would not want to deny the same right to citizens of the former East Germany, or unintentionally retard the growth of historical knowledge about the East German dictatorship. While continuing to protect the privacy rights of individuals, there remains a compelling "public policy" interest in preserving open access to the Stasi files, and to the government archives of all of the former dictatorships in Central and Eastern Europe.

Jeffrey Herf, member
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Princeton, NJ

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Pryor replies:

JEFFREY HERF'S interesting letter reveals two misunderstandings about my article.

The novel element in my incarceration was not that my cellmate was an ordinary informer, but that he played such an active role in the investigation.

My question about the public policy purpose in opening the secret police files was rhetorical because some difficulties arise in interpreting them. For instance, a Stasi agent wishing to advance his career may have made up information and attributed it to someone else. I favor opening the files, but with safeguards. As far as I can tell, Wolfgang Gauck, who handles access to the Stasi files, is aware of many of these difficulties.

Revisionism Revised:

THE LAST REDOUBT of the mindless ideological thinking that marked the Cold War is America's foreign policy discourse: how else to explain Mr. Rose citing about two chapters of a 33-chapter work only to announce that the whole effort is full of "bizarre conspiracy theories?" Mr. Rose's "favorite" conspiracy theory is my chapter on Dean Acheson's January 1950 Press Club speech. In that chapter I establish, based on unimpeachable, formerly secret materials in English and Korean, that (1) the speech stands up well as an exercise in deterrence when we know that Acheson was trying to deter both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee, not to mention a host of other hotheads along the perimeter of the communist sphere; (2) that when he said publicly "defense perimeter" he said privately (in secret Senate testimony) "great crescent," yielding not a national security strategy but a conception of political economy linking the Middle East with "Island Asia" and Japan; (3) that the best work on deterrence by two generations of political scientists still grossly misconstrues Acheson's purpose; (4) that the North Koreans misread the speech such that South Korea was *included* in the defense perimeter, and (5) that hardly anyone, including the South Koreans, raised objections about the speech at the time—indeed, people squawked mostly about Republicans who were trying to cut off aid to Seoul.

Only then do I indulge in what I call "pleasant speculation" about the American way of going to war, which (for a host of over-determined reasons) is almost always a matter of getting the other guy to jump first. This is part of a long-running debate among historians of our many (all too many) wars, the most interesting and hotly argued having been Henry Stimson's "maneuvering" of the Japanese before Pearl Harbor. I ask if Acheson was likewise "maneuvering" the North Koreans and the Chinese communists, but come to no conclusions; I do not remotely suggest that he "deliberately provoked" the war (Rose, p. 91), but argue that the best offense for Acheson was a good defense, and that he welcomed the war when it came for its effect on his larger purposes—as do most historians of his policies.

According to Mr. Rose, Acheson is the "evil genius" of my account. That I never say; I am closer to arguing that he was a genius in defending the interests of transnational capitalism and Western civilization, two things he did not separate. For Acheson the U.S. was the proper heir of British hegemony, and his goal was to dovetail British decline with American advance. It is characteristic of our imbecilic debates that one can say this with every scholarly attempt at proper substantiation and every human attempt at nuance, only to have a Mr. Rose make the argument appear to be left-wing pamphleteering. Such gross misreading is unfortunate because, I would think, there are long swatches in this work that would appeal to readers of this journal. If I have a specific target, it is the liberal internationalists who took us into both Korea and Vietnam, all the while mocking the foreign policy of American conservatism as so much ignorant nativism, and equating the hard-earned wisdom of a Charles Beard with the ostrich-like ignorance of a John Bircher.

As for the Korean War, which Mr. Rose confidently lays at Kim Il Sung's door, he could

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improve both his book reviews and his understanding of American foreign policy (he is after all working on the National Security Council) by comprehending that our highest leaders have been quite unhappy with such simpleminded historical judgments (except when proffered for public consumption). Let's take John Foster Dulles, for example, who eyeballed Kim Il Sung across the 38th parallel one week before the war began, and years after the war ended continued to worry aloud that the U.S. would not know how a new war might start in Korea, and that Syngman Rhee might well start it. At the 168th Meeting of the NSC in October 1953, Dulles warned that "all our efforts" must be to forestall a resumption of war by Rhee; in 1957 at the 332nd Meeting he still worried that Rhee might "start a war;" two weeks later, "If war were to start in Korea...it was going to be very hard indeed to determine which side had begun the war." But perhaps his comments at an NSC meeting in 1954 are most appropriate for the combination of ideological fervor and naiveté that Mr. Rose displays in abundance: in wondering once again how war might begin in Korea, Dulles

> thought it quite possible that the Communists would launch their attack by infiltrating ROK (Republic of South Korea) units and staging an attack on the Communist lines in order to make it appear as though hostilities had been started on ROK initiative.

I wonder if Mr. Rose's NSC is this perspicacious?

The American statesmen who were "present at the creation" were not conspirators, but they did have ideas, visions, theories, and plans—not to mention a better grasp of the real nature of the conflict in Korea than all but a handful of scholars, utilizing all the benefits of hindsight.

Bruce Cumings
Northwestern University

Rose replies:

PROFESSOR CUMINGS' letter illustrates both his style of argumentation and our differences of opinion.[1] He is quite correct to point out that American policymakers worried about Syngman Rhee's potential for trouble-making. This is why they denied him a significant offensive capability before the Korean War, why they seriously considered sponsoring a coup in South Korea more than once during the conflict itself, and why they watched his behavior closely afterwards. None of this, of course, says anything about what actually happened in the summer of 1950, which is that North Korea invaded South Korea, and not vice versa.

As for Cumings' treatment of Acheson's Press Club speech, it is my "favorite" section of his books precisely because it is such a fine display of both Cumings' gifts and his paranoia. First, using his thorough knowledge of the period and his bracing skepticism, he casts doubt on the conventional interpretation of events. Then he suggests that the truth can be found in the secret thoughts and plottings of a few key players. To be sure, Cumings admits that there is no hard proof that Acheson sought to trigger a North Korean attack so that the U.S. could defend against it; "this is not history," he writes on page 435, "but an absorbing speculation." Yet his protestations above are disingenuous. When his book asks, "In 1950, was Acheson 'maneuvering the North Koreans'?" the question is rhetorical, and the reader comes away with few doubts as to Cumings' answer.

Finally, in addition to disagreeing about the relative influence of economic versus security motives in postwar U.S. policy, Cumings and I differ over the worth of the policies Acheson and his colleagues pursued. I think that an activist U.S. foreign policy in the late 1940s was on balance a very good thing; he apparently disagrees. If Cumings spells out an alternative, readers can decide for themselves how the world might look today if the United States had followed his preferred course. □

[1]Due to a copy-editing error, Bruce Cumings' name was misspelled in last issue's article "The New Cold War Debate." We apologize for the mistake.

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Eternal Clausewitz

Thomas Donnelly

ONE OF THE strengths of Noel Malcolm's essay that opens this issue of *The National Interest* is that it is clearly, if mutedly, a Clausewitzian analysis of the crisis in Bosnia. Readers needn't agree with Malcolm's assessment of the correlation of forces in the former Yugoslavia—that the Bosnian army, "properly armed, and given limited assistance from the air...could have regained the territory itself"—or his contention that preventing the establishment of Greater Serbia was of such interest to the United States or Western Europe to allow for intervention. But they are obliged to appreciate the essential sanity of his larger point: war is an instrument of politics.

I know what you're thinking: here comes another dreadful lecture from a Clausewitz zealot. But one would have thought that in this age, so saturated with politics that art and literature are judged more for their political content than their aesthetic value, that war-as-politics would be an assumption rather than an argument. So why, to paraphrase Malcolm, do we turn to Jung and Freud to explain the confusion of the post-Soviet era?

The phenomenon extends far beyond the Balkans. John Keegan, perhaps the best-known and most widely-read military historian of the day, recently wrote in *U.S. News & World Report* of the "warrior spirit" conferring special determination and fighting skills upon the fighters of Chechnya. These abilities, Keegan argued, were "something that Chechens imbibe with their mothers' milk." The roots of this warriordom spring from Chechen history, geography, blood ties, and the creed of holy war. Is it any wonder, confronted with men who coursed with such warrior vitality, that the poor Russian conscripts had such a hard time?

Keegan is a leading light of the anti-Clausewitz movement—one always strong in Britain, Malcolm notwithstanding—now enjoying a renaissance of sorts. Indeed, the Prussian has taken a beating in recent years. Keegan's recent book, *A History of Warfare*, is his most theoretical and takes the form of an extended argument against Clausewitz. The first sentence reads: "War is not the continuation of policy by other means." Like those politicians and commentators whom Malcolm cites, Keegan is not satisfied with a political explanation of war, and seeks the origins of war in some deeper well of human experience.

His answer is war-as-culture, "culture" being "that great cargo of shared beliefs, values, associations, myths, taboos, imperatives, customs, traditions, manners and ways of thought, speech and artistic expression which ballast every society." While this might seem to be a conservative belief, it is at foundation a liberal one, for underlying Keegan's theory is the view that man can change, that

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progress is possible, that culture without war is emerging. "War," writes Keegan, "may well be ceasing to commend itself to human beings as a desirable or productive, let alone rational, means of reconciling their discontents." He is hopeful about the prospects for international peace-making:

> [T]he fact that the effort is being made betokens a profound change in civilization's attitude to war. The effort at peace-making is motivated not by calculation of political interest but by a repulsion from the spectacle of what war does. The impulse is humanitarian, and though humanitarians are old opponents of war-making, humanitarianism has not before been declared a chief principle of a great power's foreign policy, as it now has been by the United States...."

By contrast, Clausewitz had a professional soldier's deep skepticism about the possibility that man would refrain from war; his view was completely conservative and realist, nearly Hobbesian. And he certainly would have recognized the brutality of Bosnia immediately. To Clausewitz, anger and hatred were at the core of all war-making:

> Savage peoples are ruled by passion, civilized peoples by the mind. The difference, however, lies not in the respective natures of savagery and civilization, but in their attendant circumstances, institutions, and so forth....Even the most civilized peoples, in short, can be fired with passionate hatred for one another.

We run a great risk in thinking that those who have a taste for war-making and combat—the Serbs and Chechens of this world—are somehow fundamentally different from us. Perhaps such peoples are to be restrained and endured more than reasoned with, but in fretting over why they fight we lose track of a more pressing concern: for what do they fight? In focusing on their aims, we can discover the means to moderate their violent behavior.

For Clausewitz, this was the end of strategy; while recognizing the need to master the military arts and sciences, he lampooned "erudite or scholarly officers" who lost sight of what the purpose of war was. What fascinated Clausewitz was the great worry of professional soldiers: not how wars were conducted, but why they ended.

War, for Clausewitz, possessed a dual nature. It was "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" and had its own "laws" and "grammar." In the philosophical language of his time, it was a Kantian "thing-in-itself." This sort of "pure" war had no limits; it was a simple "act of force, and there is no logical limit to an act of force." But pure war was impossible. War could have no reality, no "logic" without the political end for which it was waged, and these political ends would impose limits. Thus, mere military balances could not bring war to an end, or more precisely, "suspend military action." What was needed was a balance of political aims and war-making strength, provoking "a desire to wait for a better moment." As Malcolm observes of the current cease-fire in the former Yugoslavia, both sides feel the need for a quiet period in which to build up their forces.

This set of reasoning should appeal particularly in the post-Cold War world, as the shadow of nuclear annihilation retreats. American strategy-making now requires more than nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union: where we once had one implacable enemy, we have an increasing number of potential enemies-for-the-moment; they are largely unaffected by our nuclear arsenal, so we must compel them to behave as we wish. Normal, complex ways of strategy-making should return, replacing Cold War crisis management or the empty diplomacy that Malcolm chastises.

Not that we should expect permanent results or rapid successes. "War does not consist of a single short blow," warned

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Clausewitz, apparently less than impressed with the popular lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm. He considered that in war the result was never final, for "the defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date." Just as the Russians have never heard the last of the Chechens, nor we the last of Saddam Hussein, nor the Bosnians, Croats and Serbs the last of each other, people will turn to war, not to reconcile their discontents, but to seek redress for their political grievances. □

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